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Abstract
My dissertation builds on the recent work of Douglas Rasmussen, Douglas Den Uyl and
Roderick Long in developing an Aristotelian liberalism. It is argued that a neo-Aristotelian form
of liberalism has a sounder foundation than others and has the resources to answer traditional
left-liberal, postmodern, communitarian and conservative challenges by avoiding certain
Enlightenment pitfalls: the charges of atomism, an a-historical and a-contextual view of human
nature, license, excessive normative neutrality, the impoverishment of ethics and the
trivialization of rights. An Aristotelian theory of virtue ethics and natural rights is developed that
allows for a robust conception of the good while fully protecting individual liberty and pluralism.
It is further argued that there is an excessive focus on what the State can and should do for us;
politics is reconceived as discourse and deliberation between equals in joint pursuit of
eudaimonia (flourishing, well-being, happiness) and its focus is shifted to what we as members
of society can and should do for ourselves and each other.
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Chapter One.
Introduction
Freedom is, in truth, a sacred thing. There is only one thing else that better serves the
name: that is virtue. But then what is virtue if not the free choice of what is good?
– Alexis de Tocqueville
The practical reason for freedom, then, is that freedom seems to be the only condition
under which any kind of substantial moral fibre can be developed.
– Albert Jay Nock

The main purpose of this dissertation is to develop an Aristotelian form of (classical)
liberalism. In doing so I will be building on a burgeoning tradition, the principal proponents of
which include Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl, Roderick Long, Chris Matthew
Sciabarra, Ayn Rand, Fred Miller, and Tibor Machan. In some areas I will be disagreeing with
one or more of these thinkers and in other areas I will be extending Aristotelian liberalism
beyond their work. In the process I will also present and attempt to resolve a number of related
aporiai faced by liberalism, particularly an Aristotelian liberalism.
How is Aristotelian liberalism different from the dominant strains of liberalism which all
have their roots in the Enlightenment? This can only really be answered fully by describing the
essential features and serious flaws of Enlightenment liberalism. This will be done shortly. But a
few things can be said first. Aristotelian liberals hold that man's natural end is a life of
eudaimonia (flourishing, well-being, happiness). We argue that virtue is constitutive of one's
own flourishing but must be freely chosen to count as such. We disagree with social contract
theorists, particularly Hobbes, in our insistence that man is a profoundly social being.
Nevertheless, we argue that individuals are ends-in-themselves and not means to the ends of
others. Enlightenment liberals hold liberty to be the highest political good and defend it and free
markets on various grounds, the two dominant ones being 1) natural rights or 2) consequentialist
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or utilitarian considerations (such as economic efficiency). While Aristotelian liberals take the
natural rights approach, we differ with Enlightenment liberals on the ultimate grounding of these
rights. Enlightenment liberals generally ground rights in self-ownership, some deontological or
rule-consequentialist theory of ethics, or God. Aristotelian liberals ground rights in the
requirements of eudaimonia. This difference has crucial implications that enable Aristotelian
liberalism to avoid the major flaws Enlightenment liberalism’s critics have identified in it as well
as some they have not. Among these advantages are that Aristotelian liberalism is concerned
with more than considerations of political justice, rights, and liberty. It is able to recognize and
account for the broader ethical and cultural foundations and principles necessary in order to bring
about and maintain a free and flourishing society.
In section three of his postscript of The Constitution of Liberty, “Why I Am Not a
Conservative,” Friedrich Hayek wrote:
When I say the conservative lacks principles, I do not mean to suggest that he
lacks moral conviction. The typical conservative is indeed usually a man of very
strong moral convictions. What I mean is that he has no political principles which
enable him to work with people whose moral values differ from his own for a
political order in which both can obey their convictions. It is the recognition of
such principles that permits the coexistence of different sets of values that makes
it possible to build a peaceful society with a minimum of force.1
Rasmussen and Den Uyl have elaborated upon and emphasized this differentia specifica of
liberalism identified by Hayek. They argue that liberalism is unique among political philosophies
in having as a central concern “the problem of how to find an ethical basis for the overall
political/legal structure of society,” namely one that recognizes the value of individual liberty
and can accommodate moral and cultural pluralism and diversity.2 Rasmussen and Den Uyl
claim that this problem should be the central problem of political philosophy, but call it
1
2

Hayek (1978).
Rasmussen and Den Uyl (2005), p. 1. Moral and cultural pluralism and diversity do not necessarily imply moral
relativism, subjectivism, or skepticism.
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“liberalism’s problem” because liberalism has been the only political tradition to recognize its
fundamental importance.3 Liberalism’s solution to this problem is the natural right to liberty and
its logical corollaries, of which more will be said later. Liberalism shows us how diverse moral
value systems can be ethically compossible both within and between societies.
However, many critics and even some defenders of liberalism claim that liberalism is
currently in crisis, if not already breathing its last. Rasmussen and Den Uyl have distilled three
types of criticism faced by liberalism. The first type is comprised of criticisms “that see the
essential character of liberalism as the political expression of principles derived from the
Enlightenment. The failures of the Enlightenment are thus the failures of liberalism, so criticisms
of the Enlightenment are also criticisms of liberalism.”4 Criticisms of this type have been made
by John Gray, Charles Taylor, and Alasdair MacIntyre, among others.
Although Rasmussen and Den Uyl do not say this explicitly, the first critique is often a
component of the second, the communitarian critique, and even sometimes of the third, the
conservative critique. Communitarianism and some forms of conservatism are postmodern
reactions against the excesses of the Enlightenment, but it is nevertheless useful to distinguish
the postmodern critique. This sort of critique also comes both from within and without
liberalism, as some liberals hold that moral relativism or moral skepticism are the only safe
foundations for liberalism. Characteristic of the postmodern type of critique is a distrust of
metaphysics, a denial of Objective Truth, an aversion to philosophical systems, and a wariness of
anything that smacks of connection to totalitarianism. A liberalism grounded in a neoAristotelian philosophy should be able to avoid or answer the metaphysical and epistemological
aspects of the postmodern objection. Likewise, a consistent, rights-oriented Aristotelian

3
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Ibid., pp. 1-3, 78 n. 1.
Ibid., p. 6.
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liberalism cannot in any way be linked with totalitarianism. Liberty, diversity, and pluralism are
not endangered by a rights-oriented Aristotelian liberalism.
The second type “are more directly criticisms of liberalism” and these usually come from
the postliberal view (or more accurately, views) of communitarianism.5 The aforementioned
scholars as well as Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, and Roberto Unger can be included in this
category of criticisms.
These thinkers mainly attack the individual-rights-based orientation of liberalism
in favor of community procedures. At the foundational level the autonomous
rights-bearing individual is rejected and replaced with individuals more fully
formed by, and integrated with, the communities in which they live and act.
Indeed, liberalism is accused of directly undermining communities as well as
being inadequate to their formation.6
While communitarian criticisms of liberalism sometimes hit home, they do not always do so, nor
when they do hit home do they strike with equal force on every version of liberalism.
Communitarians typically attack liberalism as if it were some monolithic political philosophy,
but in reality there are many different kinds of liberalisms, perhaps as many as there are liberals.
Not all forms of liberalism are rights-oriented, for example, as has been noted; many liberals
defend liberalism solely on consequentialist or utilitarian grounds. Ultimately, however,
postmodern and communitarian critiques have shown some liberals the need to find a new
philosophical foundation for liberalism. This is, I think, the impetus behind Aristotelian
liberalism. In the final analysis, however, I will argue in my dissertation in favor of a new form
of liberalism rather than side with communitarianism or postmodernism, for reasons discussed
below.

5

Ibid. Although some of the aforementioned and about to be mentioned thinkers are uncomfortable with the label
communitarian, they do seem to fit at least partly within this category.
6
Ibid., pp. 6-7.
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“Finally, there are a host of ‘conservative’ sources of criticism of liberalism ranging from
natural law theorists, to ‘Straussians’, to so-called Southern agrarians….[A]ll three of these
forms of [conservative] criticism share in the rejection of liberalism’s alleged adherence to
atomism, instrumentalism, individualism, [ethical] neutralism, subjectivism, skepticism, and the
like.”7 Some of these criticisms have already been touched upon and will be addressed again
below. However, two are worth a closer look: instrumentalism and ethical neutralism. These
criticisms are shared by communitarians as well and they are linked to an almost exclusionary
focus on economic, particularly mainstream economic, and rights/freedom-oriented defenses of
liberalism. Ethical considerations beyond material prosperity and/or rights/freedom are all too
frequently ignored by liberals, whether because they are deemed outside the purview of
liberalism or because the liberal wants to avoid the appearance of playing the moralist or because
the liberal honestly believes in moral subjectivism or skepticism or hedonism. Whatever the
reason, the result in the eyes of liberalism’s critics and in practice is the impoverishment of
ethics and the instrumentalization of non-market aspects of society.
Communitarian critics often argue that rights-oriented liberalism privileges the right over
the good. Liberalism assumes, according to Michael Sandel, “that government should be neutral
among competing conceptions of the good life.”8 It is certainly true that liberals hold that no one,
including governments, should threaten or use initiatory physical force in order impose their own
particular conceptions of the good life on others. To do so would be to prevent them from
pursuing the good life and to bias the structure of the political/legal order in favor of particular
forms of flourishing and against others. But it is not necessarily implied by this ethical constraint
on force that everyone should remain neutral on the good. It is not a necessary feature of

7
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Ibid., p. 7.
Sandel (2005), p. 212.
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liberalism that there should be an exclusive focus on justice, liberty, or rights. It is also not a
necessary feature of liberalism to privilege the right over the good. As will be discussed in
greater detail below, Aristotelian liberalism does not. That there has over time been an
increasingly exclusive focus on justice/rights and a privileging of the right over the good can, I
think, be blamed on Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment ethical theory, the leftist-statist turn
in liberalism, an excessive focus on the state and what it can and should do for us, and the
popularity of Kant and Rawls.
To the above three main types or sources of criticism I would also add a fourth:
contemporary left-liberals are generally critical of the politico-economic policies advocated by
contemporary classical liberals (nowadays usually labeled libertarians), particularly the latter’s
strict stance on negative liberty and limited government that rules out social welfare policies and
environmental and economic regulations. Insofar as left-liberals are still liberals, this is in
comparison an internal criticism. With Hayek I take the main disagreement between left-liberals
and classical liberals to be over means rather than ends, but I do not plan to attempt a systematic
defense of classical liberalism at the level of economic theory and history. There is already a vast
literature in this vein and I will be assuming in this dissertation that states and markets operate
essentially in the manner described by free market economists, particularly those of the Austrian
School and also to a lesser extent the Public Choice and Chicago Schools. It bears pointing out,
however, that it is to left-liberalism that the lion’s share of responsibility for the impoverishment
of ethics belongs through its insistence on identifying all social problems as issues of political
justice. The resulting proliferation and trivialization of rights has a necessarily impoverishing
effect on the rest of ethics.

6

Although this trend of left-liberalism did not start with Rawls, he was the first to formally
develop an explicitly political liberalism. In following Kant in privileging the right over the good
and restricting liberalism to considerations of justice (the right) narrowly conceived, Rawls
exacerbated the already existing tendency within liberalism and left-liberalism to focus on
justice/rights and consequently to impoverish ethics and trivialize rights. Classical
liberalism/libertarianism avoids the left-liberal trivialization of rights problem by recognizing the
nature and special function of rights. However, even it has been adversely influenced by Rawls’s
restriction of liberalism to considerations of political justice.
Kukathas and Pettit credit Rawls with the revival of political theory in the third quarter of
the twentieth century.9 They cite Isaiah Berlin’s harsh judgment in 1962, “No commanding work
of political theory has appeared in the 20th century,”10 and point to the academic
institutionalization of the false fact-value dichotomy and scientism as the reason. By mid-century
political theory had withered to the mere study of the history of political thought and the
analytical analysis of groundless values. A Theory of Justice, published in 1971, was the longawaited commanding work.11 However, while the book did perhaps contribute somewhat to the
revival of political theory in terms of revitalizing the discipline, although it could be argued that
political theory is still marginalized in political science departments and is being driven out of
them back into philosophy departments, it has already been noted that in my view it took
political philosophy down a wrong turn. Fortunately, some Rawlsians are starting to correct for
this detour; classical liberal John Tomasi, for example, has recently written a book titled
Liberalism Beyond Justice. But these efforts are still plagued by their roots in Kantian/Rawlsian
deontology. Even Aristotelian liberals Rasmussen and Den Uyl insist in Rawlsian fashion on a
9

Kukathas and Pettit (1990), pp. 5-6.
Quoted in ibid., p. 1.
11
Ibid., pp. 1-6.
10
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strict separation between politics and morality, and a number of prominent libertarians I know
insist that libertarianism is merely a political philosophy in the narrow sense of being solely
concerned with justice, rights, and liberty (e.g., Walter Block and Stephan Kinsella).
In light of the foregoing, my dissertation will have to perform three related tasks. It will
have to develop a version of liberalism that is not vulnerable to familiar postmodern,
communitarian, conservative and left-liberal challenges. It will have to make the case for the
viability and superiority of an Aristotelian form of liberalism. And it will have to answer likely
libertarian criticisms of this move. All three of these tasks can be carried out simultaneously in
most cases.
Let me now highlight some important ways in which my account of Aristotelian
liberalism differs from the afore-mentioned Aristotelian liberals, including how it synthesizes
some disagreements among them or goes beyond them. Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den
Uyl, who have done the most to systematically develop Aristotelian liberalism, have developed
an account of rights that I think is correct as far as it goes but is only partly so. Roderick Long
has developed an account of rights that appears to be very different. I believe that his account too
is correct, but is not the whole story either. The two accounts seem like incompatible
alternatives. Rasmussen and Den Uyl treat rights purely as metanormative principles, meaning
that they are principles that protect the necessary conditions for the possibility of human
flourishing. Long treats rights as interpersonal normative principles required by our own
flourishing qua moral agents, particularly by the virtue of justice. In Chapter Two, “Eudaimonia
and the Right to Liberty: Rights as Metanormative Principles,” I will explicate Rasmussen and Den

Uyl’s account of human flourishing and their theory of rights as well as critique the latter. In
Chapter Three, “Eudaimonia, Virtue and the Right to Liberty: Rights as Both Normative and

8

Metanormative Principles,” I will present Roderick Long’s theory of rights and then I will show

how the two theories can be synthesized to produce a more complete account of rights.
These chapters are the central chapters of my dissertation. Douglas Rasmussen and
Douglas Den Uyl argue that human flourishing has six basic and interrelated features: it is 1)
objective, 2) inclusive, 3) individualized, 4) agent-relative, 5) self-directed, and 6) social. Human
flourishing includes but is not limited to such generic goods as virtue, liberty, health and wealth
as well as virtues such as practical wisdom, courage, temperance, independence, integrity,
honesty, productiveness, justice and generosity. To summarize briefly how I plan to synthesize
the two different accounts of rights held by Rasmussen/Den Uyl and Long: At the structural level
of analysis, the level of political and legal theory, the right to liberty is a metanormative ethical
principle that protects the possibility of self-direction, which is central to and necessary for all
forms of human flourishing, and as such does not bias the structure of the political/legal order in
favor of any form of human flourishing (Rasmussen/Den Uyl). At the personal level of analysis,
the level of ethical theory, the right to liberty is an interpersonal ethical principle derived from
the demands of our own eudaimonia, particularly the virtue of justice: rights-respecting behavior
is a necessary and constitutive part of our own well-being (Long). In order to live a life proper to
a rational animal and to ourselves we ought not to threaten or use initiatory physical force against
others but rather deal with them on a voluntary basis through reason, discourse, persuasion and
cooperation except when necessary to protect our right to liberty.12 No form of eudaimonia truly
worthy of the name will advocate the threat or use of initiatory physical force.
Chapter Three will also discuss other issues related to the right to liberty, such as its
logical corollaries. One such corollary is the right to private property without which the right to
liberty is meaningless. The right to liberty and the right to property are really aspects of the same
12

See Long (1994/95, 2000).
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thing; the former is just explanatorily more fundamental. Additionally, I will discuss such
subjects as the relationship between rights and the law and whether rights trump other ethical
considerations or rather define what cannot count as moral (i.e., what is absolutely immoral) in a
social context.
In Chapter Four, “Eudaimonia and the Basic Goods and Virtues,” I will further develop the
account of human nature and flourishing introduced in the previous chapter chapters. First, I will
address the is-ought problem. Modern ethicists tend to take the supposed insurmountability of
the is-ought gap for granted, but I aim to show how the gap can be bridged by a neo-Aristotelian
philosophy. Then I will address a controversy between Aristotelian liberals and many
Objectivists over what kind of standard for morality human nature provides, a flourishing
standard or a survivalist one. Finally, I will discuss in more detail than the previous chapters the
generic goods and virtues that are essential to ethical theory and, particularly, political
philosophy. The discussion of the generic goods and virtues is one area in which I will be going
beyond Rasmussen and Den Uyl, for while they briefly mention some of the generic goods and
virtues they never go into much detail on them. I think a deeper analysis is necessary in order to
elucidate the ethical and cultural foundations necessary for bringing about and maintaining a free
and flourishing society. This discussion will sketch something of a synthesis of the ideas of
Aristotle, Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl, Roderick Long, and Ayn Rand. There are
aspects of the work of each of these individuals in this area that I find insufficient or incomplete.
I will also present my own original contribution to the literature on individual autonomy. My
account recognizes that there are more subtle forms of coercion than physical force, as well as
other issues, with which liberals must be concerned, but nevertheless holds that these cannot be
ethically or practically combated by violating the rights of others. A discussion of the generic
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goods and virtues essential to ethical theory and political philosophy will be a necessary and
useful foundation for better understanding issues discussed in subsequent chapters.
In Chapter Five, “Liberal and Communitarian Conceptions of Society,” I will attempt to
develop and clarify an Aristotelian-liberal conception of society. Here I will attempt to combine
the positive social analysis of the Austrian economists (particularly Mises, Rothbard, and Hayek)
with Aristotelian-liberal insights (both existing and my own). I conceive of politics, the market,
and the state all as aspects of society, not external intrusions, although the state differs from the
first two in being an organization. Also in this chapter I will explicitly address the criticisms of
liberalism by social liberals and communitarians, particularly Hegel, Alasdair MacIntyre, and
T.H. Green. And I will critique there conceptions of society and state in turn. Against the
communitarian conception of society will be posited an Aristotelian-liberal conception of the
Great Society (or Global Society), its major institutions, and its myriad levels of overlapping
associations, communities and organizations. While some communitarian criticisms of liberalism
have hit home to varying degrees, communitarians have been unable to provide alternatives that
are clearly defensible and avoid the specters of paternalism and totalitarianism. This chapter is
necessary for answering communitarian criticisms of liberalism, for much of the disagreement
hinges upon a differing conception of society, and to serve as a foundation for better
understanding the chapters to follow.
In Chapter Six, “The New Left and Participatory Democracy,” with the aim of reexamining the nature of politics, democracy and the state, I will sketch a brief history of
liberalism to put it into historical perspective and then discuss the New Left revolt against liberal
corporatism. And I will draw important lessons in the course of doing so. To show my hand
early, one is that the New Left movement, although not perfect, was far more in keeping with
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liberalism’s radical roots than liberal corporatism. In fact, liberal corporatism is not truly liberal
at all, but rather represents a continuation in modern capitalist drag of the traditional status
society liberalism originally arose to combat. The history of liberalism and the New Left teaches
of the evils and inefficiencies of the bureaucratic managerial state and manipulative statist
democracy. It also teaches that there are non-statist alternatives to social problems. And it
teaches of the dangers radical movements from co-option by the ruling elites, especially when
they lack a consistent, systematic anti-statist ideology.
In Chapter Seven, “Immanent Politics and the Pursuit of Eudaimonia,” I will challenge
the tendency of Enlightenment liberals, and even Aristotelian liberals Rasmussen and Den Uyl,
to separate politics from morality. The trouble with statist conceptions of politics, which most
conceptions of politics are, is that the extent to which public policy is moralized it must come at
the expense of liberty. Thus, for liberals who accept a statist conception of politics, politics must
be restricted to protecting the rights to life, liberty and property. Liberty, not virtue or human
flourishing in general, becomes the highest end of politics. Flourishing becomes a personal and
social issue, separate from politics but protected and encouraged by the fertile soil of liberty. But
the highest end of politics for Aristotle is human flourishing. How then can Aristotle and
liberalism be reconciled on this level? Reconciliation can begin by recognizing that Aristotle
conflated state and society in a way that is untenable today. Moreover, the ancient Greek polis
was nothing more than a small city by today’s standards, a direct democracy with largely
customary laws and private enforcement of legal decisions. In Aristotle’s polis, politics involved
discourse and deliberation between equals in joint pursuit of eudaimonia. Aristotelian politics is
not possible in modern democratic and non-democratic states.13 I will also argue that politics

13

Cf. Aristotle, Politics VII.4 1325b33-1326b25. While globalization of markets stemming from capital
accumulation and technological advances in communication and transportation have made it possible for smaller
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presupposes liberty and therefore the proper locus of politics is civil society, not the state. My
account of an explicitly non-statist, eudaimonist politics is to my knowledge unique, although it
does receive its inspiration from several disparate sources: Aristotle, libertarian market
anarchism, and the New Left. It will aim to show how politics and morality are intimately related
but nevertheless that true politics presupposes liberty and so libertarians need not worry that this
opens the door for state intervention.
To reiterate and provide a slightly more extended summary of my arguments in Chapters
Six and Seven – the state will be taken to task as a problematic, and indeed anti-social,
institution. Here I will follow Albert Jay Nock’s distinction between government and the state.14
On this view, government is an institution or set of institutions that are truly voluntary and
rights-respecting and protecting; the state, by contrast, claims a territorial monopoly on the legal
use of force and ultimate decision-making. It will be argued that the right to liberty is inalienable
and therefore slavery contracts are illegitimate. It will be further argued that for the same reasons
so too is the state. The master/state accepts or claims the power of arbitrary dominion over the
slave/subject, a power that the master/state cannot rightfully exercise and the slave/subject
cannot rightfully grant.
It will then be argued that the essential characteristic and primary purpose of politics is
the joint pursuit of eudaimonia – specifically, politics is discourse and deliberation between
equals in joint pursuit of eudaimonia. The particular institutions within which politics is
conducted vary, but there are at least two conditions necessary for politics to take place: direct
participation and individual liberty. Politics ceases to be immanent, and becomes increasingly

groups to be economically self-sufficient than Aristotle probably could have imagined, I do not think these
developments have made it possible for appreciably larger political communities than he envisioned to function
well.
14
Nock (2001), pp. 45-48.
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vicarious until it is nonexistent or is replaced by despotical rule, under at least three conditions:
1) the extent that it is conducted only by representatives, 2) the extent to which discourse and
deliberation are separated from their culmination in direct action, and 3) the extent that rightsviolating behavior (the threat or use of initiatory physical force) pervades the relationship. Much
of what passes for politics in modern states takes place only among representatives and involves
rights-violating behavior or policies. Thus politics, an important means of pursuing eudaimonia,
is highly vicarious in even the freest of modern states. Moreover, the tendency among liberals to
limit liberalism and politics to considerations of justice narrowly conceived, and to radically
separate politics and morality, is misguided – for politics presupposes liberty, and the right to
liberty precludes the threat or use of initiatory physical force. Political-democratic-civic debate
over our responsibilities to ourselves and each other can only truly take place within the context
of individual liberty. As Lavoie and Chamlee-Wright point out:
To do away with the principle of voluntary action, no matter how worthy the end,
is to annihilate freedom and to institute slavery. When the challenge of social
responsibility is made in the arena of civic debate, this is no longer a problem, as
any action taken in response to those claims would be voluntary.15
Statist policies such as wealth redistribution, economic regulation and morals legislation are all
unjust in this view; liberty and pluralism are not threatened by Aristotelian liberalism’s more
robust conceptions of ethics and politics.
From the foregoing, it will be argued that immanent politics, deliberative-participatory
democracy,16 and the flourishing of spontaneous voluntary associations à la Tocqueville's
America are necessary for and conducive toward human flourishing, whereas a reliance on the
institutions of the representative welfare-warfare state is not. My conception of immanent
politics transcends the false dichotomy between ancient liberty, which consists primarily in
15
16

Lavoie and Chamlee-Wright (2000), p. 116.
Participatory democracy is an idea drawn from the New Left; see Long (1969) and Teodori (1969).
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direct political participation, and modern liberty, which consists primarily of an individual’s
rights over and against society.17 Liberals need not give up direct political participation as an
important part of liberty. Indeed, excessive division of labor and centralization in politics and
security production, which is encouraged by representative government in an extended republic,
will serve to undermine the conditions necessary for the safeguarding and flourishing of liberty.
As I will argue in Chapter Six, representative government, especially in a territorially extensive
country, promotes a politically inactive and submissive citizenry, the growth of a professional
political class (state’s men) and encourages the use of statist solutions to problems that should be
solved by private initiative and voluntary cooperation. And majoritarian democracy is a
collectivist form of governance that leads to the tyranny of the majority over the minority despite
constitutional safeguards.18 Thus, by rejecting the state and shifting the locus of politics, my
account of politics and democracy accommodates, without giving entirely into, communitarian
concerns about civic participation and community procedures in a way that minarchist
Aristotelian liberals (Rasmussen, Den Uyl, Rand, etc.) cannot and it does so without
compromising liberalism’s commitment to liberty, pluralism and diversity.
No defense of liberalism would be complete, insofar as any defense can be complete,
without a defense of free markets and free enterprise. In Chapter Eight, “Free Markets and Free
Enterprise: Their Ethical and Cultural Foundations and Principles,” I will depart from most
libertarian defenses of free markets, which are usually restricted to considerations of
rights/freedom or economic efficiency, by also elucidating the moral principles expressed in
various market activities, exploring the ethical and cultural foundations necessary for free
markets, and making a case for the educative function of free markets in encouraging certain
17
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virtues and discouraging certain vices. Little has been done in any of these three areas, especially
systematically, even by Aristotelian liberals. One possible exception of the latter is Ayn Rand,
but Rand tends to focus too much on an idealized picture of the capitalist-entrepreneur and does
not sufficiently consider how truly free markets might be different from state-regulated
capitalism.19 Early in the chapter I will highlight the fundamental difference between mainstream
neoclassical economics and Austrian economics in terms of philosophical foundations and
methodology. The common criticisms of economics and free markets discussed above are valid
when applied to mainstream economics but completely miss their mark if applied to Austrian
economics. In the chapter I will briefly go over just enough positive economic theory to
undertake the abovementioned normative tasks. I will discuss production, consumption and
exchange; property, contracts and credit; savings and investment vs. consumption; the business
firm (in which I will critique the stakeholder literature in the field of business ethics); and the
negative effects of the state and state intervention in the market on morality and culture. A sharp
distinction will of course be made between state-regulated capitalism and the free market.
Finally, Chapter Eight, the Conclusion, will revisit the aporiai discussed here in the
introduction and summarize how they have been resolved. Additionally, the conclusion will
address the possible objections by critics that the account of Aristotelian liberalism presented is
utopian and, by Voegelinians in particular, that it is Gnostic. Then, in the final section, I will
discuss future avenues of research from the groundwork laid by my dissertation.
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A Brief Note on Metaphysics, Epistemology and Methodology
The account of Aristotelian liberalism presented here makes no reference to a
supernatural being. I leave it to the reader to adapt this account to his conception of God, if he so
desires. It might be wondered how in the absence of such a reference one could still plausibly
make any claim to having identified lasting, universal and general truths. To this objection at
least two related responses can be given: 1) Natural law philosophers have recognized that
reason is capable of grasping first principles even if God does not exist. 2) One might make
recourse to the 19th Century Scottish common sense philosophers to provide some sort of
coherentist “foundation,” but this is not really necessary. The natural law theorists can trace their
roots back to Aristotle who also happens to be the common sense philosopher par excellence.
One can posit a systematic order of natural laws discoverable by reason without thereby
being committed to any particular explanation for its origin. Catholic natural law theorists such
as St. Thomas Aquinas and the late Scholastics, and even the Protestant jurist Hugo Grotius,
have upheld this position. The Jesuit Francisco Suarez, one of the Spanish Scholastics of the late
sixteenth century, argued that “even though God did not exist, or did not make use of His reason,
or did not judge rightly of things, if there is in man such a dictate of reason to guide him, it
would have had the same nature of law as it now has” and noted that many Scholastics “seem
therefore logically to admit that natural law does not proceed from God as a lawgiver, for it is
not dependent on God’s will.”20 Grotius says in his De Iure Belli ac Pacis (1625): “What we
have been saying would have a degree of validity even if we should concede that which cannot
be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God.” He adds: “Measureless as is
the power of God, nevertheless it can be said that there are certain things over which that power
20
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does not extend. . . . Just as even God cannot cause that two times two should not make four, so
He cannot cause that which is intrinsically evil be not evil.”21
The Aristotelian liberal account presented in this dissertation is a species of natural law
ethics in the sense that it is grounded in the nature of reality, particularly the nature of man. The
modern Thomist philosopher Thomas E. Davitt, S.J., agrees with this general approach:
If the word “natural” means anything at all, it refers to the nature of a man, and
when used with “law,” “natural must refer to an ordering that is manifested in the
inclinations of a man’s nature and to nothing else. Hence, taken in itself, there is
nothing religious or theological in the “Natural Law” of Aquinas.22
D’Entrèves concludes from this that:
[Grotius’s] definition of natural law has nothing revolutionary. When he
maintains that natural law is that body of rules which Man is able to discover by
the use of his reason, he does nothing but restate the Scholastic notion of a
rational foundation of ethics. Indeed, his aim is rather to restore that notion which
had been shaken by the extreme Augustinianism of certain Protestant currents of
thought. When he declares that these rules are valid in themselves, independent of
the fact God willed them, he repeats an assertion which had already been made by
some of the schoolmen.23
And through Aquinas this approach traces back to Aristotle who placed great importance on the
nature of man as a rational and political animal.
Aristotelian and Thomist philosopher Henry Veatch has argued that Aristotle is the
common sense philosopher par excellence.24 Aristotle would have no patience with certain
fashions of modernity such as Cartesian radical doubt and questions of whether we, others and
the world exist or not. The default common sense position on these issues is that, absent good
reasons and evidence to the contrary, of course we, others and the world exist. Of course we are
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not merely “a complicated series of occurrences, bound together by causal laws.”25 Though of
course there are arguments that can be and have been made against such counterintuitive
positions as these. With regard to the counterintuitive views held by others in his own time,
Aristotle provided detailed arguments “to show precisely how and where they had gone astray,”
for example:
in showing what was wrong with the Parmenidean arguments that all change was
impossible; or with Plato’s arguments that there could be no such things as men
except as they participated in that perfect and immutable form of Man himself; or
with Heraclitus’ contention that since all things were changing, it was impossible
for anything ever to be anything, or to have any determinate nature and character
at all. In all such cases, Aristotle recognized the need to meet his philosophical
opponents more or less on their own grounds, to weigh their arguments as
carefully as possible in preparation for trying to answer and refute them. Still, his
initial suspicions in regard to any and all scientific or philosophical views were
most likely to be prompted if it seemed that such views could not in the long run
stand the test of the sound common sense of mankind in general.26
Perhaps more to the point, Aristotle does not begin his philosophizing with first principles.
Rather, he begins with “appearances” (phainomena; the empirical data of sense-perception) and
reputable beliefs (endoxa). Reputable beliefs are those opinions “which are accepted by everyone
or by the majority or by the wise – i.e., by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and
reputable of them.”27
Although Aristotle starts with phainomena and endoxa, he does not always end with
them. We can interpret the data of sense-perception incorrectly. Reputable beliefs can be wrong.
Aristotle proceeds by a process of induction (in the classical, not the modern, sense) from these
starting points up to first principles and from first principles proceeds by deduction to more
rigorous conclusions. Aristotle gives a brief account of induction and deduction in Nicomachean
Ethics 1139b25-31:
25
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And all teaching starts from what is already known, as we maintain in the
Analytics28 also; for it proceeds sometimes through induction and sometimes by
deduction. Now induction is of first principles and of the universal and deduction
proceeds from universals. There are therefore principles from which deduction
proceeds, which are not reached by deduction; it is therefore by induction that
they are acquired.29
The dialectic process, through questioning and answering, traces the implications and resolves
the conflicts between our beliefs. For Aristotle, our reputable beliefs count as knowledge
(gnôsis) as long as they can withstand dialectical scrutiny and cohere in the manner just
described. But the justificatory process ultimately proceeds through dialectical ascent up from
reputable beliefs to first principles. Deduction from first principles results in more rigorous and
well-founded conclusions, representing a higher standard of knowledge called scientific
explanation or understanding (epistêmê).
Clearly Aristotle is not a Cartesian-style foundationalist, for he denies that we should
start with first principles. He does seem to be something of a foundationalist, however, for
scientific understanding is derived from foundational beliefs. On the other hand, the dialectical
process brings to mind not foundationalism but coherentism, usually posited as an alternative to
foundationalist theories of knowledge and justification. Aristotelian philosopher Roderick Long
argues that Aristotle is actually “a coherentist about knowledge and justification, but a
foundationalist about (scientific) explanation.” But there are different kinds of foundationalism
and coherentism. He briefly defines them thusly:
Foundationalism: Beliefs are epistemically justified either by belonging to or by
being derived (finitely, noncircularly) from a class or self-justifying beliefs.
Classical foundationalism: Foundationalism is true, and all foundational
beliefs are indefeasible.
Neoclassical foundationalism: Foundationalism is true, and some
foundational beliefs are defeasible.

28
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See also Posterior Analytics II.19. Emphasis in original.
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Narrow foundationalism: Foundationalism is true, and only a privileged
subset of our beliefs are foundational.
Broad foundationalism: Foundationalism is true, and all, or nearly all, our
beliefs are foundational.
Coherentism: Beliefs are epistemically justified so long as, and to the extent that,
they cohere with one another.
Negative coherentism: Coherentism is true, and beliefs cohere as long as
they do not conflict with one another.
Positive coherentism: Coherentism is true, and beliefs cohere only if, in
addition to not conflicting with one another, they positively support one
another.
Long points out that “negative coherentism and neoclassical broad foundationalism are
essentially equivalent. And it is this view that [he] attributes to Aristotle.”30 A coherentism
without non-arbitrary first principles to ascend to would seem to become mired in infinite regress
or vicious circularity, and these are possibilities that Aristotle firmly rejects as insufficient.31
Some postmodernists try to do without foundations altogether, while others recognize the
need for them and proceed to go in search of elusive “foundations without foundationalism.” I
would think that the foregoing account of Aristotle’s negative coherentism on knowledge and
justification and neoclassical broad foundationalism on scientific understanding would be
attractive, or at least plausible, to at least the latter sort of postmodernist. In order to avoid an
extreme skepticism that undermines the validity of all knowledge we have need of at least some
indefeasible foundations. The account of Aristotelian liberalism presented in this dissertation
depends upon a minimalist metaphysics ultimately grounded in a handful of axiomatic concepts
and laws. At the very foundational core I follow Rand’s identification of three axiomatic
concepts: Existence, Consciousness and Identity.
Existence exists – and the act of grasping that statement implies two corollary
axioms: that something exists which one perceives and that one exists possessing
consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists.
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If nothing exists, there can be no consciousness: a consciousness with nothing to
be conscious of is a contradiction in terms. A consciousness conscious of nothing
but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as
consciousness, it had to be conscious of something. If that which you claim to
perceive does not exist, what you possess is not consciousness.
To exist is to be something, as distinguished from the nothing of non-existence, it
is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes. . . . A is A. A
thing is itself. . . . Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification.32
Consciousness, as a state of awareness, is not a passive state, but an active
process[.]33
[M]an is an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and
consciousness[.]34
Identity is also the first law of thought: the Law of Identity. Its logical corollaries are the Law of
Non-Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle.
Each of these axiomatic concepts and laws is irrefutable – for in the very act of denying
them one implicitly accepts their truth, thereby engaging in a practical or performative
contradiction. These are first principles and so they cannot be arrived at by deductive proof but
rather are arrived at by induction. Though they cannot be proven or demonstrated in that strict
deductive sense, Aristotle shows how they can nevertheless be defended by way of negative
demonstration, which was just described two sentences previous. Aristotle defines the Law of
Non-Contradiction as stating “that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not
belong to the same subject in the same respect.”35 If this law were not true, and if one denies this
law, then it is impossible to say anything intelligible and the very basis of all knowledge is
undercut. Aristotle’s negative demonstration of the law is rather long and detailed, but this
excerpt I think captures the gist of it:
32
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Again, is he in error who judges either that the thing is so or that it is not so, and
is he right who judges both? If he is not right, what can they mean by saying that
the nature of existing things is not of this kind? And if he is not right, but more
right than he who judges in the other way, being will already be of a definite
nature, and this will be true, and not at the same time also not true. But if all are
alike both right and wrong, one who believes this can neither speak nor say
anything intelligible; for he says at the same time both ‘yes’ and ‘no’. And if he
makes no judgement but thinks and does not think, indifferently, what difference
will there be between him and the plants? – Thus, then, it is in the highest degree
evident that neither any one of those who maintain this view nor anyone else is
really in this position. For why does a man walk to Megara and not stay at home
thinking he ought to walk? Why does he not walk early some morning into a well
or over a precipice, if one happens to be in his way? Why do we observe him
guarding against this, evidently not thinking that falling in is alike good and not
good? Evidently he judges one thing to be better and another worse. And if this is
so, he must judge one thing to be man and another to be not-man, one thing to be
sweet and another to be not-sweet. For he does not aim at and judge all things
alike, when, thinking it desirable to drink water or to see a man, he proceeds to
aim at these things; yet he ought, if the same thing were alike man and not-man.
But, as was said, there is no one who does not obviously avoid some things and
not others. Therefore, it seems, all men make unqualified judgements, if not about
all things, still about what is better and worse. And if this is not knowledge but
opinion, they should be all the more anxious about the truth, as a sick man should
be more anxious about his health than one who is healthy; for he who has
opinions is, in comparison with the man who knows, not in a healthy state as far
as the truth is concerned.36
Avicenna seems a tad less patient than Aristotle with those who would deny the Law of NonContradiction: “Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned
until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the
same as not to be burned.”37
My account of Aristotelian liberalism is distinguished by its combined praxeological and
dialectical analysis. Praxeology is the general science of human action, the distinctive method of
the Austrian school of economics. It is an ontological discipline that undertakes “the formal [or
conceptual] analysis of human action in all of its aspects.”38 It is, I think, the proper foundation
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for economics (its most developed branch) as well as ethics and epistemology.39 Praxeology’s
internally related counterpart and compliment is the thymological method of understanding
(verstehen; or hermeneutical psychology).40 Austrian economics, unlike classical and
neoclassical economics, is not primarily concerned with wealth, with the fabrication of things,
and comparison of static states. Rather, it is concerned with the meaning of human action, the
pursuit of ends with scarce means, and the market as a process. In other words, its subject is
homo agens not homo œconomicus.
Praxeology presupposes metaphysical and methodological individualism, both of which
are features of Aristotelian philosophy. A quotation from Eduard Zeller should suffice for now as
a synopsis of my metaphysical, epistemological, ethical and political claims, although I will
disagree with a point or two:
In this [Aristotle’s] opposition to the Platonic socialism we shall not only
recognize Aristotle’s practical sense, his clear insight into the laws and conditions
of actual life, his aversion to all ethical onesidedness and his deep knowledge of
human nature and of social life, but we shall not fail to observe that here, as in
Plato, the political views are closely connected with the principles of the
metaphysical system. Plato had demanded the abolition of all private possession
and the suppression of all individual interests, because it is only in the Idea or
Universal that he acknowledges any title to true reality. Aristotle refuses to follow
him here. To him the Individual is the primary reality, and has the first claim to
recognition. In his metaphysics individual things are regarded, not as the mere
shadows of the idea, but as independent realities; universal conceptions not as
independent substances, but as the expression for the common peculiarity of a
number of individuals. Similarly in his moral philosophy he transfers the ultimate
end of human action and social institutions from the State to the individual, and
looks for its attainment in his free self-development. The highest aim of the State
consists in the happiness of its citizens. The good of the whole rests upon the
good of the citizens who compose it. In like manner must the action by which it is
to be attained proceed from the individual of his own free will. It is only from
within through culture and education, and not by compulsory institutions, that the
unity of the State can be secured. In politics as in metaphysics the central point
39
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with Plato is the Universal, with Aristotle the Individual. The former demands
that the whole should realize its ends without regard to the interests of
individuals: the latter that it should be reared upon the satisfaction of all
individual interests that have a true title to be regarded.41
The moderate individualism of Aristotle and praxeology cannot be construed as atomistic and
does not preclude non-reductionist analysis of society, culture, markets and states, etc.
Nonetheless, it is human beings who act, not society; individuals exist within society for their
own sakes, not for the sake of society or the state; and they are not wholly determined by the
society in which they happen to be born.
By dialectics, of course, I do not mean in the Hegelian sense but rather in the original
Socratic and, primarily, Aristotelian sense of the word. Chris Matthew Sciabarra, a former
doctoral student of the well-known dialectical Marxist Bertell Ollman, but himself a self-styled
dialectical libertarian, defines dialectics as a methodological “orientation toward contextual
analysis of the systemic and dynamic relations of components within a totality. A totality is not
simply an undifferentiated or all-encompassing whole. It is a specific whole as understood from
– and structured by – shifting perspectives.”42 In short, dialectics is the art of context-keeping.
This sense of dialectics as a methodological orientation is distinct from the more specific
dialectical method of questioning and discussion employed by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.
Sciabarra sees Aristotle as a dialectical thinker in the former sense as well. This dialectical
approach is exemplified in all of Aristotle’s writings and is explicitly explained in his Topics and
Sophistical Refutations. Aristotle says in the Topics that dialectics “is a process of criticism
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wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.”43 And in the Sophistical Refutations he
distinguishes between dialectic as a method of questioning and dialectic as “a mode of
examination as well.”44 In these works, Aristotle places an emphasis on context in the analysis of
any problem by means of examining them from shifting points of view. See, for example, his
discussion of ways to show “that the whole is not the same as the sum of its parts” in sections 13
and 14 of Book VI of the Topics.45
Sciabarra argues that Ayn Rand was a dialectical thinker who analyzed social phenomena
on three conceptually distinct but interrelated levels of generality, which he reconstructs as: 1)
the personal (psycho-epistemological, ethical), 2) the cultural (linguistic, ideological), and 3) the
structural (economic, political, legal).46 In analyzing social phenomena, the analyst can focus on
one of these levels while shifting the other two into the background but never treating them as
separate from each other and the focus level or completely ignoring them, for all three levels are
necessary to fully understand the whole. The analyst can then shift focus to each of the other
levels in turn to gain a more complete and contextual understanding. As one example in which I
will be using such dialectical analysis, Sciabarra’s work on dialectical social analysis inspired
my synthesis of the two different accounts of rights provided by Rasmussen and Den Uyl on the
one hand and Long on the other. I propose that rights can be analyzed at each of these three
levels as well. A conception of rights that includes only one or two of these levels is incomplete
and insufficiently contextual. To analyze rights from only one or two, but not all three, levels
will result in an incomplete and insufficiently contextual analysis.
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Chapter Two.
Eudaimonia and the Right to Liberty:
Rights as Metanormative Principles
However much we love reconciliation, there are two principles that cannot be reconciled: liberty
and coercion.
– Frederic Bastiat, Economic Harmonies
Simplicity and truth of character are not produced by the constraint of laws, nor by the authority of
the state, and absolutely no one can be forced or legislated into a state of blessedness; the means
required are faithful and brotherly admonition, sound education, and, above all, free use of the
individual judgment.
– Benedict de Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue.
Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous
vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others,
without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder,
theft and such like.
– Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Question 96, Second Article

Introduction
An Aristotelian liberalism promises to offer a radically different foundation for rights
than has heretofore prevailed in the liberal tradition. This is because Aristotelian virtue ethics
entails a radically different approach to the right and the good than do modern ethical theories.
Modern ethical theories tend to focus on moral properties, on rules or consequences, on the
moral recipient or patient1 (be it an individual, society-as-a-whole or certain classes of it). In
contrast to typically modern demand-side approaches to morality and rights, Aristotelian-liberal
virtue ethics, like the virtue ethics of Aristotle, offers a supply-side approach: it focuses on the
moral agent – his character and his actions. As Roderick Long explains: “According to a
demand-side ethics, the way that A should treat B is determined primarily by facts about B, the
patient of moral activity; but for a supply-side approach like Virtue Ethics, the way that A should
1
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treat B is determined primarily by facts about A, the agent of moral activity.”2,3 The central
question of a eudaimonistic virtue ethics is not “What consequences should I promote?” or
“What rules should I follow?” but rather “What kind of person should I be?”4
Modern natural rights theories – from Locke (classical liberal) to Robert Nozick and
Murray Rothbard (contemporary liberals or libertarians) – tend to be demand-side accounts of
rights. They tend to focus on facts about the moral recipient in explaining their derivation,
function and justification. On such an account, rights identify the freedoms men require in order
to be able to take the actions they judge they must if they are to survive and even prosper,
without infringing on other persons’ equal freedom to do likewise. Rights, if respected and
protected, minimize that most anti-social form of conflict, violence, by prohibiting the threat or
use of initiatory physical force. A society in which rights are respected and protected promotes
long-range planning and mutual trust, enables complex commercial transactions and partnerships
between relative strangers, and makes possible friendships that are truly deep and meaningful
precisely because they are chosen. A truly free market society is not a zero-sum game, operating
according to the laws of a Hobbesian jungle, in which people compete over shares of a fixed pie
such that in order for some to win, others must lose. Rather, a truly free market society is a
positive-sum game, really no game at all, in which individual achievements make the pie larger
and richer.

2
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Nozick adds an additional explanation, which is in his view the primary foundation of
rights, viz., that rights are a recognition of the fact that we are all separate persons.
There are only individual people [and no social entity apart from them], different
individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for
the benefit of others, uses him and benefits others. Nothing more. What happens
is that something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social
good covers this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person in this way does not
sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that
his is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from his
sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him – least of all a state or
government that claims his allegiance (as other individuals do not) and that
therefore scrupulously must be neutral between its citizens.5
Thus, if I were to treat you as a mere means, rather than as an end-in-yourself, I would not be
respecting you as a person. And we all need and deserve such respect. However, as Rasmussen
and Den Uyl point out, a major flaw in Nozick’s theory is that “the inviolability of the individual
cannot be based on simply the ontological difference of individuals or the separateness of their
lives.”6
It is not that these accounts of rights are fundamentally wrong. Rather, they are very
much right as far as they go. It is just that they are incomplete. These are accounts of rights that
treat of the individual qua moral recipient, not qua moral agent. They deal with what is necessary
to protect the conditions of human flourishing. From this position, an individual’s rights qua
moral recipient entail moral obligations in others, rather than the other way around, i.e., of an
individual’s moral obligations qua moral agent entailing that others have rights against him.
These accounts fail to sufficiently link rights-respecting behavior to human flourishing and, in
particular, to virtue. As we shall see in the sections that follow and in the subsequent chapter,
even Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl, two prominent Aristotelian liberals seem to fall
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prey to this mistake.7 We turn now, however, to a discussion on the nature of human flourishing.
The section that follows is heavily indebted to the work of Rasmussen and Den Uyl.

Human Flourishing
Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl argue that eudaimonia or human flourishing
has six basic and interrelated features: it is 1) objective, 2) inclusive, 3) individualized, 4) agentrelative, 5) self-directed, and 6) social.8 Arguably, Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia
incorporates all of these features. The differences in the neo-Aristotelian account herein
described lie in the greater emphasis on the individualized nature of flourishing, the open-ended
and potentially cosmopolitan nature of human sociality, and the greater recognition of the
importance of liberty to human flourishing.
According to the Aristotelian-liberal account presented here, human flourishing is
objective. Desire plays an important role in eudaimonia and virtue. However, flourishing is “an
object of desire because it is desirable and choice-worthy, not simply because it is desired or
chosen.”9 Flourishing as the ultimate good must be understood in a biocentric context. It is both a
way of living and, because flourishing is more than mere survival, a way of living.10 As Philippa
Foot points out: “The structure of the derivation is the same whether we derive an evaluation of
the roots of a particular tree or the action of a particular human being. The meaning of the words
'good' and 'bad' is not different when used in features of plants on the one hand and humans on
the other, but is rather the same applied, in judgments of natural goodness and defect, in the case
of all living things.”11
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Flourishing is activity expressive and productive of the actualization of potentialities
specific to the being's natural kind, including both its universal and its unique particular aspects.
A human being is a rational animal, but he is also a rational animal with a particular set of
physical and mental abilities and talents peculiar to himself as well as a unique social and
historical context and his own personal choices. All of these are factors in an individual's own
eudaimonia; more on this will be said in the discussion of the individualized nature of human
flourishing, however.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl observe: “Ontologically considered, human flourishing is an
activity, an actuality, and an end (or function) that is realized (or performed) through choice.
Human flourishing is not the mere possession of needed goods and virtues.”12 It is a self-directed
activity: flourishing, and all of the goods and virtues that constitute it, exist as such only through
a person's own efforts. Finally, in a teleological theory, flourishing, as the ultimate end, “is thus
ultimately the standard by which human desires, wishes, and choices, are evaluated.”13
Human flourishing is an inclusive end, not a dominant or exclusive one. As Rasmussen
and Den Uyl argue, human flourishing “is the ultimate end of human conduct, but it is not the
only activity of inherent worth. It is not a 'dominant' end that reduces the value of everything else
to that of a mere means to it.”14 It is plural and complex, not monistic and simple. To quote J. L.
Ackrill, it is “the most final end and is never sought for the sake of anything else, because it
includes all final ends.”15 Human flourishing is inclusive in that it consists of basic or, to use
Rasmussen and Den Uyl's term, “generic” goods and virtues. Goods such as those listed by
Aristotle in Rhetoric 1362b10-28: for example, justice, knowledge, friendship, health, wealth,
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and honor. Virtues such as justice, courage, temperance, and generosity. These goods and virtues
are final ends and intrinsically valuable; and they are expressions or constitutive of flourishing as
well as partial realizations of it.16 This is possible because flourishing is a “continuous process of
living well,” not a future good received at the end of one's life or a good that, once achieved, is
never lost;17 hence, in part, Aristotle's pointed addendum, “in a complete life.”18
Human flourishing is highly individualized. Aristotle recognized this to some extent as
evidenced by his recognition of the importance of both the universal and the particular, in
philosophy in general and in ethics and politics in particular. For Aristotle, the good is “that at
which all things aim.”19 This is a universal conceptual truth. But he also recognized that the good
is different for different things. The natural end of one species is different from that of another.
The natural end or good for a particular profession or pursuit will be different from that of
another.20 Even at the individual level Aristotle recognizes important differences from one
person to another. One specific manifestation of this lies in his discussion of his doctrine of the
mean as it pertains to virtue. Virtue is right action, the mean between the two extremes of excess
and deficiency (vices), relative to us. The inclusion of ‘relative to us’ is key. Aristotle’s ethical
theory is also sensitive to the particular contexts in which action takes place. Aristotle says of our
emotions: it is a mark of excellence to feel them “at the right time, toward the right object,
toward the right people, for the right reason, and in the right manner.” He then adds that this is
true of actions as well.21 Virtue involves both right emotion and right action.22 On the other hand,
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Aristotle seems to endorse just one way of life as the best – depending on interpretations either
the contemplative life or some combination of the contemplative life and the political life.
Just as Aristotle recognized to some degree the individualized nature of human
flourishing and of virtue but did not take this far enough, so too did the Roman orator and
statesman Cicero. Some passages in Book I of his De Officiis (On Duties) provide some useful
categories for conceiving of the highly individualized nature of human flourishing. I interpret
Cicero here as elaborating upon the role of both the universal and the particular in Aristotle's
ethical theory. It will thus be useful to reproduce the passages below. In the passages that follow,
Cicero discusses the four personae, or roles, the requirements of which all men must fulfill in
order to live the Good Life: universal human nature (i.e., reason) and the individual's inborn
talents, social context, and personal choices.
Furthermore, one must understand that we have been dressed, as it were, by
nature for two roles: one is common, arising from the fact that we all have a share
in reason and in the superiority by which we surpass the brute creatures.
Everything honourable and seemly is derived from this, and from it we discover a
method of finding out our duty. The other, however, is that assigned specifically
to individuals. For just as there are enormous bodily differences (for some, as we
see, their strength is the speed that they can run, for others the might with which
they wrestle; again, some have figures that are dignified, others that are graceful),
similarly there are still greater differences in men's spirits. (I.108)
Each person should hold on to what is his as far as it is not vicious, but is peculiar
to him, so that the seemliness that we are seeking might more easily be
maintained. For we must act in such a way that we attempt nothing contrary to
universal nature; but while conserving that, let us follow our own nature, so that
even if other pursuits may be weightier and better, we should measure our own by
the rule of our own nature. For it is appropriate neither to fight against nature nor
to pursue anything that you cannot attain. Consequently, it becomes clearer what
that seemliness is like, precisely because nothing is seemly 'against Minerva's
will', as they say, that is, when your nature opposes and fights against it. (I.110)
If anything at all is seemly, nothing, surely is more so than an evenness both of
one's whole life and of one's individual actions. You cannot preserve that if you
copy someone else's nature and ignore your own. (I.111)
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To the two roles of which I spoke above, a third is added: this is imposed by some
chance or circumstance. There is also a fourth, which we assume for ourselves by
our own decision. Kingdoms, military powers, nobility, political honours, wealth
and influence, as well as the opposites of these, are in the gift of chance and
governed by circumstances. In addition, assuming a role that we want ourselves is
something that proceeds from our own will; as a consequence, some people apply
themselves to philosophy, others to civil law, and others again to oratory, while
even in the case of the virtues, different men prefer to excel in different of them.
(I.115)23
These passages suggest that we must strike the right balance, the mean between excessive
universalism and excessive pluralism. Cicero, unfortunately from the liberal point of view,
means one's social context as imposing a wide range of obligations beyond the realm of personal
choice, as long as they are not contrary to nature or beyond one's ability. Thus, the mere accident
of birth into a noble family with a long lineage of public service imposes the obligation of
maintaining and furthering the family's heritage and position in society with one's own deeds.
Thus, also, was a Roman obligated to serve the Roman Republic to the best of his ability so long
as nothing he did or was called upon to do was contrary to nature. The crux of the issue, of
course, lies in how one defines the relationship between personal choice and the particular social
contexts into which we are born. Is it beyond the scope of personal choice to change one’s social
context? Also of fundamental importance is whether particular social contexts conflict with what
is required by our universal human nature.
The scope of personal choice seems rather limited in the Roman context. We have as an
example of the dominant role of social context Cicero’s admonition to his son in De Officiis:
Anyone who is thinking about embarking upon an honourable life ought to do so
[learn about duties from the Stoics], but perhaps no one more than you. For you
carry this burden: many expect you to emulate my diligence, most my honours,
and some, perhaps, even my renown. Besides, you have incurred a weighty
responsibility from Athens and from Cratippus; since you went to them as if
going to purchase arts of good quality, it would be most dishonourable to return
empty-handed, thus disgracing the authority of both city and master. Therefore,
23
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strive with as much spirit and struggle with as much effort as you can (if learning
is an effort, and not a pleasure) in order that you may succeed, and not, instead,
allow yourself to seem to have let yourself down, even though we have provided
everything for you. (III.6)24
In this one passage we see the chain of unchosen obligations imposed on Cicero’s son, i.e., an
obligation to educate himself in such a way that he can follow in his father’s footsteps and
therefore an obligation to his teachers and even the city of Athens itself. This is not to say that all
of our obligations are chosen in a radically free, atomistic sense; rather, it is merely to criticize
Cicero and Aristotle for their inadequate recognition of the diversity of human flourishing and
the value of flourishing diversity.
As Cicero's four personae imply, but as he and Aristotle arguably do not fully appreciate,
human flourishing is highly
individualized and diverse. It depends on who as well as what one is. Abstractly
considered, we can speak of human flourishing and of basic or generic goods and
virtues that help to define it. Yet, this does not make human flourishing in reality
either abstract or universal. Concretely speaking, no two cases of human
flourishing are the same, and they are not interchangeable. . . . There are
individuative as well as generic potentialities and this makes human fulfillment
always something unique.25
An examination of human nature cannot reveal the proper weighting, balance, or proportion of
the generic goods and virtues for each individual. Indeed, these goods and virtues do not exist as
such except as concrete goods and virtues for particular individuals as they achieve and enjoy
them through their own efforts in specific contexts. Human beings are not mere loci in which
these goods and virtues qua universals are instantiated. These generic goods and virtues are
“generalized abstractions of common needs and capacities and not independent realities in their
own right.”26 Thus, human flourishing is not a one-size-fits-all standard, nor is its diversity
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limited to the level of particular communities or practices, yet it is nevertheless the objective and
ultimate standard of what is good and right on an individual level. “This account of human
flourishing is, then, a version of moral pluralism. There are many summa bona, because each
individual's flourishing is the summum bonum for him- or herself and because there is no single
summum bonum without unique form or apart from the lives of individual human beings.”27
“Human flourishing is agent-relative; it is always and necessarily the good for some
person or other.”28 Agent-relative value is contrasted with its opposite: agent-neutral value, and
the ethical impersonalism based on it. Rasmussen and Den Uyl say “that an ethical theory is
impersonal when all ultimately morally salient values, reasons, and rankings are 'agent-neutral';
and they are agent-neutral when they do not involve as part of their description an essential
reference to the person for whom the value or reason exists or the ranking is correct. One person
can be substituted for any other.”29 Agent-neutrality and ethical impersonalism are exceedingly
common in modern ethical theories, particularly of Kantian and utilitarian varieties. Aristotelianliberals, however, reject as wrongheaded the notion that particular and contingent facts such as
individual, social and cultural differences are ethically irrelevant; quite the opposite, such factors
are vitally important.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl observe that there are three possible confusions regarding agentrelativity: 1) Agent-neutrality is often confused with objectivity, and agent-relativity with
subjectivity; but agent-relativity is compatible with objectivity due to the fact that the good in
Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian philosophy is objective because of “real potentialities, needs,
and circumstances that characterize both what and who a person is” and not merely because it is
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desired.30 2) It might be thought that because something is of value only to and for someone it
must be of merely instrumental value, but this has already been shown not to be the case.31 3) It
might be thought that agent-relativity is merely a form of self-only-regarding egoism, but agentrelativity is not incompatible with other-regarding concern. Indeed, other-regarding concern in
the form of the good of friendship and virtues such as justice and generosity are constitutive parts
of human flourishing.
Human flourishing is self-directed. Self-direction is the exercise of rational agency. It is
not full-blown autonomy and it is not the full exercise of intellectual and moral virtue, although
it is a necessary constitutive element of these things. Human flourishing requires knowledge of
its constituent goods and virtues and the practical wisdom necessary to choose the proper course
of action in a given context. This depends on the individual agent to initiate and sustain over the
course of his life the exercise of his rational capacities in order to achieve the intellectual insights
and traits of character and to make the correct choices and the right actions that are necessary for
his flourishing. This no one can do for him, for although the conclusions of thought “can be
shared, the act of reasoning that is the exercise of self-direction cannot.”32 Self-direction is thus
“the central necessary constituent or ingredient of human flourishing. It is that feature of human
flourishing without which no other feature could be a constituent.”33
Finally, we come to the sixth feature of human flourishing identified by Rasmussen and
Den Uyl. Human flourishing is profoundly social. Rasmussen and Den Uyl identify four ways in
which human beings are naturally social animals: 1) “Our maturation or flourishing requires a
life with others.” 2) “[H]aving other-concern is crucial to our maturation.” 3) “Our origins are
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almost always social.” 4) And here Aristotelian liberals go beyond Aristotle: “Human sociality
can, if need be, extend beyond the polis and be cosmopolitan. . . . [H]uman sociality is openended.”34 This fourth point is particularly important because it marks a major difference between
Aristotelian liberals and Aristotle, and, to an even greater extent, between Aristotelian liberals
and communitarians. An Aristotelian liberal will recognize not only that in order to flourish one
can only do so “in some community or other,” but also that “this does not mean that a given
community's values will always be appropriate for an individual. Thus, one is not morally
required simply to accept – indeed, one might be required to reject – the status quo. In such
circumstances, one might need to [attempt to] refashion a community's values [by example and
persuasion] or find a new community.”35
Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that “the open-ended character of human sociality
discloses the need for a perspective that is wide-ranging enough to explain how the possible
relationships among persons who as yet share no common values and are strangers to each other
can, nonetheless, be ethically compossible.”36 In this vein, one may look upon humanity as a
whole insofar as its members do not engage in fundamentally anti-social behavior (i.e., the threat
or use of initiatory physical force) as comprising a cosmopolis or Great Society within which are
an uncountable number of different kinds and levels of overlapping communities: some of which
we will belong to for life, some we will join, some we will leave, and all of which we will affect
in often unintended ways to some degree with our dreams, choices, and actions.
Phronēsis (fro&nhsij), the virtue of prudence or practical wisdom, is defined by Aristotle
as “a state [of the soul] involving truth and reason concerned with action regarding things that
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are good and bad for a human being.”37 It plays a central integrating role in human flourishing.
This is so not only because there are many goods and virtues that constitute it and not only
because there is no a priori weighting, ranking, or balancing of these goods and virtues but also
because each person's flourishing is unique – given their unique talents, social context, interests,
choices, and so forth.
It is fundamentally erroneous to assume that abstract ethical principles alone can
determine the proper course of conduct for any particular individual. Such ethical
rationalism fails to grasp that ethics is practical and concerned with particular and
contingent facts – facts that abstract ethical principles cannot explicitly capture.
Such facts are crucial to determining what ought to be done. Thus, contrary to
much modern and contemporary ethics, not all morally proper conduct need be
something everybody should do.38
It might be thought, however, that this account of human flourishing is vitiated by serious
underdetermination, meaning that the theory does not give us enough specific guidance and so is
not useful for determining what ought to be done, and irresolvable conflicts between the goods
that constitute it. Rasmussen and Den Uyl point out in anticipatory reply that underdetermination
is a flaw only if one assumes that the aim of moral theory is to dictate a set of
specific and equally suited rules of conduct for every person regardless of his or
her nexus.39 But this is not necessary given that the human good is neither abstract
nor agent-neutral. Practical wisdom deals with the contingent and the particular
and can provide guidance regarding substantial matters, if we do not confuse it
with theoretical reason or its features.40
Quite the contrary to being a flaw, this “underdetermination” is actually a significant advantage
“because it represents a theoretical openness to diversity.”41
Furthermore, not only does much of modern and contemporary ethics confuse agentneutrality with objectivity. It also neglects the importance of the individual and of practical
37
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wisdom to morality and flourishing, and forgets that by its nature ethics is open-ended. It is thus
no accident that so much of modern and contemporary ethical theory confuses ethics with law.
“Law must be concerned with rules that are universal and necessary, because it is concerned with
the question of establishing social conditions that must apply to everyone equally. Ethics, on the
other hand, need not be so construed. Ethical principles need to be open to the particular and
contingent circumstances of the lives of different individuals.”42
Rasmussen and Den Uyl also have an anticipatory reply for the alleged problem of
irresolvable conflict between a significant plurality of goods: “A plurality of inherent goods does
not necessarily make them incompatible, if we do not confuse concrete with abstract
considerations and if we recognize that it is by using practical wisdom, not rules, that potential
conflicts are reconciled.”43 Considered abstractly, there is no logical incompatibility between the
various goods and virtues of which flourishing is constituted. “Concretely considered, keeping
them from becoming incompatible by discovering their proper weighting or balancing is an
individual's central task. Yet, this is only an insuperable difficulty if we assume that the goods
and virtues that compose human flourishing are equal among themselves and identical across
individuals.”44
“We need abstract [theoretical] knowledge of generic goods and virtues as well as
practical wisdom's insight into the contingent and the particular” in order to live an ethical and
hence a flourishing life.45 The generic goods and virtues serve to delimit what counts as
flourishing, but within this range what counts as a particular good or virtue for a given individual
will depend not only upon his universal human nature but also on objective and particular value-
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laden facts about him such as his talents, his historical/social context, his personal choices, and
the specific circumstances he finds himself in at the moment of action. “[P]ractical reason
properly used, which is the virtue of practical wisdom, is the intelligent management of one's life
so that all the necessary goods and virtues are coherently achieved, maintained, and enjoyed in a
manner that is appropriate for the individual human being.”46 The individual's task is not merely
one of conflict avoidance, however, but also of integration: One must make the goods and virtues
one's own, so to speak, “by an act of reason or insight, not by mere mechanical application of
universal principles to concrete cases. It is not just that an individualistic perfectionism points to
a wider variety of 'relevant differences' among agents. . . . It is rather that agenthood itself is the
'relevant difference'.”47
We are now, finally, in a better position to examine with greater precision the
Aristotelian-liberal conception of liberty. Here I will focus on an essential aspect of the political
dimension of autonomy: liberty. In chapter four I will discuss political autonomy in general and
two other important dimensions of autonomy: social and personal. According to the traditional
(classical) liberal conception, liberty consists of being free from aggression; more precisely,
liberty is freedom from the threat or use of initiatory physical force. Although some people are
never at a loss for seeming justifications (new and old) for violating individual liberty, it is
arguably almost universally and commonsensically understood that the act of coercing someone
with the threat or use of physical force – such as by violence, murder, fraud and naked theft –
imposes the aggressor's desires, interests, preferences, choices, actions, on the victim without his
consent. To the extent that this occurs the victim exists not for his own sake but for another's: his
desires, interests, preferences, choices, actions, are no longer truly his but are alien to him. More
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to the point, to the extent that this occurs his actions are not self-directed. A person being
physically coerced by another is not able to make the choices and take the actions he judges
necessary for the maintenance and furtherance of his life, i.e., for his survival and, more
importantly, his flourishing. Also, as Nozick has pointed out, he who threatens or employs
initiatory physical force against another rational being, for whatever reason, is not respecting his
victim as a person.
In her essay, “Aristotle's Function Argument: A Defense,” Jennifer Whiting makes an
apropos analogy to a malfunctioning heart controlled by a pacemaker:
A heart which, owing to some deficiency in its natural capacities, cannot beat on
its own but is made to beat by means of a pacemaker is not a healthy heart. For it,
the heart, is not strictly performing its function. Similarly, a man who, owing to
some deficiency in his natural capacities, cannot manage his own life but is
managed by means of another's deliberating and ordering him is not eudaimōn –
not even if he possesses the same goods and engages in the same first order
activities as does a eudaimōn man. For he, the man, is not strictly speaking
performing his function. . . . Aristotle's claim that eudaimonia is an activity of the
soul in accordance with virtue shows that he thinks that eudaimonia consists in
exercising rational agency.48
Similarly, an otherwise normally functioning human being who is physically coerced is to that
extent strictly speaking not performing his function; indeed, so much the worse compared to
Whiting's example because he is otherwise healthy! Thus, from the standpoint of a supply-side
ethical theory, it is not enough simply to possess the goods (and it is impossible to possess the
virtues) one needs in life without self-directed action. To the extent that one’s liberty is
infringed, one is unable to flourish.
We understand the foregoing on a more intuitive or commonsensical level too. It is
revealed in our reactions to Nozick’s experience machine.49 If we were given the chance to
experience whatever kind of life we most desired simply by hooking up to a virtual reality
48
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machine – it being stipulated that the virtual reality life would take the place of the one we
otherwise would have lived, i.e., we’d be hooked up until we died – would any of us choose to
do so? Most of us understand that being hooked up to the hypothetical experience machine is not
truly living. Most of us want and need to do and to be, in connection with actual reality, not
merely to experience. A recent illustration of this in film is exemplified by the Matrix trilogy, in
which the human race is enslaved as living batteries by intelligent robots, their minds trapped in
a virtual reality, blissfully ignorant of their situation; of the individuals who discover the truth
and escape, only one desires to return to a virtual life. This insight is equally applicable to real
world scenarios as to hypothetical thought experiments.

The Right to Liberty as a Metanormative Ethical Principle
(Rasmussen/Den Uyl)
Drawing on the foregoing analysis of human flourishing, it is possible to clarify further
the nature and importance of liberty. On the most fundamental level it is self-direction that is
compromised by the threat50 or use of physical force. As we have seen, self-direction is a
necessary and the central condition and constitutive element of flourishing. Whatever a desire, an
interest, a preference, a choice, an action, an entire life that is directed by another may be called
it is not good, virtuous or flourishing. It is the very nature of eudaimonia and virtue that they
must be desired and freely chosen for the right reasons.51 The pursuit of a flourishing life, the
practice of virtue, must be self-directed. Coercive interference, or the threat or use of physical
force, compromises self-direction and therefore moral agency. An act of mine does not count as
virtuous and therefore contributory toward my eudaimonia if you force it upon me, even if it
otherwise would have been had I desired and freely chosen it for the right reasons.
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Recall from the previous section, it was said that “the open-ended character of human
sociality discloses the need for a perspective that is wide-ranging enough to explain how the
possible relationships among persons who as yet share no common values and are strangers to
each other can, nonetheless, be ethically compossible.”52 This alludes to what Rasmussen and
Den Uyl call “liberalism’s problem,” i.e., “the problem of how to find an ethical basis for the
overall political/legal structure of society.”53 What is needed is an ordering principle for the
structure of society that protects the possibility of human flourishing in all its forms. It follows
that such a principle, when put into practice, will not hinder or prohibit some forms of
flourishing, thereby privileging others; nor will it bias structurally the political/legal order in
favor of or against one or more forms of flourishing. This follows from the fact that it is simply a
principle that protects the possibility of all forms of human flourishing, nothing more. But does
such a principle exist? Indeed, it does. That principle is the right to liberty.
The right to liberty proscribes legally the threat or use of initiatory physical force in all its
forms. Recall that the single greatest and most basic encroachment on an individual’s selfdirection is the threat or use of physical force and that self-direction is necessary and central to
human flourishing. By banning legally the threat or use of initiatory physical force, the right to
liberty, as the basis of a legal system, protects the possibility of self-direction and therefore the
possibility of all forms of human flourishing. Rasmussen and Den Uyl point out that the
“individual right to liberty allows each person a sphere of freedom – a ‘moral space’ or ‘moral
territory’ – whereby self-directed activities can be exercised without being invaded by others.
This translates into a principle of compossible and equal freedom for all.”54 A society based on
the right to liberty is one of complete and total liberty, for, to invoke the Spencer-Rothbard Law
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of Total Liberty in summary, “if every man has freedom to do all that he wills, it follows from
this very premise that no man’s freedom has been infringed or invaded.”55,56
Rasmussen and Den Uyl call the right to liberty a metanormative principle, because “it is
concerned with the creation, interpretation, and justification of a political/legal context in which
the possibility of the pursuit of flourishing is secured.”57 Rasmussen and Den Uyl identify
several requirements for metanormativity. One of them has already been discussed, viz., that
such a principle neither bias structurally the political/legal order in favor of one or more forms of
flourishing, nor hinder or prohibit any form of human flourishing. Secondly, such a principle
must be equally or universally applicable to all individuals and must therefore be centered on
“that characteristic present in all forms of human flourishing (or its pursuit).” They argue that
generic goods cannot serve as that characteristic because while “they are universal in the sense of
helping to define human flourishing for all individuals, their particular form or weighting varies
from individual to individual.” Finally, a “metanormative principle must apply to both the
particular and general in the same way and in the same respect[.]”58 As has already been shown,
self-direction is the central and fundamental feature common to all forms of human flourishing.
The right to liberty, since it protects the possibility of self-direction, does not bias the structure of
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the political/legal order in favor of or against any form of human flourishing. Rather, it secures
the central, but not the only, necessary condition that makes human flourishing in all its forms
possible.
While I think this account of the right to liberty as a metanormative principle that protects
the possibility of all forms of human flourishing is essentially correct and certainly important, it
is not the whole story, and certainly not the most fundamental part, from the point of view of
virtue ethics. David Gordon points out one deficiency of a primarily demand-side defense of
rights, like Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s seems to be:59 “[I]t does not follow from the fact that
others must respect your rights, if you are to flourish, that you have an obligation to respect their
rights. You may well have such an obligation, but more than an appeal to the conditions of your
own flourishing is needed to show this.”60 In other words, it is not enough to demonstrate that I
must respect your rights in order for it to be possible for you to flourish. Why should I allow you
to flourish? Or to “flourish” as you see fit? Arguing, as Rasmussen and Den Uyl do, that the right
to liberty is necessary for protecting the possibility of everyone's flourishing goes some distance
in shoring up this deficiency. It appeals to even unenlightened self-interest, provided the listener
is not overly short-sighted and rash, but it still seems too consequentialist, not quite Aristotelian
enough.
Actually, Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s theory appears to contain both consequentialist and
deontological elements. While an analytical philosopher might mine such elements out of a
virtue-ethical theory, without being able to reduce virtue ethics to one or the other, Rasmussen
and Den Uyl explicitly avoid grounding the moral obligation to respect rights in virtue.
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Ultimately, I think they see rights as being a sort of deontic constraint. However, ruleconsequentialism and deontology are not really so very far apart. Roderick Long has argued that
rule-consequentialism is praxeologically unstable and that it must collapse into either actconsequentialism or deontology. The rule-consequentialist either values the rules as ends-inthemselves, in which case he becomes a deontologist, or he values them as mere instrumental
means to other ends that he holds, in which case he is committed to acting counter to the rules
when the consequences dictate and his rule-consequentialism collapses into actconsequentialism.61
In somewhat consequentialist vein, Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that rights-respecting
behavior does not directly contribute to human flourishing:
Individual rights are a unique ethical concept that cannot be reduced to other
ethical concepts; hence the basic character of individual rights cannot be grasped
if ethics is understood in an equinormative manner, that is, if all ethical norms are
understood as being of the same type or having the same function. Individual
rights are an ethical concept different from those concepts generally found in
normative ethics. They are not needed in order know the nature of human
flourishing or virtue, or our obligations to others, or even the requirements of
justice. Nor are they more heavily weighted versions of these other norms. Rather,
individual rights are needed to solve a problem that is uniquely social, political,
and legal [i.e., the problem of ethical compossibility].62
It might seem paradoxical that they argue that rights are not concerned with the consequences of
actions but “rather with setting the appropriate foundation for the taking of any action in the first
place.”63 But this statement would seem to be compatible with rejecting act-consequentialism in
favor of rule-consequentialism. Rasmussen and Den Uyl continue:
Individual rights are therefore not norms in the sense of guiding us toward the
achievement of moral excellence or human flourishing. And contrary to
61
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appearances, they are not ordinary interpersonal normative principles either.
Individual rights express a type of moral principle that must obtain if we are to
reconcile our natural sociality with diverse forms of flourishing.64
They conclude that “individual rights are politically primary” but are not “primary ethical
principles.”65 Rasmussen and Den Uyl further point out, and rightly so, that individual rights are
a necessary but not sufficient condition for human flourishing: “The connection between
individual rights and human flourishing is neither direct nor isomorphic.”66 And finally, they do
not seem to find anything especially morally noteworthy in rights-respecting behavior. They
concede that “it can be said that one who respects the rights of others is a morally ‘better’ person
than one who does not”; however, in a more deontological vein, “respecting metanormative rules
is necessary for the moral game to be played, but it is not an instance of playing it well or even
playing it much at all.”67
Strangely enough, Rasmussen and Den Uyl explicitly consider rights to be
nonconsequentialistic.68 And yet they give us no nonconsequentialistic reason for respecting
them. Our obligation to respect rights seems to be derived only from the need “to reconcile our
natural sociality with diverse forms of flourishing,”69 in other words, from our “shared need to
act in a peaceful and orderly social/political context.”70 It is telling that in the beginning of the
sentence from which the second quote is cited they put the word ‘obligations’ in scare quotes.
Additionally, they have made it clear that they do not see rights-respecting behavior as being
demanded by the virtue of justice, or any other virtue. For them, rights-respecting behavior is not
a constitutive part of human flourishing. Rather, rights-respecting behavior appears to be merely
64
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(though still importantly) necessary but not sufficient for one’s actions to count as moral in a
social context. This last might seem to allow them to avoid the charge of consequentialism, but
they offer no reasons for this to be the case. It does not automatically follow from our natural
sociality sans virtue or our shared need for a peaceful and orderly society that rights-respecting
behavior is necessary but not sufficient for one’s actions to be considered moral in a social
context. What is it about human flourishing that makes it so? They do not tell us.
Moreover, their claim that respecting the rights of others is necessary but not sufficient in
order to count as acting morally in a social context seems to contradict their other claim that
rights do not guide us toward flourishing, for surely principles that show us what does not count
as moral in a social context serve to point the way in a general manner by delimiting our range of
legitimate actions.71 Furthermore, if rights do serve as normative guides, if only in this less
specific way, then perhaps rights are more than just metanormative principles; but more on this
later. Another worry arises: if respecting the rights of others is only necessary for the moral game
to be played, is violating the rights of others immoral? Or, as seems more likely on this view, just
amoral or nonmoral? Rasmussen and Den Uyl would presumably answer that it is immoral. They
do, after all, say that it can be said that a person who respects the rights of others is a morally
“better” person (note the scare quotes again) than one who does not. But what does this “better”
mean and why could it be said that he is morally “better”? They do not tell us.
Thus, respecting the rights of others seems to be of instrumental value only.72 We respect
the rights of others merely in order to live in a society in which we can reasonably expect others
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to respect ours.73 If this is so, however, it does not seem a very compelling reason to respect
everyone’s rights or to respect the rights of others all the time. Why should I not violate your
liberty for my own benefit, or the benefit of others, if I think I have a reasonable chance of
getting away with it (with or without doing irreparable harm to societal order)? Moreover,
Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s account seems to beg the question against so-called forms of
flourishing that allow as sometimes necessary, or even encourage, the threat or use of initiatory
physical force. They cannot rule them out on the basis that they violate the requirements for
metanormativity, for this begs the question that a society based on such a principle is desirable in
the first place. Why should we as individuals want to allow other forms of human flourishing?
Why should we want a society which allows all forms of human flourishing? Why should we
think that anyone, much less everyone, has a right to pursue their own flourishing as they see fit?
Indeed, what if we do not consider someone’s preferred way of life to be a form of human
flourishing at all?
The answer to these problems lies in a deeper analysis of human flourishing and, in
particular, human sociality. Recall that for Rasmussen and Den Uyl the basis of rights is selfdirection. Their account of rights is based on “an analysis of the nature of human flourishing,”
which, “before ever addressing questions about what one should reason about or how one should
conduct oneself,” “reveals a need for the exercise of reason or the need to be self-directed.”74
This is certainly true and an important consideration in determining what virtue requires of us
but, as David Gordon has pointed out, it is not enough to get us to a moral obligation to respect
the rights of others. And an analysis of human flourishing at this level does not yet get us full
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(neo-)Aristotelian sociality. To get us there a more comprehensive analysis of human flourishing
is required, one that will delve into what we should reason about and how we should conduct
ourselves, into the full range of the things required for the flourishing of a rational animal, in
other words, into the primary goods and virtues. But Rasmussen and Den Uyl have already ruled
out any of the primary goods and virtues as a basis or source for rights.
Perhaps Rasmussen and Den Uyl would argue, although they do not do so explicitly, that
the basis and justification for rights (self-direction and the ethical compossibility of diverse
forms of human flourishing) and the source of our obligation to respect the rights of others are
two distinct issues, that rights are metanormative but that there is a normative obligation to
respect them due to other requirements of human flourishing and sociality. However, Rasmussen
and Den Uyl have not provided us with a virtue ethical argument for this. That such a move
appears necessary also suggests that rights may be more than just metanormative principles. In
conclusion then, the foregoing considerations suggest that we need an account of rights as
interpersonal ethical principles the respecting of which is partly constitutive of all forms of
flourishing worthy of the name. It is to this end that I turn in the next chapter, wherein I argue
that rights are both metanormative and interpersonal ethical principles and that the obligation to
respect them is grounded in the requirements of human flourishing, in particular the virtue of
justice.
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Chapter Three.
Eudaimonia, Virtue, and the Right to Liberty:
Rights as Both Metanormative and
Interpersonal Normative Principles
Freedom is, in truth, a sacred thing. There is only one thing else that better serves the
name: that is virtue. But then what is virtue if not the free choice of what is good?
− Alexis de Tocqueville
The practical reason for freedom, then, is that freedom seems to be the only condition
under which any kind of substantial moral fibre can be developed.
− Albert Jay Nock

Introduction
In the previous chapter I pointed out the inadequacy of demand-side theories of rights and
suggested the uniqueness of and necessity for a truly agent-centered, supply-side theory that
seamlessly integrates Aristotelian virtue ethics and natural rights. I then proceeded to give an
account of human flourishing, drawing heavily on the work of Rasmussen and Den Uyl, after
which I discussed their own theory of natural rights. However, while I argued that the theory is
largely correct as far as it goes, I found their demand-side metanormative account wanting in that
it fails to ground the obligation to respect rights in the requirements of human flourishing and
virtue. I argued that what is needed is an account of rights as interpersonal normative principles.
In this chapter, I seek to synthesize what is correct in Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s theory with
philosopher Roderick Long’s theory of rights. First, however, it will be helpful to discuss briefly
Ayn Rand’s theory of rights, by which both Rasmussen and Den Uyl and Long have been
influenced, as it is something of a flawed hybrid. And then I will turn to an explication of Long’s
theory of rights before finally presenting my own arguments.
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Rand’s Theory of Rights
Rasmussen and Den Uyl have clearly been influenced in important ways by Rawls and
Nozick. The influence of Rawls can be seen in their focus on political structure. The influence of
Nozick can be seen in their conception of rights as deontic constraints. And, although they have
returned to Aristotle in many ways, they have also been heavily influenced by Ayn Rand. For
this reason, for the reason that Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism in its ethical and political
aspects is essentially a form of Aristotelian liberalism, and for others that will become clear – it
will be useful to briefly discuss Rand’s theory of rights.
Rand does not make a sharp distinction between metanormative and normative principles.
Indeed, to my knowledge Rasmussen and Den Uyl are the first to make such a sharp distinction.1
However, perusing the relevant essays collected in Rand’s two main books on ethics and
political philosophy, it is easy to see in Rand’s theory of rights similarities to the theory espoused
by Rasmussen and Den Uyl. The following passage exemplifies both similarities and the lack of
the sharp distinction between the normative and the metanormative:
“Rights” are a moral concept – the concept that provides a logical transition from
the principles guiding an individual’s actions to the principles guiding his
relationship with others – the concept that preserves and protects individual
morality in a social context – the link between the moral code of a man and the
legal code of a society, between ethics and politics. Individual rights are the
means of subordinating society to moral law.2
In this passage, we see elements that Rasmussen and Den Uyl identify as metanormative: the
observations that rights protect individual morality in a social context and that they are the link
between morality and the political/legal system. Also in this passage, however, Rand describes
rights as guiding individual conduct toward others, a feature Rasmussen and Den Uyl reject in
their conception of rights as metanormative principles.
1
2
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Although Rand offers normative reasons for respecting the rights of others, which
Rasmussen and Den Uyl do not do, she does tend to focus on the function of rights as protecting
the conditions that make flourishing possible.
The source of man’s rights is not divine law or congressional law, but the law of
identity. A is A – and Man is Man. Rights are conditions of existence required by
man’s nature for his proper survival. If man is to live on earth, it is right for him
to use his mind, it is right to act on his own free judgment, it is right to work for
his values and to keep the product of his work. If life on earth is his purpose, he
has a right to live as a rational being: nature forbids him the irrational.3
We see here the focus on the metanormative function of rights and the argument that rights have
their source in the nature of man, specifically the requirements qua moral recipient for his
flourishing. We have already seen, with the observation by David Gordon, that appealing to the
conditions of one’s own flourishing is not enough. Normative, agent-centered, reasons for
respecting the rights of others are implicit in this passage, however, and are made more explicit
elsewhere.
All of Rand’s seven cardinal virtues come into play in one way or another in calling for
us to respect the rights of others. Perhaps the three most directly connected, however, are
productiveness, independence and justice. The virtue of productiveness calls for the fullest and
most purposeful use of our minds in the production of values, both material and spiritual. In
particular, because productive work is necessary for the maintenance and furthering of our lives,
and forms the core of our identities, the virtue of productiveness calls us to consciously choose
and pursue a productive career, according to and to the best of our ability.4 The virtue of
independence calls for us to accept “the responsibility of forming one’s own judgments and of
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living by the work of one’s own mind.”5 Rand describes justice as “never seek[ing] or grant[ing]
the unearned and undeserved, neither in matter nor in spirit.”6 The converse holds as well: we
should accept and grant the earned and deserved, both in matter and in spirit. Justice is the most
directly related to rights but the other six are all important in that they add specificity to our
understanding of how we must act in order to live a flourishing life, and therefore to what justice
demands of us.
The principle of trade is the only rational ethical principle for all human
relationships, personal and social, private and public, spiritual and material. It is
the principle of justice.
A trader is a man who earns what he gets and does not give or take the
undeserved. He does not treat men as masters or slaves, but as independent
equals. He deals with men by means of a free, voluntary, unforced, uncoerced
exchange – an exchange which benefits both parties by their own independent
judgment. A trader does not expect to be paid for his defaults, only for his
achievements. He does not switch to others the burden of his failures, and he does
not mortgage his life into bondage for the failures of others.
It is only on the basis of rational selfishness – on the basis of justice – that men
can be fit to live together in a free, peaceful, prosperous, benevolent, rational
society.7
Thus, the trader principle, a principle of the virtue of justice, demands that we respect the rights
of others, not merely so that it will be possible for them to flourish or to create and maintain a
society in which it is possible for everyone to flourish but also and more importantly, from the
ethical perspective, because respecting their rights is constitutive of our own flourishing. This
last is the crucial link necessary to fill in the gap identified by David Gordon.
5
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Roderick Long’s Account:
Rights as Interpersonal Normative Principles
Like Rasmussen and Den Uyl, Roderick Long was heavily influenced by Ayn Rand but
has returned to Aristotle in many ways. Among his reasons are certain ambiguities,
inconsistencies and, arguably, even some errors in Rand’s theories of epistemology and ethics.
Long sides with Aristotle against Rand on some key epistemological issues. Regarding Rand’s
ethical theory, there are some notable controversies over proper interpretation. There is debate
over whether ‘the choice to live’ is a pre-moral one or not. There are two camps on the status of
Rand’s claim that life is the proper standard of value in ethics. One group holds that the standard
is one of bare survival. The other holds that it is a flourishing standard, like Aristotle’s, and
questions whether the survivalist standard can support a robust and meaningful conception of the
good life, i.e., one that is not Hobbesian but Aristotelian, one that can account for the
protagonists in Rand’s novels. A number of the survivalists seem to think of Rand’s ethical
theory as a form of rule-consequentialism rather than a foundationalist form of virtue ethics.
Long ultimately concludes that Rand’s epistemological and ethical theories, unlike Rand’s
practice (e.g., her novels), are flawed and inadequate to support the flourishing interpretation.8
Nevertheless, I think that in light of the full context of Rand’s work a flourishing standard is the
only correct interpretation of Rand’s moral vision. This view can be maintained while still
admitting that her formal philosophical arguments for it are sometimes flawed. In any event,
Long has provided a sketch of a more explicitly Aristotelian account of rights.
Like Rand, Long recognizes the important metanormative function of rights without
restricting the status of rights to metanormativity but, unlike Rasmussen and Den Uyl and to a
lesser extent Rand, he provides a truly agent-centered (or supply-side) account of the source of
8
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rights and our obligation to respect them. Long starts by discussing two essential aspects of
human nature qua moral agent, viz., that man is a logikon and a politikon animal. He points out
that while the best translation for these terms in English are ‘rational’ and ‘political’,
respectively, the close links between the two are somewhat lost in translation.
The core meaning of logos is speech or language or anything spoken. . . . By
extension, it has two derivative meanings: a) that which is expressed or explained
in speech, which is to say, the intelligible nature of something. . . ; and b) the
capacity or faculty of speech, that is, reason. But even when logos does not mean
“reason,” it still retains a strong connotation of “language” and “discourse,” and
thus a social dimension that the English word lacks. To be a rational animal is to
be a language-using animal, a conversing animal, a discursive animal. And to live
a human life is thus to live a life centered around discourse.
Our nature as logikon is thus closely allied to our nature as politikon. To be a
politikon animal is not simply to be an animal that lives in groups or sets up
governments; it is to cooperate with others on the basis of discourse about shared
ends.
Being politikon is for Aristotle an expression of being logikon; just as logikon
animals naturally conduct their private affairs through reason rather than through
unreflective passion, so they naturally conduct their common affairs through
public discourse and rational persuasion, rather than through violence[.]9
Contra the Hobbesian conception, reason is not merely an instrumental means to achieving one’s
ends. It is, more importantly, of value “as an intrinsic and constitutive part of a fully human life,”
of a flourishing life.10 The same is true of cooperation and human communities: “participation in
a human community, together with a shared pursuit of the human good, is a constitutive part of a
truly human life.”11
Long continues:
Human life comes in degrees, and a life is more human to the extent that it is
characterized by rationality and intelligent cooperation, and less human to the
extent that it is characterized by blind emotion and violent predation. Both the
9
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cooperative and the predatory person may use reason instrumentally to advance
their ends, but only for the former is reason also constitutive of his relations with
others. Hence if one chooses to subordinate others forcibly to one’s own ends
rather than deal with them through rational persuasion, one chooses violent
predation over intelligent cooperation in that particular instance – and ipso facto
chooses a life that is less human overall than it would have been if one had made
the opposite choice. To violate the rights of others, then, is to lesson one’s own
humanity.12
Elsewhere, Long links the obligation to respect the rights of others to a specific virtue:
[J]ust as courage, generosity, and temperance are the virtues that define the
appropriately human attitudes toward danger, giving, and bodily pleasures
respectively, so the virtue of justice defines the appropriately human attitude
toward violence. A maximally human life will give central place to the
distinctively human faculty of reason; and one's life more fully expresses this
faculty to the extent that one deals with others through reason and persuasion,
rather than through violence and force. To choose cooperation over violence is to
choose a human mode of existence over a bestial one. Hence the virtuous person
will refrain from initiating coercion against others.13
We are called upon by our own eudaimonia and, more specifically, the virtue of justice, to deal
with others “as conversation partners rather than as slaves, cattle, or dupes.”14 In order to live a
fully flourishing life, we must refrain from threatening or using initiatory physical force against
others. Others therefore have a claim against us to refrain from threatening or using initiatory
physical force against them. This claim is what is called the natural right to liberty (and its
corollaries and consequences). Since they are free from initiatory coercion when their rights are
respected, free to exercise self-direction, they are able to take the actions they judge to be
necessary to maintain and further their lives. Thus, violating the rights of others is harmful of the
agent's flourishing as well as the victim’s. Those “who rob and use force” cannot live a truly
flourishing life.15
12
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A Dialectical Synthesis (Plauché)
We have thus far considered two Aristotelian approaches to rights (as metanormative and
interpersonal-normative principles) that at first glance, and perhaps even second and third,
appear to be incompatible. It is true that the theory of Rasmussen and Den Uyl, taken in its
entirety, is incompatible with the theories offered by Rand and Long. Rasmussen and Den Uyl
explicitly rule out the possibility that rights are normative principles rather than or as well as
metanormative principles. I have argued that this position is mistaken, however, and is the main
flaw in their theory. In this I side with Rand and Long. On the other hand, I do think that they are
right to distinguish clearly and conceptually the metanormativity of principles from the
normativity of principles. In this I go beyond Rand and Long, if only just a little. Furthermore, I
think that a truly agent-centered approach to the derivation of rights is more sound and truer to
Aristotelian virtue ethics. An agent-centered approach is able to fill in the missing link, identified
by David Gordon, in explaining our obligation to respect the rights of others. In this I side with
Long. And finally, while I remain indebted to Rand’s moral vision, both in general and still in
many of the particulars, like Long, Rasmussen and Den Uyl, I find a more explicitly Aristotelian
approach to liberal ethics and rights to be more consistent, compelling, rich and flexible. My task
in this section will be to offer a conceptual framework that synthesizes these different elements
into a coherent and consistent whole, and to attempt to answer likely worries and objections from
Rasmussen and Den Uyl.
I owe the inspiration for this synthesizing conceptual framework indirectly to Rand,
directly to Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s reconstruction of Rand’s dialectical method. By dialectics,
of course, I do not mean in the Hegelian sense but rather in the original Socratic and, primarily,
Aristotelian sense of the word. Chris Matthew Sciabarra, a former doctoral student of the well-
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known dialectical Marxist Bertell Ollman, but himself a self-styled dialectical libertarian, defines
dialectics as a methodological “orientation toward contextual analysis of the systemic and
dynamic relations of components within a totality. A totality is not simply an undifferentiated or
all-encompassing whole. It is a specific whole as understood from – and structured by – shifting
perspectives.”16 In short, dialectics is the art of context-keeping. This sense of dialectics as a
methodological orientation is distinct from the more specific dialectical method of questioning
and discussion employed by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Sciabarra sees Aristotle as a
dialectical thinker in both senses. This dialectical approach is exemplified in all of Aristotle’s
writings and is explicitly explained in his Topics and Sophistical Refutations. Aristotle says in
the Topics that dialectics “is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all
inquiries.”17 And in the Sophistical Refutations he distinguishes between dialectic as a method of
questioning and dialectic as “a mode of examination as well.”18 In these works, Aristotle places
an emphasis on context in the analysis of any problem by means of examining them from
shifting points of view. See, for example, his discussion of ways to show “that the whole is not
the same as the sum of its parts” in sections 13 and 14 of Book VI of the Topics.19
Sciabarra argues that Ayn Rand was a dialectical thinker who analyzed social phenomena
on three conceptually distinct but interrelated levels of generality, which he reconstructs as: 1)
the personal (psycho-epistemological, ethical), 2) the cultural (linguistic, ideological), and 3) the
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structural (economic, political, legal).20 In analyzing social phenomena, the analyst can focus on
one of these levels while shifting the other two into the background but never treating them as
separate from each other and the focus level or completely ignoring them, for all three levels are
necessary to fully understand the whole. The analyst can then shift focus to each of the other
levels in turn to gain a more complete and contextual understanding. I propose that rights can be
analyzed at each of these three levels as well. A conception of rights that includes only one or
two of these levels is incomplete and insufficiently contextual. To analyze rights from only one
or two, but not all three, levels will result in an incomplete and insufficiently contextual analysis.
Levels one and three, the personal and the structural, are most relevant to the purpose of this
paper so I will focus on them.
When we conceive of or analyze the function of rights as metanormative principles we
are doing so at the structural level. When we conceive of or analyze the function of rights as
interpersonal normative principles we are doing so at the personal level. At the structural level of
analysis, the level of political and legal theory, the right to liberty is a metanormative principle
that protects the possibility of self-direction, which is central to and necessary for all forms of
human flourishing, and as such does not bias the structure of the political/legal order in favor of
or against any form of human flourishing (Rasmussen/Den Uyl). At the personal level of
analysis, the level of ethical theory, the right to liberty is an interpersonal normative principle
derived from the demands of our own eudaimonia, particularly the virtue of justice: rightsrespecting behavior is a necessary and constitutive part of our own well-being (Long).21 In order
to live a life proper to a logikon and politikon animal, and to ourselves, we ought not to threaten
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or use initiatory physical force against others but rather deal with them on a voluntary basis
through reason, discourse, persuasion and cooperation except when necessary to protect our own
right to liberty (or the rights of others).22 No form of eudaimonia truly worthy of the name will
advocate the threat or use of initiatory physical force.
Whether one conceives of rights as metanormative principles for which we have
normative obligations to respect or interpersonal normative principles that also serve a unique
metanormative function, thus depends on one’s point of view. Both views are essentially correct,
but only if understood contextually. Rights are both normative and metanormative principles.
They are a bridge with feet coming down on both sides – both the side of ethics and the
political/legal side. Rand and Long conceive of and analyze rights at all three levels, albeit not
explicitly, while Rasmussen and Den Uyl restrict their conception and analysis to the structural
and cultural levels. Rasmussen and Den Uyl, however, have benefited us by clearly and
conceptually distinguishing the metanormative function of rights from the normative. Long, too,
has benefited us by grounding rights in the moral agent’s own flourishing and in the virtue of
justice. Recall that for a supply-side ethics like Aristotelian virtue ethics, how A (the moral
agent) should treat B (the moral recipient) is determined primarily by facts about A. The key
word here is ‘primarily’, for ‘the good and the right’ for A is not determined exclusively by facts
about A. The conditions necessary for the flourishing of the individual qua moral recipient, or
anyone and everyone qua moral recipient, are also relevant; and we have seen that a certain
condition (liberty, which preserves the possibility of self-direction) is of central importance at the
structural level of political and legal theory. A full and contextual understanding of rights
requires understanding them as both normative and metanormative principles, at both the
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personal (ethical) and structural (political, legal, economic) levels, indeed, at all three levels, the
cultural included.
Now I want to briefly consider several worries or objections to my account of rights that
Rasmussen and Den Uyl are likely to have. Indeed, these worries/objections are present already
in their recent book, Norms of Liberty, as part of their argument in favor of their own position.
One objection they will likely make is that we have not one but two primary sources of
obligation not to threaten or use initiatory physical force. Earlier I suggested that Rasmussen and
Den Uyl might salvage their theory by arguing that we have a normative obligation to respect
metanormative principles. But in fact they explicitly rule out the possibility that we have a
normative obligation to respect the rights of others. They argue, using theft and murder as
examples, that we actually have two overlapping obligations not to steal or commit murder: a
normative obligation derived from the demands of self-perfection, particularly the virtue of
justice, and a metanormative obligation derived from the demands of rights. The other worries or
objections, which I will deal with next, have to do with why they reject a normative justification
of and source for rights.
There are several problems with this ‘two overlapping sources of obligation’ objection.
The first that comes to mind is that the metanormative obligation (whatever that means) to
respect rights is not Aristotelian enough. On this view respecting rights is not a constitutive part
of our eudaimonia. It would then seem to be merely a necessary instrumental means external to
our flourishing and this seems more Hobbesian than expressive of full-blown Aristotelian
sociality. Rights, on this view, are simply Nozickian moral side-constraints with a different
justification. Also, to whom do we have this obligation – to “society” as an abstract entity?
Surely not; but if instead it is an obligation to ourselves and to others, this suggests regular
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normativity. Another problem is that it seems to run afoul of Occam’s Razor. Why multiply
entities unnecessarily when one source of obligation will do? Now, the answer to this question
may depend in whole or in part on Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s reasons for rejecting any normative
obligation to respect rights, so a full answer will have to wait.
The answer to the above question regarding Occam’s Razor also seems to depend on a
third apparent problem with their position. If there are two primary sources of social obligation,
one determined by virtue and the other determined by rights, then the possibility arises that we
may at times have conflicting obligations to these two sources. If and when such a conflict arises,
which do we choose and on what basis do we do so? The typical answer, which is far from
unique to Rasmussen and Den Uyl, is that rights trump, i.e., that is, rights necessarily override or
outweigh any other conflicting obligations.23 (If what is demanded by virtue could never conflict
with what is demanded by rights, then it would seem to be unnecessary to argue that rights
trump. Moreover, if virtue and rights never conflict, then are there really two sources of
obligation?) Presumably then, it might be virtuous for me to try to force you to stop acting
immorally but the demands of your rights forbids me such action. In this example, the
importance of rights overrides the demands of virtue. But how can something that is only of
instrumental and external value to my flourishing override what is required by virtue, a
constitutive part of my flourishing? Finally, the claim that rights trump in this way seems to
violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the unity-of-virtue principle.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s argument summarized in the previous paragraph is made in
the beginning of their Norms of Liberty. They might respond to my objections with a different
argument made later in Norms of Liberty (also discussed several sections previously) that rights
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are moral side constraints; they determine what can count as moral in a social context.24
Therefore, any action that violates someone’s rights cannot count as being virtuous. But again, I
fail to see how this can be so without appealing to the demands of self-perfection. From the fact
that rights are necessary to protect the social conditions that make human flourishing possible, it
does not automatically follow that rights are moral side constraints. Why is it (always) wrong to
threaten or use initiatory physical force? Simply because we are better off living in a free
society? As we have seen, there is far more to it than this. Finally, what we have here appear to
be two different and incompatible accounts of how and why rights trump.
It also seems difficult to reconcile the claim that rights do not serve as guides to selfperfection with the way that rights-language has (to my knowledge) always been used. To steal
from or murder someone is, in the liberal tradition, to violate someone’s rights and such an act is
usually considered to be wrong because of this. In contrast, Rasmussen and Den Uyl would seem
to be advocating a truly new conception of rights when they write:
In the case of basic, natural rights, by contrast, the obligations are not so much to
individuals per se because such rights are fashioned independently of particular
practices, circumstances, and agents. Basic rights are ethical principles that apply
to no one in particular and to everyone equally.
Rather, our obligations derived from rights are to take certain actions necessary “to achieving an
appropriate [social] context for ourselves and others.”25 Rights qua metanormative principles
serve purely as a guide, a standard, in evaluating, creating and reforming our laws and legal
system. This is not entirely new, however, as this metanormative function of rights serving as the
proper standard for laws and legal systems has always been part of the concept of rights. What is
new is the attempt to divorce rights from their normative roots. And it is not clear just who or
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what our rights-derived obligations are to if they “are not so much to individuals per se” and
“apply to no one in particular.”
Rasmussen and Den Uyl seem to blame state-of-nature theorizing for facilitating our
confusing metanormative principles with normative principles, or rights with what is right. They
point out quite rightly that in the absence of society, and all its norms and institutions, “securing
the setting (noninterference), in other words, appears to be the same as undertaking appropriate
conduct itself.”26 I do not see why state-of-nature theorizing is necessary for identifying
metanormative principles, i.e., rights; Rasmussen and Den Uyl only say it may be helpful; but
they are quite correct that it is virtually useless for generating the full range of normative
principles necessary for human flourishing in society. However, I also do not see how
considering man in society changes anything with regard to “securing the setting” being part of
“undertaking appropriate conduct itself.” Of course, the two are not identical; but the former is a
species of the latter.
It is both right by nature (that is, by appeal to human nature) that a certain context
for human action be secured and a right (in the sense of a claim about a certain
sort of treatment due one) that one not be treated in certain ways in light of what
is necessary to secure that context.”27
Certainly the latter is an important reason to respect the rights of others (or rather, why others
have rights), but it is not the only one. If both virtue and rights demand the same thing here, then
it is difficult to see why two separate primary sources of obligation should be maintained.
Indeed, it seems more natural to see the obligation to secure a proper social context simply as
part of the broader obligation we have to ourselves and to others sketched above in this and in
the previous sections. In other words, my obligation to secure the proper social setting for human
flourishing is a part of my obligations to myself and others. I respect rights both for myself and
26
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them, partly because it is the right way to behave towards others and partly in order to secure the
proper social context for all of us.
We can now profitably turn to the reasons why Rasmussen and Den Uyl reject the
conception of rights as interpersonal normative principles. One of these reasons has already been
foreshadowed in the previous paragraph and is exemplified in their critique of another
Aristotelian liberal account of rights as interpersonal normative principles. This is the account
offered by Henry Veatch.28
In his account, natural rights are not derivative of natural duties we owe to others,
nor are they the results either of social contracts or of interests manifested through
either calculations of personal or social advantage. Instead, natural rights are
derived from duties one naturally owes to oneself. The argument runs something
like this: since we all by nature have an obligation or duty of self-perfection
(given by an Aristotelian ethic), each of us is bound by nature to fulfill that
obligation. To prevent or interfere with a person’s efforts to fulfill his natural
obligation deprives the person of what he and others recognize he ought to do
(and so for each of us). Therefore, our duty to self-perfection generates the right
not to have the pursuit of our end impeded.29
Although Rasmussen and Den Uyl do not point this out, note that Veatch’s account of rights is
essentially a demand-side account, albeit of a more vulnerable kind than theirs. Rasmussen and
Den Uyl think Veatch commits what they call the moralist fallacy, which they define as “the
failure to distinguish clearly having a right from doing what is right.”30 They argue that it is
evident in Veatch’s theory “that one possesses the right to freedom from interference only so
long as one is pursuing one’s self-perfection,”31 for Veatch writes of the person “who engages in
nonperfecting conduct”: “The actions that he takes and the conduct that he pursues are then no
longer right at all; nor can his natural rights to life, liberty, and property be said to entitle him so
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to live in the way he has foolishly and unwisely chosen to do. In other words, that one should
abuse one’s rights must not itself be taken to be right, or even one’s right in any strict sense.”32
Rasmussen and Den Uyl are indeed correct that Veatch’s theory is confused. However,
neither Rand’s theory (arguably), nor Long’s, nor mine suffer from this problem. In our theories
a person’s rights do not depend upon whether he pursues excellence; they depend in part on the
conditions necessary for his flourishing but more importantly they depend on how others should
treat him in light of the requirements of their own flourishing. Nor are our theories in danger of
conflating rights with what is right. A right is clearly conceived as a moral claim and a claim to
legitimate legal enforcement of another’s prior obligation not to threaten or use initiatory
physical force. A right is clearly distinct from but intimately related to the obligation from which
it is derived. Certainly it is right to respect the rights of others and wrong to violate their rights,
but rights-respecting and rights-violating behavior do not exhaust the limits of what is right or
wrong.33
Rasmussen and Den Uyl have two related worries: that a conception of rights as
interpersonal normative principles leaves rights with no special work to do and that such a
conception endangers pluralism and individualism.
But if one goes further, as Veatch does, and conflates rights with what is right, not
only does one leave the concept of rights with no work to do that cannot be done
by duty or obligation, but, more important, pluralism and individualism are
thereby threatened. The more closely that rights are identified with what is right,
the more likely it is that a particular form of self-perfection will be structurally
incorporated into the principles of rights to the prejudice of other forms.
Furthermore, if one does not want one’s principles of rights to be vacuous, some
answer to the question of what is right must be given. Yet in a social context
where all individuals must be addressed, this answer must always be put in
32
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universal form – and it is precisely this universal form that is so problematic, even
contradictory, to the individualized nature of any positive account of selfperfection.34
It is clear how Veatch’s theory exemplifies a very real problem that gives rise to both worries.
However, I do not think that the theories offered by Rand, Long and myself succumb to them. To
answer the first worry first: There is a sense in which rights are convenient shorthand for certain
obligations we have to others.35 They serve as ready guides for how other persons should be
treated by us. In this sense, they do perform a useful function. Unlike Veatch’s account,
however, they have these rights primarily in virtue of what is required for our own flourishing,
not theirs. Furthermore, as a moral claim rights are distinct but not separate from the obligation
itself. But not all moral claims are rights. Rights do serve two unique purposes that serve in part
to distinguish them from other moral claims, viz., as a claim to legitimate legal enforcement of
said obligation and as a standard for evaluating, creating and reforming our laws and legal
system.
As to the second worry: The drive to universalize ethics into a detailed system of rules to
be applied the same way by and to everyone is indeed something to be worried about. However,
I do not think our accounts are guilty of this. To paraphrase Roderick Long, on the Aristotelian
conceptions of human nature and ethics sketched in this essay, it is possible to be both a generic
universalist and a specific pluralist. Moreover, we can make a distinction analogous to
Aristotle’s general and particular (or special) justice.36 The virtue of justice qua special justice is
concerned at a very basic, universal level with how human beings should treat each other qua
human beings and with how society should be organized. Indeed, these are two aspects of the
34
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same thing; for the proper context for social life is not simply a certain political/legal structure
(i.e., laws and a legal system that respect and protect rights) but also a matter of how rational
beings treat one another (i.e., by dealing with one another through reason, persuasion and
cooperation rather than violence). This does not exhaust the limits of justice, of course. Justice is
also, qua general justice, concerned with far more complex and particular issues; it is concerned
with the whole of interpersonal moral claims in general, with all those claims deriving from the
particular, contingent, highly context-dependent obligations called for by the other virtues, or, as
Aristotle would say, it is the whole of virtue in relation to others. But, to return to special justice,
at a very basic level we as human beings all have the same requirements for our flourishing both
as moral agents and as moral recipients, owing to our universal human nature: peaceful,
cooperative, productive, discursive co-existence with other human beings. Rights are a
recognition of that fact. Unlike other moral claims, the essential differences are that they apply to
everyone in particular and to everyone equally, in that each of us must not initiate coercion
against anyone else, and that they are legitimately enforceable. Even so, the proper application of
rights can be dependent on the full range of the virtues and on context. For example, if one
person is trespassing on another’s property without his consent, what does the property-owner
have a right to do? The trespasser is violating his rights, perhaps unintentionally, perhaps not.
The property-owner has a right to exclude him from his property (under normal conditions), but
in what manner can he legitimately exercise this right? Can the property-owner simply blast
away at the intruder with his 12 gauge shotgun? Well, that depends. It depends on a whole
complex host of issues: the type of neighborhood, where on the property the intruder is, the time
of day or night, the physical capabilities of the property-owner for self-defense, whether the
intruder looks threatening or makes a threat, whether the intruder refuses to leave after being told
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to do so (provided the context allows for a reasonably safe attempt at rational discussion first),
whether it is possible to call law enforcement agents and safely await their arrival, and more.
Rights cannot be applied blindly in a contextless manner.
Thus, given the foregoing considerations, it would seem that Rasmussen and Den Uyl
would consider my theory and Long’s to be equinormative. Our theories are not, however,
vulnerable to the worries or objections they have about equinormative theories. Rights are
derived from moral obligation but are nonetheless distinct from other moral claims. The
distinction between rights and what is right is maintained. Rights perform both normative and
metanormative functions. And, finally, it appears possible to derive rights from eudaimonia and
virtue without endangering pluralism and individualism or biasing the political/legal order in
favor of or against any legitimate form of human flourishing.
I have tried to sketch a theory synthesizing elements of Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s theory
with that of Long’s and Rand’s. In the process I have also attempted to anticipate some worries
or objections they are likely to have for Long’s approach and my own. A counter-worry for their
own position may be offered, however: human flourishing is highly individualized, granted, but
is it so individualized that there are no universal obligations that are common to all forms of
flourishing? If so, this would seem to contradict their own appeal to a universal human nature.
Moreover, it would seem to require the recognition as legitimate forms of flourishing ways of
life that hold the threat or use of initiatory physical force to be (at least sometimes) acceptable,
even admirable. If rights-respecting behavior is not a constitutive part of all legitimate forms of
flourishing, derived from the demands of our own eudaimonia and virtue, but is rather only a
metanormative, instrumental and external means to achieving a social context in which all forms
of flourishing are possible, then such ways of life cannot be ruled out as legitimate forms of
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flourishing and it is difficult to see how, according to them, rights as Rasmussen and Den Uyl
conceive them could be recognized as universally obligatory. Moreover, with two sources of
obligation and the possibility of conflict between virtue and rights, and if it is indeed possible for
virtue and one’s own flourishing to require we aggress against others, to violate their rights (even
though this obligation is trumped by rights), it would appear that the right to liberty does bias the
political/legal order in favor of some forms of flourishing (the non-aggressive ones) and against
others (the aggressive ones), but this would mean that the right to liberty violates one of their
criteria for metanormative principles and thus is unable to solve liberalism’s problem. Indeed,
this would suggest liberalism’s problem is unsolvable.
In maintaining that rights are not normative principles, Rasmussen and Den Uyl follow
the Rawlsian tradition of sharply separating politics from morality. It is true they do not want a
complete separation, for they do try to link political philosophy to an Aristotelian ethical
framework. This tension has led them to proposing that there are two primary sources of
obligation, normative and metanormative, and that metanormative principles are a different kind
of ethical principle but are ethical principles nonetheless.37 It is my view, however, that rights
considered solely as metanormative principles, separate from a constitutive role in selfperfection, are not ethical principles at all but rather just descriptive ordering principles of the
structure of a free society. But rights are not just metanormative principles in the above sense,
they are also normative principles and as such they play a direct role in ethical theory in
explaining in part what sort of behavior is required in order to live a flourishing life. In other
words, if rights were only metanormative principles as Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue then they
do no more than describe the conditions necessary for preserving the possibility of flourishing
for all in society. A reason to respect them would still be needed and I do not think that
37
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Rasmussen and Den Uyl have provided an adequate one. The apparent plausibility of their theory
rests upon prior acceptance of the values of pluralism and individualism and of a political/legal
order that is not structurally biased for or against any form of flourishing.

The Right to Life
The astute reader will have noticed that thus far I have discussed only rights abstractly in
the plural and, when in the singular, the right to liberty. What of the rights to life and property as
well as other rights? Objectivists in particular will no doubt wonder why I have been discussing
the right to liberty but not the right to life, which Rand held to be the “one fundamental right” of
which “all the others are its consequences and corollaries.”38 On the other hand, many
libertarians following Rothbard insist that the right to property is fundamental and that all rights
are essentially property rights. There is some truth to the latter claim, but the former is mistaken.
The reason I have focused on the right to liberty is that like Rasmussen and Den Uyl I hold that it
is actually this right that is the fundamental right of which all the others are its corollaries or
consequences.
It has not to my knowledge been noted before that Rand conflates the right to life and the
right to liberty. That she does so is clearly evident in the following passage from her essay
“Man’s Rights”:
A “right” is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man’s freedom of action
in a social context. There is only one fundamental right (all the others are its
consequences and corollaries): a man’s right to his own life. Life is a process of
self-sustaining and self-generated action; the right to life means the right to
engage in self-sustaining and self-generated action – which means: the freedom to
take all the actions required by the nature of a rational being for the support, the
furtherance, the fulfillment and the enjoyment of his own life. (Such is the
meaning of the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.)
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The concept of a “right” pertains only to action – specifically, to freedom of
action. It means freedom from physical compulsion, coercion or interference by
other men.
Thus, for every individual, a right is the moral sanction of a positive – of his
freedom to act on his own judgment, for his own goals, by his own voluntary,
uncoerced choice. As to his neighbors, his rights impose no obligations on them
except of a negative kind: to abstain from violating his rights.39
Notice that Rand defines rights as freedom of action, i.e., liberty. The right to life is elaborated to
‘the right to one’s own life’, which incorporates the language of ownership. Rand does go on to
say immediately after the last quoted passage above that “the right to property is their [other
rights] only implementation.”40 I fully agree, and the right to property will be discussed in more
detail in the next section. Notice also that Rand uses the singular in her parenthetical remark
about “the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”41 The Declaration of Independence
discusses these rights in the plural. Finally, notice that the argument Rand gives for rights in the
passages quoted above are essentially demand-side arguments. This is illustrative of the fact that
while her theory does provide normative reasons for respecting rights, unlike Rasmussen and
Den Uyl’s, it is still like theirs primarily a demand-side theory. Rand tends to focus on the
individual qua moral recipient while also recognizing that rights create the proper social context
within which all men can flourish, while Rasmussen and Den Uyl place almost exclusive
emphasis on the role of rights in creating this social context; the difference is largely a matter of
emphasis, with Rand focusing more on the personal (ethical) level of analysis and Rasmussen
and Den Uyl focusing more on the structural (political, metanormative) level of analysis.
Although, as I have argued, the overemphasis Rasmussen and Den Uyl place on the structural
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level of analysis is what prevents them from giving normative reasons for respecting rights as
Rand does.
What the foregoing is meant to suggest is that the right to liberty is the definitive and
fundamental right. Just because life is the standard of value in Rand’s ethical theory, in any
Aristotelian ethical theory, does not mean that in neatly symmetrical fashion the right to life will
be the most fundamental right. Rand believed that the right to life was the fundamental right
because her theory is essentially a demand-side one that focuses on the individual qua moral
recipient, i.e., on the conditions necessary for him to live a life proper to man. We have seen why
this is inadequate.
It will, I think, be instructive to look briefly at a particularly bad misinterpretation of
Rand’s theory of rights. In a footnote of his Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick wrote:
We should note Rand’s theory of property rights. . . , wherein these follow from
the right to life, since people need physical things to live. But a right to life is not
a right to whatever one needs to live; other people may have rights over these
things. . . . At most, a right to life would be a right to have or strive for whatever
one needs to live, provided that having it does not violate anyone else’s rights.
With regard to material things, the question is whether having it does violate any
right of others.42
Although Rand contributes to such a misinterpretation with her focus on the right to life and her
conflation of the rights to life and liberty, it is nonetheless difficult to understand how Nozick
could so badly misinterpret Rand’s theory. Rand is quite clear that the right to life and the right
to property are rights to freedom of action. Of the right to property in particular, she says “it is
not the right to an object, but to the action and the consequences of producing or earning that
object. It is not a guarantee that a man will earn any property, but only a guarantee that he will
own it if he earns it.”43 To the extent that the right to property and a theory of property are
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necessary for the proper implementation of the rights to life and liberty, Rand could agree with
Nozick on the following: “Since special considerations (such as the Lockean proviso) may enter
with regard to material property, one first needs a theory of property before one can apply any
supposed right to life (as amended above).” But he is correct that “the right to life cannot provide
the foundation for a theory of property rights,” just not for the right reason.44 Neither the right to
life nor the right to property are fundamental, the right to liberty is, for the other two are defined
in terms of it (even by Rand). It is the right to liberty that gives us the right to our own lives, free
from coercive interference, and to the particular objects (property) that we earn through
productive work and voluntary exchange.45 And the right to liberty is itself derived from the
virtue of justice which obligates A not to threaten or use initiatory physical force against B, i.e.,
to keep B free from aggression by A himself. The virtue of justice, of course, takes into
consideration the conditions necessary for human flourishing, both the individual’s qua moral
agent and that of others qua moral recipients.

The Right to Property
The core rights in the liberal tradition are the rights to life, liberty and property. 46 All the
others are merely their corollaries and consequences just as the rights to life and property are the
corollaries and consequences of the right to liberty. The previous section has already indicated
what I take to be the correct approach to property rights. It has also indicated the central
44
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importance of property rights to liberalism. More needs to be said about these two issues,
however.
I follow Rand, Rasmussen and Den Uyl, and Long in rejecting Locke’s claim that “God
or nature has given mankind a stock of objects (in common or otherwise) from which we must
devise a set of rules for just distribution (or even . . . for original ownership).”47 What the natural
world offers is the potential opportunity to transform its natural resources through human action,
i.e., productive work, into economic goods and wealth (property). These things do not come
ready-made in nature for us; rather, they are created. Even an apple in an uncharted forest is not
an economic good or anyone’s property, until someone plucks it from the tree. Therefore, “a
theory of property rights will . . . concern itself with legitimate exploitation of opportunities, not
with things or objects, and ‘ownership’ will be the legal expression of the legitimate exploitation
of opportunities.”48 Now, this is not to say that a theory of property rights cannot establish our
right to own things or objects. It is just to say that the focus of such a theory should be liberty,
i.e., freedom of action or the legitimate exploitation of opportunities.
Human beings are not beings of pure reason or disembodied souls. We live, we act, in the
world.
Our position is that human beings are material beings, not disembodied ghosts,
and that being self-directed is not merely some psychic state. Self-directedness
pertains to actions in the world, actions employing or involving material things at
some place and at some time. For such actions by individuals to be self-directed,
they need to have the use and control of what they have created and produced
protected from being used without their consent. Thus, it is not objects per se that
individuals need to have property rights to, as if any random distribution were
acceptable. A human being needs to have property rights to things that are the
result of his or her own judgments and productive efforts. A person’s choices and
judgments cannot be said to have been respected if the material expression of
those judgments is divested from the individual.49
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Furthermore, the things or objects themselves are not merely the ends of actions but, as
productions or creations, are features of the actions themselves.50 The individual has invested
part of his life into his material possessions, i.e., through devoting the effort of his own
judgment, actions and time to their production (or acquisition through trade). From these
considerations, Rasmussen and Den Uyl derive two points: “(1) the objects or possessions one
has must be considered an extension of what one is (assuming no dichotomy between oneself
and one’s actions) and not as items contingently attached to oneself; and (2) the concept of
‘opportunity’ must be a function of the general right to action [liberty] . . . if there is to be a
natural right to property.”51 Thus, considerations of how we should treat others are not limited to
their persons but extends also to their alienable property.
Earlier we saw that Nozick argued that considerations like the Lockean proviso – that
there be “enough and as good left in common for others”52 – might be necessary for determining
the proper application of the rights to life and property. Locke adds the additional qualification
on how much property people may own: “As much as anyone can make use of to any advantage
of life before it spoils.”53 A number of scholars have observed that even on Locke’s own terms,
and as he himself argues, the famous ‘enough and as good’ proviso as well as the spoilage
proviso are essentially made moot by the advent of money and free markets.54 Money does not
spoil. Well, hard money – historically, that “little piece of yellow metal” – at any rate, does not;55
fiat paper money, on the other hand, does lose value with inevitable government-induced
monetary and credit inflation. A hard money, free market economy will normally leave enough
and as good for anyone willing to exert the requisite responsibility and effort (although there will
50
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always be room and need for charity); indeed, such a social system serves, in Locke’s view, “to
increase the common stock of mankind” rather than lessen it.56 It is possible to go even further
than this, however. David Schmidtz has argued that because collective ownership and common
use wastes resources, generally resulting in a tragedy of the commons, "leaving resources in the
commons does not leave enough and as good for others. The Lockean proviso, far from
forbidding the appropriation of resources from the commons, actually requires appropriation
under conditions of scarcity."57
We have already rejected, however, the notion that mankind has been given a stock of
objects or even natural resources in common for which a just distribution must be determined. To
assume common property at the outset in formulating a theory of property rights, whether to
establish limits on private property or to argue against private property, is begging the question:
it assumes that which a theory of property rights is meant to establish, i.e, what constitutes
legitimate property. In light of this, Locke’s proviso and the spoilage proviso cannot get off the
ground. Rasmussen and Den Uyl suggest yet another reason that the Lockean proviso is moot:
[S]ince property is created or produced through an act of transformation, the
Lockean proviso that there must be “enough and as good” left for others in the
case of original appropriation is moot. For there can never be “enough and as
good” left for others if every action issues in a unique transformation. If an action
transforms the material order, there can be no identical forms of property until a
similar action accomplishes the same result. Picking an apple from a tree should
not be judged in terms of the number of apples left, but in terms of the action that
transformed the tree into a useful commodity.58
They then head off the likely objection that equivalent opportunities ought to be left for others.
[A]part from questions of scarcity, it is not clear why one has this obligation. This
is because one’s act of transformation in no way deprives another of what he has
56
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transformed. Nor is it the case that opportunities are as similar to each other as the
apples on the tree, since they are highly dependent on an individual’s
circumstances, interests, and abilities. Finally, opportunities are essentially
matters of judgment and thus in no way common.59
They point out that to “suppose that opportunities are themselves subject to prior obligations
(e.g., to others or the community) is equivalent to saying that one’s own judgments are so
obligated. This, however, is clearly slavery or the absence of any individual rights.”60 However,
one “may . . . have prior obligations that could affect what one does in exploiting an
opportunity,” such as respecting “existing rights that may exist around it” or the obligation of a
husband and father to support and take care of his family.61 Of course, only the obligation not to
violate the rights of others is legitimately enforceable.

Self-Ownership
The self-ownership thesis, the idea of owning oneself, was first explicitly used as the
starting point for a theory of property rights by Locke62 and still commonly serves this function
in contemporary libertarian thought (e.g., Rothbard and Hoppe). Self-ownership cannot serve
this function, however. It is essentially a cluster concept invoking individual sovereignty and
autonomy and the inviolability of the individual. To use it as a starting point, rather than as a
conclusion, is essentially to conflate “individuality, possession, and control”63 with ownership.
From the fact of the former,64 the latter does not automatically follow. Nevertheless, selfownership is true; it follows from the rights to life, liberty and property that one’s life is one’s
own – that each of us is an end in himself.
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Other Rights
I do not wish the reader to leave this essay with the impression that the rights to life,
liberty and property are the only rights we have. We can distinguish between basic natural rights
on the one hand and, on the other, constitutional, legal and contractual rights. “Basic” here
means that natural rights are “not founded on any other right and [are] the source of other,
derivative rights.”65 In this sense, the rights to life and property (and other natural rights) are not
derivative of the right to liberty; rather, they are expressions and further specifications of it. The
rights to freedom of speech, to freedom of religion, to keep and bear arms, and to privacy are of
great historical, theoretical and practical importance but they are just the application of the rights
to life, liberty and property to more specific issues. The basic natural right to liberty and its
corollaries and consequences are natural in the sense that they are founded in the nature of
human flourishing and are not, by contrast, the inventions (however useful) of positive law.
Constitutional, legal and contractual rights, then, fall into one or the other of two
categories: either they are positive law expressions of basic natural rights or they are derivative
rights – either way their legitimacy depends on whether they agree with or conflict with basic
natural rights. For example, so-called economic rights – alleged rights to adequate housing, a job,
a minimum or living wage, adequate health care, equal opportunities and fair competition, and so
forth – are not rights at all, for their fulfillment necessarily involves the threat or use of initiatory
physical force against those whose property must be expropriated to support the have-nots (and
often, as is inevitable, politically connected haves as well). In short, the effect of the doctrine of
economic “rights” is to enslave some for the material benefit of others. A rejection of the
doctrine of economic “rights” should not be taken to preclude any obligation to be generous or
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charitable, however. Quite the opposite, in fact: as Aristotle wisely observed, one can only truly
be generous or charitable with one’s own property and there is every reason to expect that people
in a free society generally will be.66 With regard to the right to keep and bear arms, the NRA and
many gun enthusiasts champion victories of employees over employers in which the formers’
right to keep and bear arms is allegedly upheld by forcing their employers to allow them to keep
firearms in their cars in the company parking lot, but the right to keep and bear arms cannot
conflict with and does not trump the right to property – employers have a right to prohibit
firearms on their property if they so desire. Likewise with the rights to freedom of speech and
religion, one has the right to say anything one wants or practice any religion one wants (or none
at all) on one’s own property or with permission on someone else’s, but one does not have the
right to say anything one wants on someone else’s property without their consent or to practice
their religion on someone else’s property against their wishes. Finally, the right to privacy exists
only to the extent that the privacy violations it protects against are in fact property violations
such that one has the right not to have one’s property broken into or stolen.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to show how Aristotelian liberalism promises a radically
new conception of natural rights. I have attempted to fulfill that promise by synthesizing several
apparently incompatible accounts of rights by Aristotelian liberals. This synthesized account
envisions rights as special, legally enforceable moral claims to freedom of action within a
delimited sphere – a “moral territory” – with the basic natural right to liberty being the central
and most fundamental right of which all the others are its corollaries and consequences.
Liberalism’s three core rights were reaffirmed as the rights to life, liberty and property. The right
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to liberty itself, I have argued, derives from the demands of our own eudaimonia, specifically the
virtue of justice, to deal with other rational and political beings through reason, persuasion, and
cooperation rather than through the use of force in its many forms. Such a supply-side account of
the derivation of rights and our obligation to respect them fully integrates liberal natural rights
into an Aristotelian virtue ethics. But rights also serve an important metanormative function, one
that should be clearly and conceptually distinguished from their role as interpersonal normative
principles; as metanormative principles rights protect the possibility of self-direction and thus the
possibility of all forms of human flourishing. Finally, I have sketched the implications of the
Aristotelian-liberal account of rights for the rights to life and property, other rights, and the
concept of self-ownership in order to better distinguish this approach from that of others. In the
next chapter I explore in more depth and detail the nature of human flourishing. More yet needs
to be said about its objectivity and obligatoriness as well as about the basic goods and virtues of
which it is comprised.
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Chapter Four.
Eudaimonia and the Basic Goods and Virtues
My philosophy, in essence, is the concept of man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the
moral purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his
only absolute.
– Ayn Rand
The basis for our disagreement [with Aristotle] is simply the unshakeable conviction that living is
not for the sake of knowing, but rather that it is toward intelligent living that all our powers and
capacities are ultimately directed, including our powers of knowledge, and that it is the man
himself who counts more than all his knowledge, no matter how great the latter may be.
– Henry B. Veatch, Rational Man
Basic goods, like knowledge, are for the sake of the fulfillment of individual human beings;
individuals are not for the sake of achieving basic goods. It is the perfection of the individual
human being, not disembodied reasoning, that ultimately matters. Our true end or good consists,
as Veatch emphasized, “in living intelligently.”
– Douglas Rasmussen, Forward to Rational Man
"No one chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become someone else." Aristotle's
words epitomize a radical disparity between the moral sensibilities of his time and our own. For
surely the motto of our time runs, "Show me how to possess the whole world and I will become
whomever you please."
– David Norton, Personal Destinies, p. 216

Introduction
The previous chapters were primarily concerned with sketching a new theory of natural
rights. Consequently, a number of important issues were either taken for granted or not examined
in detail. Some formal and substantive features of human flourishing were examined but it was
taken for granted that flourishing is man’s ultimate end and the proper standard of value in
ethics. This issue will be addressed in the first part of this chapter. Furthermore, the previous two
chapters only scratched the surface of the nature and content of flourishing. For example, some
of the basic goods and virtues that constitute flourishing were mentioned only in passing or
explained only briefly in their connection with rights. Rasmussen and Den Uyl do not discuss
these goods and virtues in any detail either and so the remainder of this chapter will be devoted
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to remedying this lack. Examining the basic goods and virtues will also serve to set the stage for
the chapters that follow.

Eudaimonia as Man’s Ultimate End and Standard of Value
The so-called is-ought problem stands as a major objection to any objective naturalistic
ethics. It has a number of variations. Perhaps the most fundamental version of the problem is the
assertion of a strict fact-value dichotomy which entails the consequent problem of how to derive
an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, a value from a fact. Many hold that there is an unbridgeable gulf between
‘is’ and ‘ought’. Indeed, it is practically taken for granted in our time. Second, there is the
question of the ultimate source of obligation: how is the ultimate prescriptive premiss justified?
Third, there is Moore’s open question argument which deals with the problem of defining the
good. These three versions of the is-ought problem can be seen as successive fallback positions
for the critic of an objective naturalistic ethics. If the first version of the problem is answered, the
critic can always fall back to the second version and likewise to the third. Finally, even if all
three of the aforementioned versions have been answered, the critic can fall back to criticizing
the particular conception of the good being offered. The previous two chapters and the next part
of the present chapter offer just such a particular conception, and anticipate some objections to it,
while the remainder of this part of chapter four aims to answer the three versions of the is-ought
problem. What follows is heavily indebted to part of chapter 2 of Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s
Liberty and Nature (1991).
How to Bridge the “Is-Ought Gap” by Transcending the Fact-Value Dichotomy
It has been pointed out that one cannot validly deduce conclusions about what ought to be
from premises about what is, assuming, of course a strict dichotomy between fact and value. In
other words, one cannot validly derive evaluative conclusions from non-evaluative premises.
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This is just an application of a general principle of logic regarding strict syllogisms, viz., that one
cannot validly deduce a conclusion including a predicate that is not contained in one of its
premises. As Hume famously observed:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always
remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God or makes observations concerning
human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual
copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not
connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is,
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some
new relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and
explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others,
which are entirely different from it.1
Such arguments invariably contain implicit evaluative premises for which no explanation or
justification has been given. The remedy is not simply to make such premises explicit for they
would still appear to run afoul of the fact-value dichotomy: how are they justified and what is
their connection (if any) to the non-evaluative premises (i.e., facts)? We still face the problem of
how to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. This is only an apparently insurmountable problem,
however, for as Rasmussen and Den Uyl observe: “if the world of facts is totally and completely
separate from values, then there is no way one can move from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’. So, the
problem faced is not so much one of how one derives an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ as it is the problem
of whether there is any conception of the ‘is’ that would allow for the existence of values.”2
The answer to the question of whether there is such a conception of the ‘is’, of course, is
yes. That conception was traditionally and still is a teleological one. It was only with the modern
rejection of teleology in favor of an atomistic and mechanistic metaphysical world-view that
values came to be divorced entirely from facts and the is-ought problem came to appear to be a
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serious one in ethics. We need not, however, defend the traditional versions of teleology that
have been rejected by many: such as mystical vitalist accounts, mechanical “as if” accounts, and
theistic accounts of teleology. We need not defend a conception of teleology that is universal,
grounded in anything other than nature, or operating according to some unified and pre-ordained
purpose. We need not defend a conception that postulates any particular origin of the species. As
Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue, all that is necessary for the naturalistic conception described here
“is that there be some facts which cannot be adequately understood without appealing to a
natural end or function.”3
A teleological ontology of potentiality and actuality (or, to use strict Aristotelian
terminology, of potency and act) would seem to be necessary for understanding change and can
provide an ontological foundation and real definition of the good. As Henry Veatch explains:
Things as we know them in the everyday world of common-sense reality are at
once universally and radically subject to change: from having been this, a thing
becomes that; or being this, a thing is still able to be or become other and
different; or not being this, a thing may still have a potentiality to become so. Nor
could anything possibly change or become different unless it were able to do so –
i.e., unless it had a potentiality for thus becoming and being other and
different. . . . In other words, it is just such abilities, capacities, and potentialities
that are everywhere to be found in our world and that are among the necessary
and requisite principles of change.
Further, one readily recognizes that any and all of these potentialities are
correlated with actualities. Indeed, “actuality” is no more than a term to designate
simply what a given potentiality is a potentiality for; and since any potentiality
must be a potentiality, capacity, ability, or capability for something, that
something is no more and no less than the actuality of that particular potentiality.
Moreover, insofar as I am not actually informed about something or other, but
only able to do so; or insofar as the seed is able to sprout and grow and develop
into the full-grown plant, but has not actually done so; or insofar as the coiled
spring has a potential energy, although there has been no actual release of that
energy – in all such cases a potentiality or mere capacity may be compared to the
corresponding and correlative actuality, as the imperfect to the perfect, the
incomplete to the complete, the undeveloped to the developed. It is as if a mere
3
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potency just as such somehow bespeaks a certain lack, or imperfection, of which
the actuality for its part is simply the fulfillment or completion.4
Value, or the good, may then be thought of in terms of the actual as compared with the potential:
it being the end toward which a thing, being the kind of thing it is, naturally tends.
More specifically, it does not seem possible to reduce our understanding of living
organisms in general and human beings in particular – how they grow and develop and act – to
explanations that “make no mention of the end or goal of the living process but only of how the
material constituents interact.”5 Indeed, the evidence speaks against such reductionism. As
Michael Bradie and Fred D. Miller, Jr. argue:
. . . the core of Aristotle’s teleology has been vindicated by modern biology. For
the point is that life processes are self-regulating in virtue of inherent forms or
structures. The type of movement required on Aristotle’s account for a potential
for form is the type of movement exemplified by the DNA molecule. The genetic
“program” contained in the manner set forth in Aristotle’s biological writings.6
There is then a natural naturalistic interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of teleology. Allan
Gotthelf (as Rasmussen and Den Uyl emphasize) “has argued that for Aristotle the primary use
of for the sake of concerns the development of living things.”7
Aristotle’s teleology is neither vitalist and mystical nor “as if” and mechanical.
The notion of an irreducible potential for form supplies the proper content to the
awareness that for Aristotle organic development is actually directive, without
implying (as the “immaterial conscious agency” interpretation does) that it is
directed; and it identifies the ontological basis of the awareness that the existence
and stages of development can be understood only in terms of its end – by
establishing that the identity of the development is its being irreducibly a
development to that end, irreducibly the actualization of a potential for form.8
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Thus, in the neo-Aristotelian conception of teleology described here, “teleology exists because
the very nature of living things involves the potential that is irreducibly for development to
maturity.”9
Life, Rand points out, is not automatic. Indeed, it is of a very conditional nature. “Life is
a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action.”10 Action is the use of scarce means, such
as time and resources, to achieve a particular end. The conditional nature of life not only makes
such end-oriented behavior possible (in the sense that a being must be alive to act) but actually
necessitates it. Living beings face alternatives: fundamentally, life or death, but generally also
between various ends and the proper means to achieve them. Good choices will tend to lead to
continued life and even flourishing, bad choices to suffering, injury, illness, even death.
What is the natural end of a human being, i.e., its mature or developed state? Is it the
actualization of any and all of its potentialities? Surely not, we must reply, for the critic will be
only too quick to point out that human beings have the potential to lie, cheat, steal and murder.
Indeed, man’s natural end involves the actualization of potentialities in connection with and in
light of that which is the essence of the kind of being he is: a rational animal. Man’s natural end,
then, is to live a rational life: the life of man qua man, not the life of a beast or a god, i.e., a life
of flourishing or well-being according to the standard set by his nature. Just as we can identify
the qualities that make a plant healthy and mature or unhealthy and defective, so too can we
identify the qualities that make a human being healthy, mature and good or unhealthy, defective
and bad. As Philippa Foot points out: “The structure of the derivation is the same whether we
derive an evaluation of the roots of a particular tree or the action of a particular human being.
The meaning of the words 'good' and 'bad' is not different when used in features of plants on the
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one hand and humans on the other, but is rather the same applied, in judgments of natural
goodness and defect, in the case of all living things.”11 The difference between natural norms and
moral norms, between values and moral values, is the element of choice. But if the moral is a
matter choice, why should we follow it?
But Why Should I_______?
This question – “if the moral is a matter of choice, why should I follow it?” – brings us to
the second formulation of the is-ought problem, viz., an objection pertaining to how one can
justify one’s ultimate prescriptive premiss. The ultimate prescriptive premiss of Aristotelian
virtue ethics is ‘One ought to live in accordance with the requirements of one’s nature’. The
objection poses an apparent dilemma – either our natural end is ineluctable and therefore not a
matter for morality at all or we can choose to obey or disobey it, in which case we can always
ask why we should follow it. Rasmussen and Den Uyl answer that our natural end is indeed
ineluctable as a potentiality but that its actuality or actualization is not ineluctable; we can
choose to pursue it or not. Their answer to the second half of the disjunct takes two stages. First,
they point out that
the obligatory character of ‘One ought to live in accordance with the requirements
of one’s nature’ results from the fact that this is the good for a human being. The
demand that we justify the obligatory character of this statement supposes that
something else is required for there to be values that are good. It supposes that
this ultimate prescriptive premiss is in fact not ultimate. This demand ignores the
facts which give rise to obligation. Further it fails to realize that in ethics, as well
as elsewhere, an infinite regress in justifications is not possible, and there must be
something ultimate; something which is simply the case.12
Thus, the ultimate prescriptive premiss of Aristotelian ethical theory cannot be proven in the
normal sense of deduction from premises.
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Intellectual historian David Gordon, in a review of Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Liberty and
Nature, in which the preceding argument is put forth, poses some minor criticisms of their
arguments that I think are mistaken and illustrative of common post-Humean misunderstandings
of the nature of Aristotelian ethics.
This reply [to this version of the is-ought problem] relies on a good Aristotelian
point, but does not in intention or effect show the correctness of the “prescriptive
premise.” This the reader must assess for himself. In an effort to assist the reader,
the authors provide a supplementary argument.13
Gordon is correct that the first stage of Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s reply does not “in intention or
effect show the correctness” of the ultimate prescriptive premiss. It is merely designed to correct
an incoherent objection to it based on its ultimateness. The obligatory nature of an ultimate
prescriptive premiss as such “does not require justification (nor could any be given),”14 but
justification can and does need to be provided for favoring one particular formulation over
another. However, Gordon fails to recognize the relevance of Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s
arguments in their preceding section (see also the preceding section of the present chapter)
wherein they explain the teleological and biocentric basis of values.
The second stage of Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s argument proceeds by way of Aristotelian
negative demonstration.15 The ultimate prescriptive premiss cannot be proven (in the strict
logical sense of that term) by deduction from premises because it is itself a first principle. In the
same way that Aristotle shows that he who denies the Law of Noncontradiction must in fact
accept its truth in order to do so, thus embroiling himself in a practical or performative
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contradiction, Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that the person who challenges the ultimate
prescriptive premiss of Aristotelian ethics actually accepts it.
The person who asks why he should live in accordance with the requirements of
his nature has a value he is trying to attain. He wants an answer to his question; he
is seeking a value. Yet wants or values are not metaphysically primary. Having an
answer to a question is a value only to a being for whom knowledge is a value and
for whom possessing knowledge as opposed to not possessing knowledge could
make a difference in its existence or functioning. Otherwise, there would be no
ultimate difference between possessing knowledge or not possessing knowledge
and thus no basis for knowledge being an object of pursuit for this being.
It is, as argued in the previous section, the natural end of a living thing which
necessitates and makes possible the existence of values – including the existence
of the value of having an answer to the question, ‘Why should one live in accord
with the requirements of one's nature?’ Someone could not, therefore, value the
answer to this question - the answer qua value and qua object of choice would not
exist - if it were not true that one should live in accord with the requirements of
one's nature. The very fact that the person values an answer to his question
requires the truth of the principle he is questioning. In asking his question, in
seeking an answer, the person accepts the principle he is questioning. In this way,
the obligatory character of ‘One ought to live in accordance with the requirements
of one's nature’ can be defended. It should be stressed, however, that this
‘negative demonstration’ does not prove this ethical first-principle. Only an
understanding of how values arise and what the human good is will allow one to
grasp the obligatory character of this ultimate prescriptive premiss.16
David Gordon responds:
This argument goes astray at its last step. Given the authors' account of value,
they say correctly that the value of a response to the question rests on the place of
knowledge within the natural end of human beings. Very well, then; if I ask the
question then I am in so doing acting in accordance with my natural end. But the
question is not: Is it ever permissible for me to act in accordance with my natural
end? It is, to reiterate, Why must I act in this way? The fact, if fact it be, that I
cannot ask the question without acting in accord with my nature does not show
that it is always wrong for me at other times to transgress my nature's
requirements. The authors’ response assumes the precise point that the inquirer
puts in question – the step from natural end to moral ought.17
To an Aristotelian, Gordon’s mistake here seems obvious. His objection to Rasmussen and Den
Uyl’s argument in this section is premised on an acceptance of the fact-value dichotomy that
16
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Rasmussen and Den Uyl have already dissolved. Gordon wonders how the is-ought gap is to be
bridged, but Rasmussen and Den Uyl (and I) have already shown this in the previous section.
Certain facts, at least, are value-laden. Indeed, values are facts too. Rasmussen and Den Uyl, and
I, have already shown in the previous section that man’s natural end is or ought to be desired and
chosen because it is good, and is not good simply because it is desired or chosen. In the case of
man’s natural end, at least, an ‘is’ has an ‘ought’ embedded in it; an ‘is’ can imply an ‘ought’ by
its very nature.
Gordon seems to have misconstrued the nature and purpose of the defense of the ultimate
prescriptive premiss by negative demonstration. The nature and purpose of the argument was not
to bridge the is-ought gap. That has already been done. Rather, the nature and purpose of the
argument was to show that the ultimate prescriptive premiss of Aristotelian ethics is in fact one
that everyone actually accepts. It is not simply that in seeking a value, a person is acting in
accordance with his nature. It is that in seeking a value, a person (implicitly at least) actually
accepts the ultimate prescriptive premiss ‘One ought to live in accordance with the requirements
of one's nature’ else he wouldn’t be seeking the value.
Before concluding this section it will be helpful to briefly discuss two things that
illuminate 1) the nature of the ultimate prescriptive premiss of Aristotelian ethics and 2) how, if
they cannot be arrived at by strict logical deduction, the ultimate prescriptive premiss and the
nature and specific content of man’s natural end are identified. With regard to (1), it might be
tempting to mistake the ultimate prescriptive premiss for a typical ‘if-then’ hypothetical
imperative, for it is surely not a categorical imperative. Categorical imperatives make no
reference to human ends, particularly man’s natural end: ‘Regardless of what ends you pursue,
you ought to do Y.’ But the ultimate prescriptive premiss of Aristotelian ethics is not an ‘if-then’

93

hypothetical imperative. Philosopher Roderick Long distinguishes two different kinds of
hypothetical imperative and the difference is crucial: the familiar ‘if-then’ he calls a problematic
hypothetical imperative, the other type he calls an assertoric hypothetical imperative and these
take the form of ‘since-then’ statements.18 ‘Since you ought to act in accordance with your
nature, and since your nature is X, you ought to do Y.’ Not: ‘If you desire X, then you ought to
act in accordance with your nature.’ And not: ‘If you believe you ought to act in accordance with
your nature, then you ought to do Y.’
Finally, with regard to (2), it bears pointing out, if an ought cannot be derived from an is
or a value from a fact by strict logical deduction, just how we can identify and derive values and
oughts. Part of the answer to this apparent dilemma is induction – not modern enumerative
induction (which is more akin to retroduction/hypothetico-deduction), however, but classical
induction, including concept-formation and classical inductive inference. The other part of the
answer is to reject the false metaphysical assumption of a strict fact-value dichotomy. Recall that
Hume’s is-ought problem is simply an extension of a general principle of logic to ethical theory,
viz., that one cannot validly deduce a conclusion including a predicate that is not contained in
one of its premises. In other words, one cannot validly derive evaluative conclusions from non-
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inherent potential for her or his mature state, which is that individual's natural end and has been identified as human
flourishing, and since this potentiality, though actualized through choice, is not itself a matter of choice but a matter
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“Thus, on the one hand, the obligation to do X, where X is either a means to or constitutive activity of human
flourishing, does not flow from the mere choice to pursue human flourishing; but, on the other hand, neither does
the obligation to do X result merely because one categorically ought to do X. It is recognized that human choice is
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case is the doing of X being actually good for us and worthy of our choice.”
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evaluative premises in strict deductive fashion. Hume’s is-ought gap applies only to strict logical
deduction and even then in order to be perceived as insurmountable it depends upon the false
metaphysical assumption of a strict fact-value dichotomy. The gap does not apply to classical
induction. Of induction and deduction, Aristotle says, in Nicomachean Ethics 1139b25-31:
And all teaching starts from what is already known, as we maintain in the
Analytics19 also; for it proceeds sometimes through induction and sometimes by
deduction. Now induction is of first principles and of the universal and deduction
proceeds from universals. There are therefore principles from which deduction
proceeds, which are not reached by deduction; it is therefore by induction that
they are acquired.20
And Ayn Rand explains that concept-formation, “[t]he process of observing the facts of reality
and of integrating them into concepts is, in essence, a process of induction.”21 It is in forming
concepts by integrating the facts of reality and in making inductive inferences that we identify
factual values, the value-laden implications of facts and derive an ought from an is.22
Knowledge, for Aristotle, derives from experience but is also constitutive of it; and yet,
such knowledge is not a matter of making hypothetical generalizations from atomistic
phenomena and then repeatedly testing them but rather of grasping the universal when we
perceive the particular. That man is a rational animal is a conceptual truth arrived at via
induction; the question of whether a particular perceived two-legged animal is a fullyfunctioning human being is an empirical (or thymological) matter, but this is still not the same as
retroduction which might look something like this: I've seen two dozen two-legged animals
(humans) and all were rational and capable of speech, therefore all two-legged animals are
rational and capable of speech (or, alternatively, therefore all humans are rational and capable of
speech). Classical induction depends upon Aristotelian essentialism; modern enumerative
19
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induction (unless recognized for what it really is: retroduction) assumes an atomistic and
mechanistic reality. And herein lies the root of the Humean is-ought problem: it rests upon
mistaken modern metaphysical and epistemological assumptions which Aristotelians reject.
Moore’s Open Question Argument and Defining the Good
Even if the strict separation of fact and value is accepted to be a false dichotomy, it still
might be objected that we cannot know the good. It might be that the human mind is incapable of
knowing things as they are. Although G. E. Moore’s open question argument, upon which he
bases his ‘naturalist’ or ‘definist’ fallacy, assumes a strict fact-value dichotomy, it can be adapted
as a purely epistemological and logical argument. Since the fact-value dichotomy has already
been dealt with previously, I will focus on the question of whether and how one can define the
good.
Moore’s naturalistic fallacy is the attempt to move from the fact that something is natural
to the fact that it is good, i.e., to move from the ‘is’ to the ‘ought’. Leaving aside all that has been
said in the previous sections, it is easy to see how Moore would say that Aristotelian ethics runs
afoul of the naturalistic fallacy: it appears to move illegitimately from the fact that man has a
natural end that he tends toward to the fact that man ought to pursue that end, i.e., that it is good.
Unlike Hume, Moore does not focus on the logical fallacy of attempting to deduce an ‘ought’
from an ‘is’. Instead, Moore focuses on what he takes to be the logical criteria of good definition.
Moore takes Bishop Butler’s dictum “Everything is what it is, and not another thing” as
the fundamental criterion of good definition.23 Applied literally, as Moore does, this criterion
results in purely tautologous definitions, in merely analytic truths. The test that Moore uses to
determine whether any given definition violates this criterion is the heart of his open question
argument: the conceivability of the opposite. Thus, if the opposite of the definition is conceivable
23
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then it cannot be a legitimate definition; a legitimate definition is one whose opposite is
inconceivable or self-contradictory. Defining the good as man’s natural end in this sense is
clearly not defining it as what it is and nothing else. Its opposite is conceivable, according to
Moore. No more is needed than for the question “But if a thing is natural, does that necessarily
mean that it is good?” to be a meaningful question. If this criterion be a good one, then the good
(or goodness as Moore prefers) can only be defined as the good (or goodness). Goodness cannot
be equated with any other property whatever, whether natural or supernatural; it can only be
equated with itself, for that is the only way it can be “what it is, and not another thing.”
Goodness is goodness. Goodness is essentially an indefinable, non-natural property.
As Henry Veatch points out, Moore’s argument is self-defeating. Not only do definitions
like “goodness is goodness” give us no information about the thing in question, being mere
formal or analytic truths, but Moore’s argument proves too much.
If any definition of the good must commit a fallacy, then on the same principles
just about any definition of anything must also commit a fallacy. If one defines A
as A, this is merely a tautology, not a definition. . . . Hence, on such principles, it
would seem impossible ever to define anything. And this is far more than Moore
himself ever bargained for.24
The result of accepting Moore’s criterion for good definition is that there can be no good
definitions of anything. Human knowledge is thereby made impossible, for there can be no
meaningful definitions of anything. “Water is H2O” must be considered a bad definition
according to Moore’s criterion; “Water is water” a good one.
Here’s a howdy-do. Any definition that meets Moore’s criterion must be of a form
that makes it quite impossible for it to be a definition at all, at least in the sense of
telling us what the thing being defined is. In short, to define anything is, on
Moore’s principles, to fail to define it, and to aim at knowing what anything is, is
to commit oneself to the logical impossibility of ever knowing what it is.25
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Clearly, this result is absurd. Moore’s criterion is too severe. We are then compelled to reexamine the validity of Moore’s criterion.
Moore’s doctrine of the naturalistic fallacy, together with Hume’s is-ought problem, has
been a leading source of moral skepticism in ethical theory. It has also served as a major impetus
for the transcendental or linguistic turn in ethics, which has resulted in many tortured attempts at
getting around Moore’s argument without challenging it directly. All of this can be avoided if we
simply reject Moore’s criterion. That it leads to a reductio ad absurdum is one good reason for
rejecting it. But other reasons can be given. One is that it is a mistake to conceive of all good
definitions as being tautologies. Moore’s argument involves a non sequitur. From the fact that
certain questions are always meaningful, it does not follow that the things we encounter in the
world must either be indefinable or generative of definitions that are either unquestionable or not
really definitions at all. Another reason for rejecting Moore’s criterion is that he has arguably
misinterpreted Bishop Butler’s dictum due to a flawed epistemology. We can agree with Butler
that it is a fallacy to attempt to define something in terms of what it is not. We can even agree
that a definition must be such that a denial of it is self-contradictory. As Rasmussen and Den Uyl
point out, the crucial issue is “how we determine whether a definition’s denial is selfcontradictory.”26 They make two important points: 1) Being open to questions about rightness
and correctness “is the price we pay for not dealing in trivialities and for not being omniscient.”27
Yet even being open to [such questions] does not establish the possibility that we
might be wrong or even that this definition might need changing. Rather, all we
know is that people can be mistaken or that definitions can be revised, but we do
not know that this might be the case in some specific instance. As noted before,
there is a difference between something being possible and something being
always and necessarily possible, and until and unless evidence for such alleged
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possibilities is forthcoming, there is no reason to regard the naturalistic definition
as flawed.28
2) “The meaningfulness of the question ‘But is it good?’ cannot always be determined from the
philosopher’s armchair.”29 To determine whether the definition “Water is H2O” is selfcontradictory or not requires knowledge of the chemical composition of water. Similarly, the
natural end of man cannot be determined purely from the philosopher’s armchair by an exercise
in freewheeling imagination. Finally, one more reason for rejecting Moore’s criterion bears
pointing out, and it is that in the Aristotelian tradition a good definition is not a tautology but
rather a real definition specifying genus and species and identifying the essential characteristics
of the thing defined. “Water is H2O” is such a definition.

Further Defining Eudaimonia: The Basic Goods and Virtues
Even if the foregoing arguments in defense of a natural end ethics should be accepted,
critics may still fall back to criticizing the particular conception of man’s natural end being put
forth. I cannot provide a thorough defense of my own Aristotelian-liberal conception of human
flourishing here, but it is necessary to describe it in more detail and to say something in support
of it. The previous two chapters have largely been about rights, although they have dealt in some
detail with formal features of human flourishing as well as some of its substantive content.
Despite their central importance in political philosophy, Aristotelian liberalism is not only
concerned with rights. There is much more to ethics than rights. One of the gravest mistakes of
contemporary liberalism has been to narrow the scope of objective ethics to rights or to expand
the use of rights-language to encompass all of ethics, issues normally covered by the concepts
‘goods’ and ‘virtues’. Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter I wish to put more emphasis on
the basic goods and virtue that comprise human flourishing.
28
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Flourishing vs. Survival
But first, I want to deal in more detail with a controversy between two camps of
Aristotelian liberals, viz., the debate over whether the proper standard of value in ethics is
flourishing or survival. The survivalist standard is held mainly by a number of Objectivists.
David Kelley and William Thomas, in particular, in the working draft of their unpublished
manuscript The Logical Structure of Objectivism spend a couple of pages critiquing the
flourishing standard. Although I do not find their critique at all compelling, it nevertheless needs
to be addressed. Doing so will also be useful in forestalling a common mistake made by critics of
Aristotelian liberalism, since several critics have inexplicably misinterpreted the flourishing
standard espoused by Rasmussen and Den Uyl as a survivalist one.
Ayn Rand argues that the proper standard of value in ethics – “the standard by which one
judges what is good or evil – is man’s life, or: that which is required for man’s survival qua
man.” And since “reason is man’s basic means of survival, that which is proper to the life of a
rational being is the good; that which negates, opposes or destroys it is the evil.”30 Now, Rand’s
use of the word ‘survival’ might lend itself to the unsubtle reading that what she has in mind is
bare survival, but this would be a mistake for then it would make no sense for Rand to qualify
‘man’s survival’ with the phrase ‘qua man’. This signifies that the standard is survival as the
kind of being man is, a rational being, and not as anything else, e.g., a god or a beast. Beasts act
for mere survival, and reproduction. Such a life is beneath man. Rather, Rand’s standard is a
flourishing one, and this interpretation conforms better with the moral vision she dramatizes in
her novels.
Oddly though, Kelley and Thomas interpret Rand as arguing for a bare survivalist
standard premised on “the bare fundamental alternative of survival versus death that stands at the
30
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root of all values.” They argue that “survival is the literal alternative of life versus death,
existence versus nonexistence.”31 They explicitly exclude the potentialities and capacities of man
from their conception of human life while recognizing that those who adhere to the flourishing
standard include these.32 But how is a standard that does not include the potentialities and
capacities of man really a standard grounded in human life? They then proceed to construct a
straw man argument and diagram it:
Premise 1 states the assumption that a flourishing life is the ultimate value.
Premise 2 adds the rich content assumed in the “flourishing” conception of life: a
flourishing life consists of rationality, productiveness, benevolence, etc. The
conclusion summarizes ethics in one fell swoop: rationality, productiveness,
benevolence, etc., are virtues.33
Of course, those who adhere to the flourishing standard do not pretend to make so simplistic an
argument as this. A full argument would require expanding both premises into a series of
inductive and deductive arguments. Neither premise is or need be taken for granted, particularly
the rich content of a human life.
Kelley and Thomas go on to assert on the basis of this straw man argument that the
content of the flourishing standard is arbitrary. They claim that unlike the survivalist standard
that they espouse, there is no clear, fundamental criterion or established procedure for
determining the contents of the good life, of what is of value and what is not. Flourishing is just a
grab-bag of whatever its advocate happens to deem admirable or desirable, included without
proof that the thing in question really is a good or a virtue. The flourishing standard, Kelley and
Thomas claim, is a rich, derivative concept whereas the survivalist standard is a clear and
fundamental one; the former must be based on the latter and cannot serve as the ultimate
standard.
31
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Kelley and Thomas pose the following problem: “For instance, a communitarian may
think that man is by nature a political animal. He argues that man needs to be enmeshed in
tradition and social rules, and that individual rights are therefore contrary to flourishing. How
can a classical liberal advocate of life-as-flourishing objectively gainsay that?” Why, for one
thing, he can agree in whole or in part with the communitarian’s premises and still disagree with
the conclusion, arguing that it does not follow, that in fact individual rights are all the more
necessary because man is a social and political animal enmeshed in rich cultural traditions and
norms.34 “The communitarian and the classical liberal would end up arguing over the meaning of
flourishing, over the standard of their supposedly shared ethics.”35 Well, this sort of
disagreement is not unlikely in any case, even if one’s standard is bare survival.
Kelley and Thomas claim: “Unlike flourishing advocates, however, Objectivism clearly
states what it means to base our principles in human nature.” Really? But they give no evidence
for this claim that flourishing advocates do not. They simply assert it. “Properly understood, a
“flourishing” life is a good life, but only because the capacities that are exercised in flourishing
are in fact conducive to survival.” Yes, meeting the criteria for a flourishing life does tend to be
conducive toward long-term survival, but two important issues are 1) whether the goods and
virtues of a flourishing life are valuable only insofar as they are conducive toward long-term
survival and 2) whether survival ought to be conceived as bare survival or as survival qua man,
i.e., flourishing. “This is true throughout the realm of living things. When we speak of plants as
flourishing, we mean that they are strong, healthy and capable of living.”36 And the flourishing
advocates also argue that identifying good and bad as they pertain to human beings is the same
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procedure as identifying good and bad as they pertain to other plants and animals. “Health and
strength not only stave off death in the moment, but raise the chances of survival into the future.
Every life is a span, and a human life in particular is a long span: capacities that are conducive to
survival increase the likelihood that that span will be prolonged.”37 Herein lies a major difference
between the survivalists and the flourishers as well as a major mistake of the bare survivalist
standard. Unlike a plant, a man can choose to die. And unlike other animals, a man can choose in
a truly volitional way to die for moral reasons. At the end of Rand’s novel Atlas Shrugged, for
instance, John Galt is prepared to die rather than see his lover Dagny tortured for the purpose of
extracting his compliance. A bare survivalist standard cannot account for such a decision or
action. For a human being, unlike for plants and other animals, flourishing is more than just
highly successful survival at any cost – even though the character traits that tend to promote
highly successful survival and the character traits that count as flourishing tend to be the same.
Kelley and Thomas will surely object to the phrase ‘at any cost’, claiming that they do not
advocate survival at any cost, but only from a flourishing standard could some costs be judged
too great to be born or imposed in the name of continued survival.
Aware of the criticism that the survivalist standard is too narrow or shallow to
accommodate the goods and virtues usually associated with flourishing, Kelley and Thomas
attempt to address it. They say that while “survival is a binary condition, success in survival is
not”38 and want to equate flourishing with highly successful survival. They point out that
organisms ward off harm and death by developing redundant capacities such that the loss of one
or more is not necessarily immediately fatal. The various goods and virtues are among these
capacities, the more we can gain and keep them the more successful we will tend to be at
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surviving well, i.e., flourishing. They put much emphasis on something which they say critics
often overlook, quoting Rand’s formulation “‘survival at any price’ . . . may not last a week or a
year.”39 This line of argument, and the interpretation they give to Rand’s work, suggests that the
goods and virtues are to be valued merely or primarily for their contribution to man’s chances of
survival. As such, the goods and virtues appear to be merely instrumental and external means to
a dominant end, survival. Men should consistently follow the proper moral code, for which
survival is the standard of value, even when it might mean his death, because to do so maximizes
his chances of surviving well. Objectivist ethics, on this view, is a form of rule-consequentialism.
And indeed, from personal conversations with Kelley and Thomas, they do conceive of
Objectivist ethics as a form of rule-consequentialism.
I don’t think this response by Kelley and Thomas really answers the objection that a
survivalist standard is too narrow or shallow to accommodate the goods and virtues usually
associated with flourishing. By relegating the goods and virtues to the role of mere instrumental
means to a dominant end, they are diminishing or downgrading the value of the goods and
virtues relative to their role in an ethics based on a flourishing standard – for in a flourishing
standard the goods and virtues are part of an inclusive ultimate end; they are both final ends,
valuable in themselves, and constitutive means to an inclusive, most final end. Thus the
survivalist standard has the effect of conceptually diminishing the importance of the goods and
virtues, which in itself is problematic but can also potentially have psychological and
praxeological effects on their pursuit. The focus on consequences, with bare survival as the
standard, I should think, will tend to cheapen the goods and virtues as well as human
relationships and to encourage choosing survival over flourishing.
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Roderick Long has argued that indirect- or rule-consequentialism is conceptually
unstable.40 This is a separate argument from the familiar one that rule-consequentialism is
psychologically unstable, which would be an empirical rather than a conceptual question. Actconsequentialism is generally rejected by moral philosophers. A survivalist standard in this mode
would result in an ethics of bare survival over the short-term at any cost, because each action
would be evaluated in light of its consequences for one’s immediate survival. With ruleconsequentialism, a set of rules or moral code, is valued, adopted, and meant to be followed
consistently because it will tend to lead to far greater success in producing the desired
consequences. The problem is this, rule-consequentialism holds morality to be an instrumental
means to an end, but it requires us to treat morality as if it were an end in itself, even though it is
not one. I cannot act as if morality is an end in itself; either it really becomes so for me, or it
remains a mere instrumental means. When I act I must treat morality either as an instrumental
means or an end in itself. If I treat morality as an instrumental means, then morality is of no
value in and of itself; it is only of value inasmuch as it produces the desired consequences. So if I
treat morality as a mere instrumental means, even when I act morally in a given situation
(because it happens that this time the right thing to do will have the desired consequences) I am
committed to rejecting morality in situations in which acting morally will not have the desired
consequences but acting immorally will. In other words, if I treat morality as a mere instrumental
means I am acting as an act-consequentialist; but rule-consequentialism already rules out actconsequentialism as untenable. If instead I treat morality as an end in itself, I am not acting as a
consequentialist at all. I have then become a deontologist or a virtue ethicist, and I must reject
consequentialism on pain of inconsistency. But consequentialism and the survivalist standard go
hand in hand, and so the survivalist standard must be rejected as well. Rand rejected deontology
40
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too, so the Objectivists who continue to agree with her on this have nowhere to turn except virtue
ethics, which is inherently based on a flourishing standard.
One more claim made by Kelley and Thomas remains to be addressed. They close their
defense of the survivalist standard and criticism of the flourishing standard with a paragraph that
includes the following: “Flourishing cannot substitute for the alternative of life versus death as
the basis of ethics, any more than happiness can.” But why is this? Aside from their point that
survival is a binary alternative, their claim that survival is more fundamental, their unsupported
claim that the flourishers provide no clear, fundamental criterion or established procedure for
determining the contents of the good life, and their diagrammed straw man version of the
flourishing argument, they have offered no arguments to back up this claim. Happiness, as
Objectivists define it, which is as an emotion, cannot be the standard of ethics for familiar
reasons that both Aristotle and Rand discuss.41 But flourishing, which is a decent translation of
Aristotle’s eudaimonia, does not suffer from this flaw. Moreover, although they claim survival is
the binary alternative at the base of ethics, nearly all of the choices we make involve a range of
alternatives from surviving well to surviving less well. Enough bad choices can lead to death, but
most choices people make are not conscious choices to embrace death, either straight away or in
a drawn out process. Even those who do choose death must necessarily see a life ending in the
time and manner of their choosing as being preferable to a life ending in a different time and
manner. In practice then, a flourishing standard is the standard all rational beings at least
implicitly employ.
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The Basic Goods and Virtues
So in what then does human flourishing consist? I will make no attempt here to provide
an exhaustive list. Not everyone’s exhaustive list need be exactly the same. And such a task is
not really appropriate for armchair philosophizing to begin with. What matters is to identify a
core set of basic goods and virtues important to the flourishing of all men. Such a set of goods
and virtues is no danger to pluralism and diversity. Aristotelian liberals are careful to distinguish
between the goods and virtues in the abstract, at a general theoretical level, from the goods and
virtues in their particular concrete manifestations, at the practical level. A general, theoretical
analysis of human flourishing cannot reveal any a priori weighting of the goods and virtues. And
at the practical level, the particular concrete manifestations of the goods and virtues can vary
considerably from culture to culture, community to community, organization to organization, and
person to person, while still retaining universal characteristics that identify them as
manifestations of certain goods and virtues. None of this should suggest that we are merely
engaging in an empiricist cross-national study such that we can only identify goods and virtues
universal to all cultures. An analysis of human flourishing, while it must pay attention to
historical and cultural evidence, is not bound by a scientistic process of enumerative induction.
As such, it is quite possible to critique particular cultures, to identify elements that are contrary
to the requirements of human flourishing.
A good place to start would be with goods and virtues identified by Aristotle. In Rhetoric
1362b0-28 Aristotle lists a number of goods and some of the virtues that he also discusses in the
Nicomachean Ethics. Rasmussen and Den Uyl summarize the list of goods as 1) intellectual
ability (including speech), 2) intellectual pursuits, 3) health (including action, pleasure and life),
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4) friendship, 5) honor, 6) wealth, 7) beauty, 8) justice, and 9) artistic pursuits.42 In Aristotle’s
own words:
Further, health, beauty, and the like, as being bodily excellences and productive of
many other good things: for instance, health is productive of both pleasure and of
life, and therefore is thought the greatest of goods, since these two things which it
causes, pleasure and life, are two of the things most highly prized by ordinary
people. Wealth, again; for it is the excellence of possession, and also productive
of many other good things. Friends and friendship; for a friend is desirable in
himself and also productive of many other good things. So, too, honour and
reputation, as being pleasant, and productive of many other good things, and for
the most part accompanied by the presence of the good things that cause them to
be bestowed. The faculty of speech and action; since all such qualities are
productive of what is good. Further – good parts, strong memory, receptiveness,
quickness of intuition, and the like, for all such faculties are productive of what is
good. Similarly, all the sciences and arts. And life; since, even if no other good
were the result of life, it is desirable in itself. And justice, as the cause of good too
the community.43
Of the moral virtues (and their corresponding vices of excess and deficiency), Aristotle discusses
1) courage (the mean between rashness and cowardice); 2) temperance (licentiousness and
insensibility); 3) generosity or liberality (prodigality and illiberality/meanness), a minor virtue
regarding getting and spending; 4) magnificence (vulgarity and pettiness/extreme stinginess), a
major virtue regarding getting and spending; 5) magnanimity (vanity and pusillanimity), a major
virtue regarding honor and dishonor; 6) proper ambition or pride (excessive ambition/empty
vanity and unambitiousness/undue humility), a minor virtue regarding honor and dishonor; 7)
patience or good temper (irascibility and lack of spirit); 8) truthfulness (boastfulness and
understatement/mock modesty); 9) wittiness (buffoonery and boorishness); 10) friendliness
(obsequiousness/flattery and cantankerousness); 11) righteous indignation (envy and malicious
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enjoyment/spitefulness); and 12) justice (injustice).44 Aristotle also discusses five intellectual
virtues: 1) art or technical skill/knowledge, 2) scientific/philosophical knowledge (of the
universal and necessary), 3) practical wisdom or prudence, 4) theoretical wisdom, and 5)
intuitive wisdom.45
Aristotle’s list of goods and virtues seems fairly uncontroversial, even commonsensical.
They are not all of immediate and central importance to political philosophy, however, although
one could probably show in what ways each of the goods, virtues and vices can affect and be
affected by politics. Disagreements may arise over particular specifications of what counts in the
concrete as an instance of a particular good or virtue. In the face of such disagreements one must
make recourse to philosophical insight as well as scientific and other empirical evidence. That
intellectual ability, pursuits, knowledge and wisdom should be counted as goods and virtues, as
the case may be, ought to be clear. As a rational animal, man’s rational capacity is central to his
functioning. While the range of our raw intelligence is fairly fixed by genetics, environmental
and educational factors and our personal choices do influence where we fall into that range and
how well we are able to exercise our rational capacity. The different forms of knowledge, skill
and wisdom have their uses in living the good life and are valuable in themselves. We can
disagree with Aristotle, however, that the contemplative life is the universal and objective ideal.
Practical wisdom is in some sense the master virtue, for it is the integrator of all the goods and
virtues into a complete life and it guides the proper application of the other virtues. Aristotelian
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prudence is not pure, calculating prudence à la Hobbes, however; while the moral virtues without
practical wisdom are blind, practical wisdom without the moral virtues is empty.46
Some of Aristotle’s moral virtues have more immediate and central importance for
political philosophy than others. Perhaps chief among these is courage. Like other Greeks, and
Romans too, Aristotle put undue focus on courage in the face of physical violence, harm and
death. This is a martial courage. Aristotle does briefly discuss a political form of courage that is
related to what he calls true courage, but he links this perhaps too tightly to legal penalties and
honor. One can, and ought to, be courageous with regard to much more than this. It takes
courage to face unpleasant truths, about oneself and others, ideas and institutions, and facts. It
takes courage to take the initiative to do what needs doing. It takes courage to put one’s beliefs
and one’s reputation out into public and/or political arenas to be challenged, tested, possibly even
refuted. It takes courage to stand up for what is right, particularly when no one else will. If
otherwise good people systematically lack courage in these areas, a free and flourishing society
is not likely to remain so for long. Temperance is also relevant, at least insofar as this: if
licentiousness and self-indulgence, particularly of certain kinds, become sufficiently prevalent
they can erode other goods and virtues as well as precipitate crises that incentivize aggression.
Generosity is also integral to a free and flourishing society, but we need not limit it to money as
does Aristotle – we can also extend the things we are generous with to time, physical labor,
advice and the like. Generosity in the form of charity fills an important role in society, for there
will likely always be those in need due to unforeseeable and uncontrollable unfortunate
circumstances or due to forgivable mistakes. But a systematic prodigality, of giving too much,
especially to the wrong people or for the wrong things, will result in capital consumption –
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which means a stagnating or regressing economy, worse lives materially-speaking for the givers
and less to give in the future.47 I leave off a discussion of justice, as a good and as a virtue, for
later.
While I do not think Aristotle intended his list of goods and virtues to be complete, to the
modern liberal there are a number of important omissions that need addressing. It will be
instructive now to turn to the goods and virtues identified by Aristotle-influenced liberal
philosopher-novelist Ayn Rand and a couple of her followers. Rand’s list too is not intended to
be exhaustive but rather to identify the essential, major goods and virtues central to a flourishing
life and to establish a stark contrast between her conception and the prevailing mistakes of her
time. Rand identifies three cardinal values (goods) and seven cardinal virtues. The goods are
reason, purpose and self-esteem. And the virtues are rationality, productiveness and pride,
corresponding to the three cardinal values, as well as independence, integrity, honesty and
justice. Rand argues that productive work is the central propose of a rational man’s life. It is both
made possible and necessitated by man’s faculty of reason. Life is conditional and values do not
come automatically. One must produce values in order to maintain and further one’s life, and to
do that well one must make rational use of one’s mind. While the virtue of productiveness is not
limited to the economic realm narrowly defined, as values are not, productive work is a central
part of it. It provides one not only with the ‘material’ values needed to survive and flourish but
also a core personal identity with which to integrate and determine the hierarchy of all one’s
other values. Knowing that we are efficacious and worthy of a flourishing life results in
necessary self-esteem. And the virtue of pride is a commitment to moral perfection, to earning
that self-esteem, to avoiding vice and correcting one’s flaws and moral errors.
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Rationality, Rand argues, is man’s basic virtue, for it makes the others possible and is
presupposed by them. It “means the recognition and acceptance of reason as one’s only source of
knowledge, one’s only judge of values and one’s only guide to action.”48 In productive work it
“means the consciously chosen pursuit of a productive career, in any line of rational endeavor,
great or modest, on any level of ability.”49 We have already seen how rationality is a part of the
virtue of pride. It bears pointing out that Rand’s conceptions of self-esteem and pride are much
more internal than conceptions of honor and pride held by Aristotle as well as other classical
Greeks and the Romans; Rand’s does not center around appearances and external recognition as
does theirs’. For Rand, a commitment to rationality also means:
. . . one’s acceptance of the responsibility of forming one’s own judgments and of
living by the work of one’s own mind (which is the virtue of Independence). It
means that one must never sacrifice one’s convictions to the opinions or wishes of
others ( . . . Integrity) – that one must never attempt to fake reality in any manner
( . . . Honesty) – that one must never seek or grant the unearned and undeserved,
neither in matter nor in spirit ( . . . Justice).50
Objectivists David Kelley and William Thomas add an eighth cardinal virtue, which they see as
being consistent with and implied by Rand’s philosophy: benevolence, which subsumes four
minor virtues: sensitivity, tolerance, civility, and generosity.51
Rand presents three of the virtues as corresponding to the three cardinal values. She also
gives each of these three virtues – rationality, productiveness and pride – its own paragraph. The
four other cardinal virtues – independence, integrity, honesty and justice – she discusses within
the paragraph on the virtue of rationality. Given these facts, it seems as if Rand thought of the
four as minor virtues subsumed under the major virtue of rationality, yet important enough to
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rank as cardinal virtues. Independence is an important virtue. While many critics of liberalism
fear atomism, the human propensity to fall in with the herd is much more worrisome and
prevalent. The virtue of independence recognizes that we are separate persons with our own
minds which we must use to make decisions. It means that if we are to live a flourishing life that
is our own, we must take the responsibility to think and work for ourselves rather than abdicate
this responsibility to others. The virtue of integrity touches on this responsibility too. Rand
couches it in the sense of having the courage of one’s convictions in the face of social pressure
but more generally it is about endeavoring to have a consistent set of principles and to holding to
them whatever temptations one might face, be they other people, unfortunate situations or one’s
baser inclinations. Rand’s conception of honesty is the most unusual, for it is not simply about
telling the truth or not lying. It is more fundamental than that. While the virtue of honesty entails
that it is generally right to tell the truth and wrong to lie, sometimes (contra Kant) lying may well
be the right thing to do. The classic example is the case of a would-be kidnapper demanding to
know where your child is hiding. It is excessively rigid and a-contextual, typical of a deontic rule
as opposed to a virtue (a principle), to maintain that lying in such a case is immoral. A
deontologist might reply that one does not have to lie, one could simply not answer instead. The
consequences of keeping silent are likely to be severe, and keeping silent will not necessarily
direct the would-be kidnapper away from one’s child. This is an ethics for a god, not a man.
Instead, a more fundamental conception of honesty involves never faking reality (to oneself or to
others) – which means not attempting to acquire values via fraud and not shying away from the
facts, including one’s proper hierarchy of values. It is not wrong to lie to protect one’s values
from criminals, i.e., those attempting to expropriate your values by force or fraud. To tell the
would-be kidnapper the truth, or likely even to keep silent, would be to put the lie on the value
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your child is to you. Similarly, it may also be right in certain contexts to lie to protect one’s
privacy from snoopers.52 Finally, once again I will put off discussing the virtue of justice until
later.
Rational beings are also capable of communication and conscious, purposeful
cooperation. Being social and political beings is part of what it means to be a rational being. We
are born in a social environment. We derive enjoyment from being in the company of other
human beings who share our ideas and interests. We acquire much of our knowledge from other
human beings. We depend upon exchanging the values we produce for the values they produce
in order to survive and flourish. Social existence enables the division and specialization of labor
responsible for the continual expansion of knowledge and economic progress that we benefit
from today. We naturally form into groups to cooperate in the pursuit of shared ends. Together
we accomplish much more, and live much better lives spiritually and materially, than we would
alone.
There are a number of virtues made possible and required by human social existence.
Many of the virtues we have already discussed have readily recognizable social dimensions.
Other important social virtues include those that Kelley and Thomas argue should be added to
Rand’s list of cardinal virtues: benevolence and the minor virtues subsumed under it: sensitivity,
generosity, civility and tolerance. Benevolence means having a habitual disposition of goodwill
towards others. Sensitivity involves being alert to the interests, feelings, concerns, needs and so
forth, of others, particularly our friends. Generosity is that virtue in which we give of ourselves
to others out of a sense of fullness or overflowing, without any expectation of receiving anything
definite in return. Civility involves being polite and courteous in myriad ways and the virtue of
tolerance involves enduring ideas or practices with which we disagree. It is easy to see how these
52
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virtues serve to grease the wheels of social relationships, so to speak, while their lack can cause
friction and even grind cooperation to a halt. Civility and tolerance, in particular, are also
necessary for the joint pursuit of truth because they facilitate open discussion and debate.
There are two important aspects of Aristotle’s ethical theory that Rand unfortunately
seems to have rejected without fanfare. These are 1) the distinction between intellectual and
moral virtue and 2) the doctrine of the mean. For Aristotle, rationality in its several forms –
intuitive, theoretical and practical wisdom as well as skill and knowledge – is an intellectual
virtue. For Rand, it is a moral virtue. This might help to explain an unfortunate tendency among
many Objectivists to moralize, to denounce intellectual errors (actual or perceived) as evil. This
tendency led Objectivist David Kelley to argue in favor of the virtue of tolerance and to found an
independent branch of the Objectivist movement.53 While I agree that tolerance is a virtue, I do
not think it goes far enough in curbing the tendency to moralize. So long as rationality is seen as
a moral, rather than an intellectual, virtue, any deviation from what is perceived as rational
necessarily must be seen as immoral as well. It is not by the ideas we hold but by what we do
that we count as being good or bad. Intellectual error can lead to immoral actions, to be sure, and
moral failings (vices) can lead to bad intellectual habits that produce intellectual errors that in
turn lead one to vice and crime. In other words, vice can lead to a lack of practical wisdom but a
lack of practical wisdom is not itself a moral vice. For Aristotle, practical wisdom guides the
proper application of the moral virtues but gets its content from them. Practical wisdom without
the moral virtues is empty; the moral virtues without practical wisdom are blind.
Rand also quietly drops Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. But the doctrine performs useful
practical and theoretical functions. Simply at a practical, day-to-day level the doctrine of the
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mean can be useful for determining the right thing to do in a given situation, because contrasting
a virtue with vices at two extremes provides one with more specific information than the virtue
alone. As Aristotle says, there are more ways to do the wrong thing than the right.54 This is true
at the theoretical level too: conceiving of a virtue and its two vices in relation to one another
gives one a better grasp of the meaning of each, which should aid in richer, more contextual and
nuanced theorizing. The doctrine is also useful for developmental purposes, for selfimprovement or pedagogy, as Aristotle himself points out, for if one knows he has a tendency
toward a particular deviation from a virtue, e.g., courage (the proper response to fear and
potential harm), say toward excess (rashness), then he can attempt to habituate himself in the
virtue of courage by consciously erring in the direction of deficiency, what he might normally,
though erroneously, consider to be cowardice.55 Related to this is Aristotle’s observation that
virtue is the mean relative to us.56 This has both practical and theoretical import as it underscores
that virtue is not one and the same for everyone no matter the context, while the universal and
general aspects of flourishing keeps Aristotelian virtue ethics from descending into moral
relativism or subjectivism. The doctrine of the mean can be overused, however, for as Aristotle
points out – not everything admits of a mean. It can also be misused, through rigid analysis that
pays insufficient attention context.
Finally, or nearly so, let us turn to a discussion of liberty and justice. Liberty is a final
good (end), valuable in itself but also valuable as a constitutive means to the ultimate end of
flourishing. For liberals, it is often said that liberty is the highest political value (end), but in
chapter seven I will argue instead that it is the highest pre-political value (end). Also, in chapter
seven I will discuss the place of liberty in Aristotle’s political philosophy and in what ways its
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role in Aristotelian liberalism differs. Intimately related to liberty is justice. Justice is both a final
good and a virtue; as such, it too is valuable in itself and also as a constitutive means to
flourishing.
Liberty and justice are of central importance to political philosophy. To the extent that
they are absent, a life of flourishing and a free and flourishing society are made impossible. As it
is conceived in (classical) liberal tradition, liberty is freedom from aggression; more precisely,
liberty is freedom from the threat or use of initiatory physical force. The act of coercing someone
with the threat or use of physical force – such as by violence, murder, fraud and naked theft –
imposes the aggressor's desires, interests, preferences, choices, actions, on the victim without his
consent. To the extent that this occurs the victim exists not for his own sake but for another's: his
desires, interests, preferences, choices, actions, are no longer truly his but are alien to him. More
to the point, to the extent that this occurs his actions are not self-directed. A person being
physically coerced by another is not able to make the choices and take the actions he judges
necessary for the maintenance and furtherance of his life. And he is not being respected as a
person.
In the Aristotelian tradition, remember, morality is a matter of choice. To elaborate on
my earlier comments, for an action to count as virtuous it must be done freely, by choice, both
for the right reasons and because it is desired.57 Thus, it is not enough simply to possess the
goods, and it is impossible to possess the virtues, one needs in life without self-directed action.
In other words, an act of mine does not count as virtuous and therefore contributory toward my
flourishing if you force it upon me, even if it otherwise would have been had I desired and freely
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chosen it for the right reasons. To the extent that one’s liberty is infringed, one is unable to
flourish.
What liberals bring to the table, as a matter of political justice, is a greater recognition of
this central importance of liberty and a more consistent protection of liberty in the form of an
ethical, political and legal principle of justice: the right to liberty (and all of its corollaries and
consequences). A right is a legitimately enforceable moral claim against the prior obligation of
another not to threaten or use initiatory physical force against you. Not all the moral claims we
have on the obligations of others are legitimately enforceable via the law or vigilantism. In the
liberal tradition, only the moral claim to freedom from aggression can be consistently upheld as
legitimately enforceable. The rights to life and property are two of its corollaries. A right to
liberty is a right to a life of our own. And our right to liberty cannot be exercised if we are not
allowed to keep and use the fruits of our labor as we see fit (provided we do not use our property
to violate the equal rights of others to their own life, liberty and property).
But so far we have not gotten deeply enough into the reasons, at the level of personal
ethics, for why rational beings have rights and why we must respect them. I have said that our
rights derive from a prior obligation of others.58 What gives us this obligation? Ultimately, what
gives us this obligation not to aggress against others is our obligation to pursue a life of
flourishing. To put it in a nutshell, since we are rational, political and social beings, we ought to
deal with other such beings through reason, discourse, persuasion and cooperation, except when
necessary to protect our own right to liberty (or the rights of others), rather than through violence
and force. To do so is a matter of justice.
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Consider the virtue of justice; it means accepting and granting the earned and deserved,
and never seeking or granting the unearned and undeserved.59 What do other rational beings
deserve from us? Again we can turn to Aristotle for some illumination. Aristotle argues that
justice is complete virtue practiced in relation to others and because of this it is “often thought to
be the greatest of the virtues.”60 In other words, what other rational beings deserve from us is for
us to possess integrity, to be prudent, independent, honest, productive, brave, benevolent,
sensitive, generous, civil, tolerant, and so forth. We owe virtue first and foremost to ourselves,
and because we are political and social beings we owe virtue to others as well. Virtues are not
rigid rules, however; they are abstract principles and traits of character whose proper application
is highly dependent upon context. While the virtues are, in the abstract, universal principles,
Aristotle reminds us that what virtue demands of us will depend upon our talents and abilities,
the cultural traditions we accept (so long as they do not contradict what our nature as a human
being demands of us), our particular circumstances and the particular conditions at the time of
action.
Finally, we may follow Aristotle in his wisdom in another way. He makes a useful
distinction between what he calls general justice and particular (or special) justice. General
justice is, for Aristotle, the complete virtue we have just been discussing. Particular justice
pertains more to political matters, such as violence, theft, fraud, restitution and the like. With
some tweaking, this distinction can be adapted to the liberal conception of justice and rights. An
Aristotelian liberal must disagree with Aristotle that it is just that the law be used to require all
virtue and prohibit all vice. The only vices that we recognize as crimes are those that involve
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aggression, i.e., those that involve the violation of rights. It is aggression that is fundamentally
anti-social, as it substitutes force for reason and discourse. It is aggression that compromises selfdirection and so makes flourishing impossible to the extent that it is used. Requiring virtue and
prohibiting vices that do not involve aggression necessarily involves aggression.61 Aristotle says
that particular justice is distinct from complete virtue, but even while accepting this we must
recognize that even particular justice is informed, as general justice is, by all of the other virtues.
Through the lens of particular justice the other virtues tell us how we should treat rational beings
qua rational beings at a pre-political and pre-social level. I do not mean ‘pre-‘ in a temporal sense
here, but rather in the teleological sense that dealing with one another through reason and
discourse rather than force is a fundamental prerequisite for a social or political relationship. So
in light of all this, an Aristotelian liberal would see particular justice as pertaining to what is
sometimes called political justice, which involves protecting the right to liberty and rectifying
violations of it. An Aristotelian liberal would thus see general justice as pertaining to obligations
we have to others that are not legitimately enforceable. To keep the difference between the two
types of justice clear, it will help to rename them: 1) We have political justice which pertains
only to rights and is legitimately enforceable. And 2) we have social justice which pertains to our
moral obligations to others and is not legitimately enforceable.62
While liberals tend to focus exclusively on (political) liberty given its fundamental
importance, there is no reason why liberals cannot accommodate and be concerned about other
senses of freedom. Indeed, Aristotelian liberalism counsels about the importance of doing so.
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One fruitful area of research is the issue of autonomy currently popular in moral philosophy.
There are a number of competing conceptions and theories that all suffer in my view from some
weakness or other. Aristotelian liberalism is in a position to offer a unique account of autonomy.
In the short remainder of this chapter I can offer only a brief sketch of an Aristotelian-liberal
account of autonomy. I have gone into more detail elsewhere on the existing literature and on the
account presented here.63
What is called autonomy in much of the existing literature is really a conflation or
confusion of several different things. Moral philosophers are concerned almost exclusively with
individual autonomy, a property of individuals considered individually. Group autonomy is the
autonomy of individuals considered as a group, e.g., political autonomy or political self-rule.
Note that individual autonomy does not necessarily entail conceiving of human beings as
essentially a-social or apart from society or in a state of nature. Within individual autonomy we
can further distinguish global and local dimensions. Global autonomy is the exercise of one's
rational capacities. This is similar to Gerald Dworkin's account of autonomy64 and is what
Rasmussen and Den Uyl call self-direction. Local autonomy is individual autonomy with respect
one's particular desires, preferences, actions, and so forth. It is local autonomy that is the primary
concern of contemporary moral philosophers. Local autonomy, hereafter referred to just as
autonomy, can be distinguished yet further in two ways. First, autonomy can be considered in
relation to particular desires, preferences, actions, and so forth taken singly; or it can be
considered in relation to particular desires, preferences, actions, and so forth in the aggregate. In
the former case, one is either autonomous with respect to a particular desire, etc., or one is not.
The latter case is a matter of degree, one is more or less autonomous in proportion to the number
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of desires, etc., in relation to which one is autonomous and/or heteronomous. Granted, there are
obvious epistemic difficulties with respect to judging the degree of autonomy possessed by
particular individuals, but this does not vitiate the theoretical usefulness of the distinction.
Second, it seems necessary to conceptually distinguish three dimensions of autonomy that
the contemporary literature generally conflates: political, social, and personal. Political
autonomy is here not quite equivalent to the traditional classical liberal/libertarian concept of
liberty (political or negative liberty). The traditional meaning of liberty is freedom from the
threat or use of initiatory physical force. We can define political autonomy as freedom from the
threat or use of physical force period. Thus, one might not be autonomous in this sense while still
not having his liberty violated if the force he is being subjected to is retaliatory rather than
initiatory, as in the case when he is an aggressor and his victim employs force in self-defense and
restraint of a serious standing threat. Autonomy therefore has a broader meaning than liberty, and
freedom a broader meaning still. The threat or use of physical force clearly constitutes a violation
of autonomy, or at least this should be clear, and it bears noting here that it is the swiftest and
surest means of compromising self-direction. Social autonomy is freedom from the tyranny of
systematic social oppression, other than the threat or use of physical force, that leads a person to
deviate from his telos (natural end). Personal autonomy, in turn, is internal freedom from the
tyranny of deviant desires, severe addiction to drugs, and so forth that lead a person to deviate
from his telos. There are two marked differences between political autonomy on the one hand
and social and personal autonomy on the other: 1) Political autonomy involves freedom from
physical coercion while the other two do not. And 2) except possibly in some very extreme
cases, self-direction is not compromised by social or personal heteronomy. Even in the face of
systematic social oppression, deviant desires and drug use, self-direction is still usually possible,
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even if the range of options available to choose from is narrower than it should be. Thus, issues
of social and personal autonomy are more complex and therefore more difficult to judge. They
also depend far more on one’s own choices.
There are any number of social influences that can lead a person astray from the life
appropriate for him. Some social influences are more pervasive and powerful than others. Some
such influences are in and of themselves malignant, but others are for the most part neutral or
benign. Among the more malignant are certain sorts of behaviors and institutions that discourage
or actively seek to suppress rationality, individuality, self-responsibility, productivity, and other
virtues. Cultures that encourage unquestioning obedience to authority and subordination of the
individual to the collective are prime examples. Other problematic cultural institutions are
paternalism, racism, and sexism. Many social influences are not malignant in and of themselves,
however; they can serve to distract but they also offer themselves up as opportunities to discover
our true telos. It is the task of the individual to develop practical wisdom and employ it to make
the correct choices for himself.
Personal autonomy can be compromised in a number of ways as well, most prominently
by deviant desires and severe addiction to drugs. Deviant desires, in the Aristotelian tradition,
stand opposed to reason, to one's eudaimonia. They undermine one's personal autonomy in the
aggregate. They are a part of who we are presently but alien to our telos. It also seems clear that
being physically addicted to some substance undermines one's personal autonomy. Addiction
puts one's desires in opposition to reason, but it does not necessarily compromise self-direction.
It does, however, undermine how well one uses one's self-direction. On the other hand, an
extremely severe addiction to a powerful drug might well be enough to compromise selfdirection.
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While it is important to distinguish political, social and personal autonomy conceptually,
it is also important to recognize their deep interrelations. To the extent that political autonomy is
violated social and personal autonomy are rendered impossible, for violations of political
autonomy not only impose alien desires, etc., on the recipient. They also compromise selfdirection, which is a constitutive part of all three dimensions of local autonomy. Social
heteronomy can promote personal heteronomy, and vice versa. Similarly, personal and social
heteronomy can encourage violations of political autonomy. For example, a teenager could
mistakenly seek fulfillment by joining a street gang and, in order to fit in, get hooked on drugs
and then commit violent crimes in support of his gang and his habit. For a generational example,
a verbally abusive relationship with one's father can be a contributing factor (although not an
excuse!) in the son growing up to become an alcoholic who then visits the same abuse he
suffered on his own son. Personal heteronomy could easily lead to the verbal abuse becoming
physical as well.
I will grant that in extreme cases of social and/or personal heteronomy in which selfdirection may be compromised, that it might be the necessary and right thing to do to forcefully
but temporarily intervene in order to restore the heteronomous person's capacity for selfdirection. Because these are exceptional cases, involving highly complex issues, the proper
course of action cannot be generalized or universalized into law. It is a personal moral decision
not to be taken lightly – one that depends on the capabilities and other obligations of the one
making the decision, on the likelihood of immediate and long-term success, and myriad other
factors; and one that requires intimate knowledge of the heteronomous person in question,
including whether the person would endorse the intervention after being restored to self-direction
and some measure of local autonomy. Such a decision is not one that can be freely sanctioned
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by the law. There must be a presumption in favor of liberty in the legal system and the law must
be restricted to protecting individual liberty, as a requirement of justice and in order to protect
the possibility of self-direction. Should the concerned party choose to intervene, he must be
prepared to pay the legal consequences if the one he intended to help ultimately rejects his efforts
and chooses to press charges.65 The paradigm case I have in mind here is that of a close friend or
relative who becomes severely addicted to drugs, such as crystal meth. Up to a point it might be
the necessary and right thing to do for that person's family and close friends to stage an
intervention in an attempt to restore his or her capacity for self-direction and some measure of
local autonomy, in order to give the drug addict a chance to reconsider his life and past actions.66
In such a case I would say that the drug addict's right to liberty has not necessarily been violated,
if there was good reason to believe that the intervention was something he or she would want and
if, freed from the immediate grip of the drug, he or she actually endorses the intervention. In
other words, the intervener(s) must have good reason to believe that the intervention is
something that the heteronomous person would consent to and then hope that this supposition
proves to be accurate.
To avoid possible misunderstanding, it is important to clarify what the argument of the
previous paragraph does not mean or imply. I do not think that there is an inherent conflict
between virtue and rights or between morality and the law. The actual demands of virtue and
rights, of morality and the law (insofar as it is just), do not conflict. Ultimately, rights are ethical
principles derived from the virtue of justice. On the other hand, there certainly can be apparent
conflicts between virtue and rights, morality and the law. These can arise because of errors made
by the involved parties – the principals, witnesses, lawyers, and judge(s) – whether because of
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Then again, it might turn out not to be the right thing to do.
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bias, a deficiency in practical wisdom, a mistaken notion of the good and the right, a badly
formed or applied law, a lack of all the relevant information, etc. If the law and the legal system
are to be just and the possibility of self-direction protected, there must be a presumption in favor
of liberty. It thus may happen that particular legal decisions will sometimes run counter to what
virtue and rights actually demand in those cases.
There can be no conflict between the actual demands of justice and rights; and there is no
conflict between morality and just laws. However, ethics and law have different natures and
functions. Ethics is open-ended and must deal with the contingent and the particular in the lives
of individuals; its demands are 'relative to us'. Law must be universal, applying to all equally,
because it has the function of maintaining a political/legal order that is not biased in favor of any
form of human flourishing by protecting the possibility of self-direction, the central and most
fundamental necessary feature of all forms of human flourishing. Rights qua metanormative
principles are the standard by which we judge whether the laws and legal system are just. In
order to fulfill their function, the laws and legal system must have a presumption in favor of
liberty and this will sometimes lead to a gap between particular legal decisions and the actual
demands of virtue and rights qua interpersonal ethical principles.
Along the lines of distinguishing between ethics and the law, a few brief remarks can be
made here about the notion of 'law as educative'. It can be, but this is not its primary function and
its educative power is far more limited and indirect than Aristotle and many others have
supposed. First, there is no necessary connection between the law and the promotion of ethical
virtue. Second, correct behavior or orderly conduct is only one component of ethical virtue or
moral excellence, and it is only the former that the law can promote directly.67 Third, there is an
important difference between legislative laws, those mountains of arbitrary and vague laws
67
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invented by state’s men in a generally corrupt monocentric system on the one hand and
polycentric customary law, which can result from competitive institutions through a process of
natural social evolution on the other.68 Finally, any law or public policy that goes beyond the
protection of the right to liberty is contrary to the demands of justice and the nature of law, and
biases the political/legal order in favor of some forms of human flourishing over others.
Clearly on the Aristotelian-liberal theory of autonomy sketched above there are epistemic
difficulties inherent in evaluating the autonomy of particular persons, particularly for social and
personal autonomy but even for political autonomy.69 We sometimes or often in the case of
political autonomy, and usually in the case of social and personal autonomy, do not have all of
the relevant information about a person, persons, or situation. Such epistemic difficulties are not
unique to the Aristotelian-liberal theory of autonomy. Indeed, they are a natural part of life. The
epistemic difficulties of evaluating particular cases of autonomy or heteronomy can only be
mitigated, as social and personal autonomy can only be promoted, through effective teaching,
habituation, and experience – i.e., through the development of practical wisdom and ethical
virtue. It is important to reiterate that social and personal autonomy cannot be promoted at the
systematic expense of political autonomy, for political autonomy is necessary for the very
possibility of social and personal autonomy. Moreover, the threat or use of initiatory physical
force is harmful of the agent's flourishing as well as the patient's.
This concludes the series of chapters focusing on eudaimonia, the basic goods and
virtues, and rights. In the next chapter I will go into more detail about the Aristotelian-liberal
conception of society. I will also address various communitarian criticisms of the liberal
conception of society. And I will critique the communitarian conception of society in turn.
68
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Chapter Five.
Liberal and Communitarian Conceptions of Society
Of all accusations against the system of Free Trade and Private Property, none is more foolish than
the statement that it is anti-social and individualistic and that it atomizes the body social. Trade
does not disintegrate, as romantic enthusiasts for the autarky of small portions of the earth's
surface assert; it unites. The division of labour is what first makes social ties: it is the social
element pure and simple. Whoever advocates the economic self-sufficiency of nations and states,
seeks to disintegrate the œcumenical society; whoever seeks to destroy the social division of
labour within a nation by means of class warfare is anti-social.
– Mises, Socialism, p. 310.
Morality knows nothing of geographical boundaries, or distinctions of race. You may put men on
opposite sides of a river or a chain of mountains; may else part them by a tract of salt water; may
give them, if you like, distinct languages; and may even colour their skins differently; but you
cannot change their fundamental relationships. Originating as these do in the facts of man's
constitution, they are unalterable by the accidents of external condition. The moral law is
cosmopolite – is no respecter of nationalities: and between men who are the antipodes of each
other, either in locality or anything else, there must still exist the same balance of rights as though
they were next-door neighbours in all things.
– Herbert Spencer, Social Statics (1851), Ch. XXIII, Section 1.
It is only with abstract principles that a social system may properly be concerned. A social system
cannot force a particular good on a man nor force him to seek the good: it can only maintain
conditions of existence which leave him free to seek it. A government cannot live a man's life, it
can only protect his freedom. It cannot prescribe concretes, it cannot tell a man how to work, what
to produce, what to buy, what to say, what to write, what values to seek, what form of happiness to
pursue – it can only uphold the principle of his right to make such choices. . . . It is in this sense
that 'the common good' . . . lies not in what men do when they are free, but in the fact that they are
free.
– Ayn Rand, “From My ‘Future File,’” The Ayn Rand Letter.

Introduction
What is the liberal conception of society? On the one hand it is cosmopolitan,
encompassing the whole of the Earth and the human race. On the other, it can accommodate
restrictive, close-knit local communities and all manner of social and market organizations. It
recognizes a universal brotherhood of human beings and embraces the increasing global
integration brought on by modern telecommunications, transportation and commerce. But it also
recognizes that this universal brotherhood and increasing globalization does not necessarily
entail the homogenization of culture or render families, local communities, and myriad other
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voluntary associations and organizations (such as churches, fraternal societies, clubs, business
firms and the like) either unnecessary or undesirable. The liberal conception of society embraces
pluralism and diversity while respecting the right of individuals to associate as they please, even
if that means establishing a restrictive, closed society, so long as it is done on a voluntary basis.
While liberalism, especially Aristotelian liberalism, recognizes that human beings are profoundly
social and political animals, it also holds along with Aristotle that society exists for individuals
and not the other way around.1 Liberalism goes further than Aristotle, however, in consistently
upholding the inviolability of an individual’s rights to life, liberty and property. For liberalism,
the ordering principle of society is the right to liberty, and its corollaries and consequences. But
liberalism has oft been criticized for having an atomistic, a-social and a-historical conception of
man. Communitarians of various stripes (progressive, conservative and others) are now perhaps
the most prominent critics of liberalism. The fundamental disagreement between liberals and
communitarians lies over whether, to what extent and in what manner society may exert control
over the individual. In this chapter I will attempt to sketch in more detail than heretofore an
Aristotelian-liberal conception of society. I will also address various communitarian criticisms of
the liberal conception of society and offer some criticisms of the communitarian conception in
return.

An Aristotelian-Liberal Conception of Society
In previous chapters it has been argued that human flourishing is profoundly social. I am
not aware of any major form of liberalism that does not at least tacitly agree with the following
four ways in which human beings are naturally social animals: 1) “Our maturation or flourishing
requires a life with others.” 2) “[H]aving other-concern is crucial to our maturation.” 3) “Our
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origins are almost always social.” 4) And here liberals go beyond Aristotle: “Human sociality
can, if need be, extend beyond the polis and be cosmopolitan. . . . [H]uman sociality is openended.”2 This fourth point is particularly important because it marks a major difference between
liberals and Aristotle, and, to an even greater extent, between liberals and communitarians. An
Aristotelian liberal will recognize that in order to flourish one can only do so “in some
community or other,” but also that “this does not mean that a given community's values will
always be appropriate for an individual. Thus, one is not morally required simply to accept –
indeed, one might be required to reject – the status quo. In such circumstances, one might need to
[attempt to] refashion a community's values [by example and persuasion] or find a new
community.”3
Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that “the open-ended character of human sociality
discloses the need for a perspective that is wide-ranging enough to explain how the possible
relationships among persons who as yet share no common values and are strangers to each other
can, nonetheless, be ethically compossible.”4 In this vein, one may look upon humanity as a
whole insofar as its members do not engage in fundamentally anti-social behavior (i.e., the threat
or use of initiatory physical force) as comprising a cosmopolis or Great Society within which are
an uncountable number of different kinds and levels of overlapping communities: some of which
we will belong to for life, some we will join, some we will leave, and all of which we will affect
in often unintended ways to some degree with our dreams, choices, and actions.
Although Stephen Toulmin, in his book Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity,
criticizes the idea of a cosmopolis as an ecumenical society as rationally ordered as the
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Newtonian view of nature,5 the idea of a human cosmopolis actually dates back to the Stoics.
Toulmin’s modern Newtonian cosmopolis is exemplified by Hobbes’ Leviathan:
Writing shortly after Descartes, with a knowledge of his arguments, Thomas
Hobbes presented the theory that shaped so much later political and social theory
of Western Europe and North America. A modern state (specifically, a nationstate) requires, in his view, overwhelming force concentrated at the center, under
the authority of a sovereign, whom he likens to an irresistible monster, or
Leviathan. As willful social atoms, all of his subjects will otherwise go their own
ways, and pursue their individual goods independently; so they must be made to
understand that their personal activities take place under, and are constrained by,
the shadow of this overwhelming central force.
Given this theory, the Newtonian image of the state as a planetary system, and the
power of the sovereign as a counterpart of the central force of the sun, fleshed out
and added detail to Hobbes’ basic picture. The stability of society required not
just centralized force, but also a system of fixed orbits (or stations) in which
different parts of society follow predictable paths.6
In contrast, the Stoic conception of the cosmopolis is that of a universal moral community
grounded in the universal aspects of human nature, the aspects from which individual rights are
derived by liberals. Although there are of course differences between Aristotelian and Stoic
thought, this is essentially the Aristotelian-liberal conception of the cosmopolis as well.
Naturally, this conception predates and rejects the conception Toulmin devotes his book to
criticizing. His target is a product of the Age of Enlightenment rationalism and empiricism.
Toulmin sees this Enlightenment cosmopolis as “conferring Divine Legitimacy on the political
order of the sovereign nation-state” and taking as its “guiding principles stability in and among
the different sovereign nation-states, and hierarchy within the social structures of each individual
state.”7 But liberalism rejects any kind of enforced stability or hierarchy, and, in its most radical
forms, rejects the state entirely (we may call this radical liberalism). Toulmin calls for a move
from “Leviathan to Lilliput,” from a Newtonian society that encourages “hierarchy and rigidity,
5
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standardization and uniformity” to one based on an “ecological perspective” that “emphasizes,
rather, differentiation and diversity, equity and adaptability.”8 This is a goal that liberals share,
and a cosmopolis whose ordering principle is the right to liberty embodies this ideal.
An ecological perspective that emphasizes differentiation, diversity, equity and
adaptability is inherent in the nature of liberalism. This is all the more so in its more radical
forms and in those directly influenced by the social philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment.
Ronald Hamowy observes: “For at least two hundred years [owing to the Scottish
Enlightenment], social philosophers have known that association does not need government, that,
indeed, government is destructive of association.”9 Scottish Enlightenment thinkers like Adam
Ferguson, David Hume, and Adam Smith as well as modern thinkers like Austrian economist
F.A. Hayek have theorized about and historically described the emergence of society, culture,
law, language, and markets as spontaneous orders. Hayek observes: “The conception of an
already fully developed mind designing the institutions which made life in society possible is
contrary to all we know about the evolution of man.”10 And he is critical of social contract
theories, like that of Hobbes, which he views as being a retrogression in social and political
science.
This 'rationalist' approach [of Cartesian constructivism], however, meant in effect
a relapse into earlier, anthropomorphic modes of thinking. It produced a renewed
propensity to ascribe the origin of all institutions of culture to invention or design.
Morals, religion and law, language and writing, money and the market, were
thought of as having been deliberately constructed by somebody, or at least as
owing whatever perfection they possessed to such design. This intentionalist or
pragmatic account of history found its fullest expression in the conception of the
formation of society by a social contract, first in Hobbes and then in Rousseau,
who in many respects was a direct follower of Descartes. Even though their
theory was not always meant as a historical account of what actually happened, it
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was always meant to provide a guideline for deciding whether or not existing
institutions were to be approved as rational.11
But law, culture, markets and other institutions of society are evolving spontaneous orders.
Hayek distinguishes two sources and kinds of social order: 1) “The made order . . . an
exogenous order or an arrangement may . . . be described as a construction, an artificial order or,
especially where we have to deal with a directed social order, as an organization [in classical
Greek: taxis].” 2) The grown order, on the other hand, which we have referred to as a selfgenerating or endogenous order, is in English most conveniently described as a spontaneous
order [kosmos].”12 Spontaneous orders are the result of human action but not of human design.
They do not have a centrally directed purpose. They result from individuals following certain
rules of conduct which allow them to understand and predict the actions of their fellows with
reasonable accuracy, to mutually adjust their actions and plans to each other and to the particular
circumstances of time and place about which only they know, to compete and cooperate.
Spontaneous orders need not be vast and complex but, owing to their reliance on rules of conduct
rather than central direction, they are able to achieve much greater degrees of scale and
complexity than can made orders directed by a human mind. “In society, reliance on spontaneous
order both extends and limits our powers of control.”13 Individuals have more freedom to direct
their own lives, and the increasing knowledge, scientific and technological advancement, and
economic prosperity made possible by spontaneous orders is also giving individuals more control
over their lives and over nature. However, this comes at the cost of the ability to consciously
direct the particular arrangement and content of the order’s elements. Even the ability to control
its overall shape will be severely limited in comparison to directing an organization.

11

Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid., p. 37. Emphasis in original.
13
Ibid., p. 41. Emphasis removed.
12

133

Law is of central importance to a well-functioning society and thus will serve as a
particularly relevant example. Hayek distinguishes between law and legislation. Legislation is
the product of an organization and has generally been issued in an attempt to direct society as if
it were an organization itself. Hayek argues that law is older than legislation:
Legislation, the deliberate making of law, has justly been described as among all
inventions of man the one fraught with the gravest consequences, more farreaching in its effects even than fire and gun-powder. Unlike law itself, which has
never been 'invented' in the same sense, the invention of legislation came
relatively late in the history of mankind. . . . It will certainly remain an
exceedingly dangerous power so long as we believe that it will do harm only if
wielded by bad men.
Law in the sense of enforced rules of conduct is undoubtedly coeval with society;
only the observance of common rules makes the peaceful coexistence of
individuals in society possible.14
The idea of law as a deliberate product of human design was first fully developed in ancient
Greece, largely died out during the Age of the Roman Empire and the subsequent Dark Ages,
and then was revived in recent centuries in the form of legal positivism.15 Hayek observes why
in all early civilizations we find a law like that 'of the Medes and the Persians that
changeth not', and why all early 'law-giving' consisted in efforts to record and
make known a law that was conceived as unalterably given. A 'legislator' might
endeavor to purge the law of supposed corruptions, or to restore it to its purity,
but it was not thought that he could make new law. The historians of law are
agreed that in this respect all the famous early 'law-givers', from Ur-Nammu and
Hammurabi to Solon, Lykurgus and the authors of the Roman Twelve Tables, did
not intend to create new law but merely to state what law was and had always
been.
Nevertheless, law did not remain static, but those “changes which did occur were not the result
of intention or design of a law-maker.”16
There are a number of other ways than the open-ended nature of human sociality in
which Aristotelian liberals disagree with Aristotle, some of which have already been discussed
14
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and some of which will be discussed in later chapters. It is pertinent to note a few more here.
One of these is that Aristotle conflates the state and civil society in his conception of the polis, a
conflation that might have been unavoidable in the era of the Greek city-state but can no longer
be excusable in light of modern experiences, theory and historical knowledge. The conflation of
state (an organization) and civil society (a spontaneous order) can only lead to conceptual
confusion, paternalism and totalitarianism. Two more areas of disagreement involve central
principles that Aristotle accepts – the principle of community and the principle of rulership.
These principles, as Aristotle conceives them, have little, if any, validity for radical liberals. The
principle of community holds that “individuals can attain the good only if they belong to and are
subject to the authority of the political community” – it is the second half of this principle that is
problematic. Whether individuals can attain the good only if they are subject to the authority of
the community depends on what exactly is meant by 'subject to the authority of'. And the
principle of rulership holds that “the community can function only if an order is imposed on it by
rational agents.”17
Liberals reject any use of aggression (the threat or use of initiatory physical force) to
impose the authority of the community on individuals. Defensive uses of force will sometimes be
necessary in order to end rights violations, including acquiring restitution, and sometimes to
restrain criminals who present serious on-going threats. Aside from this, the only legitimate and
legal means of imposing the authority of the community on individuals are all voluntary, ranging
from moral suasion to boycotts and ostracism. As the discussion on social autonomy in the last
chapter indicates, however, liberals, or at least Aristotelian liberals, can and I think ought to be
concerned about systematic social oppression. The notion of subjecting individuals to the
authority of the community flirts with collectivism and threatens to easily shade over into a soft
17
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form of coercion that stifles individuality and thus human flourishing. Though admittedly
difficult, it is important to find the proper mean here.
Recently, one Aristotelian liberal has attempted to bring Aristotle’s polis into the twentyfirst century. I quote a section from my review of Mark Young’s Negotiating the Good Life:
Aristotle and the Civil Society:
Young recognizes that the ancient polis, a necessary condition for eudaimonia
according to Aristotle, no longer exists and that we probably could not return to it
even if we so desired. Yet he does not see a necessary connection between the
ancient polis and eudaimonia. Instead, he reconceives the polis in light of modern
conditions and possibilities. Aristotle lived in a time in which the boundaries of
the state and of society were nearly one and the same, such that it was easy to
identify the two. In light of modern globalization, economic interdependence, and
technological advances in transportation and communication, it need no longer be
the case that society and other forms of association be confined to the limited
territorial borders of states. Indeed, it is now possible to conceive of a global
society composed of an uncountable number of other societies, communities, and
other forms of association with overlapping memberships and jurisdictions that
need not be territorially defined.
Young locates the notion of a modern Aristotelian polis within civil society,
which he defines as a “globally linked community of [shared] values.”18 The
global civil society may, in turn, be termed a modern cosmopolis. Instead of
looking to the bureaucratic state to help its citizens live a eudaimonic life through
coercive legislation, regulations, and education, Young turns to his notion of
modern polei, civil societies, to help their members or citizens aim at and achieve
eudaimonia by providing them with the necessary conditions, opportunities, and
capabilities through voluntary cooperation and exchange. Not just any association
will do, however. Young argues that only “communities which help their citizens
aim at this true Good can be considered viable candidates for a modern
Aristotelian polis.”19
Young treats his modern polis as an ideal type, a standard by which to judge all
existing communities. But perhaps we should go further, and not only look to
individual communities to provide all by themselves the full function of an ideal
polis for their members. Most human beings hold memberships in a multitude of
associations over the course of their lives, many of them simultaneously. Each
association provides some value that the others do not. Perhaps membership in
multiple communities, taken together, could perform the function of a polis by
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compensating for the deficiencies of any single community. Young does not
discuss such a possibility, though it seems a fruitful one to explore.20
So the Aristotelian-liberal cosmopolis, or Great Society, can be conceived in two ways: 1) as a
universal moral community including all human beings, or even all rational beings should it turn
out intelligent aliens exist. And 2) an empirically identifiable global human society that is
becoming increasingly integrated by modern telecommunications, transportation and commerce
while retaining a healthy pluralism and diversity. Within this cosmopolis, I have suggested, are
an uncountable number of associations, communities and organizations of various sizes, scope
and cohesiveness, with overlapping and constantly changing memberships, some territorially
defined and some not. Some of these associations, communities and organizations will fulfill the
needs and wants of their members more fully than others. I am skeptical that any single one,
other than the cosmopolis itself because it includes them all, could provide by itself all a person
needs to flourish.
Some readers may be frustrated by what they perceive to be an insufficient degree of
specificity in the foregoing conception of society. Unfortunately, for those readers, it is not the
purpose of this dissertation to lay out a detailed blueprint. Indeed, by now it should be evident
that developing such a blueprint would be antithetical to the nature of Aristotelian liberalism.
This is so for a number of related reasons: 1) Human flourishing is highly individualized. 2)
Moral and cultural pluralism and diversity are liberal values. 3) The right to liberty prohibits
aggression, and so individuals cannot legitimately be forced to follow anyone’s blueprint for a
better world. 4) Law, culture, markets and many other social institutions are spontaneous orders.
It is best to let them evolve naturally, rather than to attempt to centrally plan them; and if, in
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one’s view, they do not change fast enough or in the right direction, then one ought to take the
initiative, lead by example and persuade.
The demand for a detailed blueprint, and often even the more limited demand to know
how X would be done or provided in a free society, is the demand that the liberal contradict his
own beliefs to play the role of the central planner and social engineer. It is not reasonable to
demand that the liberal explain, or even demonstrate in practice, how every existing or
conceivable issue will be dealt with successfully (in the questioner’s view) in a free society. It is
not even really necessary that the liberal be able to explain, or have already demonstrated in
practice, how the “key issues” or even one issue in particular will be dealt with successfully in a
free society. The whole point of liberalism is that people ought to be free to experiment with
other ways of doing things, to judge for themselves what works best for them in their pursuit of
their own flourishing. It is not necessary to have all the practical answers in advance. The moral
case for liberty is enough. This is not to say that nothing can be said about what a free and
flourishing society will/might/probably and will/might/probably not look like. When asked how
X will be done, provided or dealt with in a free society one should, to the extent one is able,
endeavor to provide an explanation. The point is simply that the inability to do so to the
questioner’s satisfaction does not in and of itself undermine the case for liberty with respect to X.
I believe, even ignoring the moral case for the moment, that there is ample theoretical and
historical support for other associations and organizations in a free society being able to provide
on a voluntary basis every good and service ever and currently provided by the state. This
dissertation is primarily about the moral case for a free and flourishing society, however.
Nevertheless, a few more things can be said in addition to what has already been said and what
will be said both in the remaining sections of this chapter and in subsequent chapters. Rather
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than a monocentric legal system with predominantly legislative laws, a free and flourishing
society will possess a polycentric legal system with predominantly customary laws. A
monocentric legal system is one in which a single organization (generally the state) monopolizes
through institutionalized aggression the promulgation of laws and provision of legal services. A
polycentric legal system is one in which the law and legal services are provided by multiple,
freely competing associations and organizations with overlapping jurisdictions. Rather than large
standing armies and police forces, security in a free and flourishing society will be a matter of
self-responsibility and will also be provided by various private associations (e.g., family, friends,
clubs, etc.), local communities and private businesses. 21 Instead of state-run and funded schools,
education will be provided by more traditional associations and organizations – e.g., the family,
the church, etc. – as well as by private schools and other businesses. Health care, medicine,
support during unexpected unemployment, food, clothing and shelter, and so forth – these are
ultimately one’s own responsibility as well, although one may also be able to depend on the
generosity of family, friends, members of one’s local community and even total strangers, and
one can purchase insurance and join mutual aid associations such as churches or something like
the fraternal associations that existed before the state crowded them out.
In the remaining sections of this chapter I turn to a discussion of some communitarian
thinkers and a social liberal. Hegel was a modern critic of liberalism, while Alasdair MacIntyre
is a post-modern Aristotelian critic. T.H. Green was a modern British idealist who was
influenced by Hegel and was an early proponent of what one might call social liberalism or leftliberalism, which deviates from classical liberalism in (greater) support of welfare statism and
government involvement in the economy, e.g., via greater economic regulations and state
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enterprises. I aim to answer some of their criticisms of liberalism, describe their conceptions of
society and the state, and criticize their conceptions in turn.

Hegel on the State: A Conservative Rationalization of the Status Quo
Or – The State and War as Historical Moments
in the Process of Reabsorption
Reabsorption Theology: “Stage One is the original state of the pre-creation
cosmic blob, with man and God in happy and harmonious unity, but each rather
undeveloped. Then, the magic dialectic does its work, Stage Two occurs, and God
creates man and the universe. But then, finally, when the development of man and
God is completed, Stage Two creates its own aufhebung, its transcendence into its
opposite or negation: in short, Stage Three, the reunion of God and man in an
'ecstasy of union' and the end of history.”22
Perhaps this is something of a caricature of Hegel’s position; it was not meant to apply to
Hegel alone. But if it is a caricature, it nevertheless seems an apt one. In this section I will sketch
out an argument along two parallel lines. I will argue that Hegel’s philosophy, and in particular
his Philosophy of Right, amounts at least in part to a conservative rationalization of the historical
conditions of his time. It will be seen that his ideal conception of society stands diametrically
opposed to the Aristotelian-liberal conception sketched above. I will also suggest that the logic
of Hegel’s account of the state and war implies that they are historical moments in the
progressive process leading towards the absolute rationalization and unification of mankind.
I will begin by looking at some key aspects of Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel believed that
there is a rational necessity to history, that is, that history is a rational process with a specific
telos or end, namely freedom. This freedom is not only the negative freedom inherent in the
protection of individual rights, but ‘positive’ freedom in the sense of “humanity’s self-awareness
that it is both separate from and sovereign over nature where nature indicates both our external
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environment and our internal drives and inclinations.”23 The goal or end of history is the
fulfillment of human freedom. Hegel’s philosophy is an attempt to find the rational in the real
and the real in the rational, to “comprehend what is.”24 On the Philosophy of Right in particular:
This book, then, containing as it does the science of the state, is to be nothing
other than the endeavor to apprehend and portray the state as something
inherently rational. As a work of philosophy, it must be poles apart from an
attempt to construct a state as it ought to be. The instruction which it may contain
cannot consist in teaching the state what it ought to be; it can only show how the
state, the ethical universe, is to be understood.25
This is a curious doctrine; it eerily resembles positivism, except insofar as Hegel is interested in
unobservables; and it is not hard to see how such a doctrine can predispose one to conservatism
regarding the historically given institutions of one’s time. But what if the State is not rational?
What if, on the contrary, it is wholly irrational?
For Hegel, the real is rational because it is a necessary part of the rational, progressive
process of history. Thus, even evil is rational in the context of historical development. In contrast
to this extreme holistic and organic approach, Aristotelian liberalism follows Aristotle in locating
rationality in individual human beings. This does not mean that the reality of currently existing
human behavior is rational but rather that human beings have the capacity for rationality and
ought to choose to exercise it. People can make mistakes, evade the truth, do the wrong thing,
and because of this evil exists in the world. I would also argue that the foregoing also means
historical progress toward the fulfillment of some ideal is not guaranteed. The obvious objection
to this would be that it may seem that way now from a limited, individual perspective but from
the perspective of history the present will in the future be shown to be rational. But this flirts
with the danger of rationalizing the status quo. While it may seem when examining the historical
23
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record that one development necessarily follows from another as if by some logical progression,
this is not reason enough to accept the results uncritically. And, moreover, we cannot know what
the future will bring; for all we know we could be furthering the rational progress of history by
rejecting the status quo. Thus, just because the State developed historically and still currently
exists does not mean that it is necessary for human flourishing or is right and good.
The State is the culmination of Hegel’s political philosophy. It is the State that makes the
ethical life and thus the maximization of human freedom, or absolute freedom, possible. Rather
than launch directly into a discussion of Hegel’s State, I will briefly examine the two imperfect
institutions (or stages) that culminate in and make up a necessary part of the State: the family and
civil society. In his critique of civil society lies Hegel’s critique of liberalism, but as a dialectical
thinker Hegel does not reject liberalism outright; instead, he reconciles it with his communitarian
ideal by subsuming civil society within the State.
For Hegel, the family is imperfect because “it is ethical mind in its natural or immediate
[and substantial] phase.”26 It is “characterized by love, which is mind’s feeling of its own
unity.”27 The result is that one views oneself “not as an independent person but as a member.”28
The family is undifferentiated but eventually dissolves as children grow up, become educated,
and form families of their own. It quite escapes me, however, precisely how the family is
undifferentiated and why one cannot view oneself as both an independent person and a member
of the family simultaneously.
Civil society Hegel defines as “an association of members as self-subsistent individuals
in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is
brought about by their needs, by the legal system – the means to security of person and property
26
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– and by an external organization for attaining their particular and common interests.”29 Civil
society is “the world of ethical appearance.”30 The imperfection of civil society is its external
character and the fact that it exists only to satisfy the needs of self-interested individuals. Civil
society in fact resembles what we would recognize as a conflation of society and the modern
state; in addition to the market and the various social relations of its members, Hegel’s civil
society also performs the function of administering justice and producing security through a
monopolistic institution. Here some conservatism creeps in: Hegel, like most political
philosophers before and after him, commits a non sequitur by making the illogical leap from the
correct premise that man needs protection of his rights and property to the unwarranted
conclusion that a monopolistic institution is needed to provide it.
Hegel claims that the State is needed to weld civil society back into unity; the State is
“the end and actuality of both the substantial universal order and the public life devoted
thereto.”31 In other words, the State is “the actuality of the ethical Idea. It is ethical mind qua the
substantial will manifest and revealed to itself, knowing and thinking itself, accomplishing what
it knows and in so far as it knows it. [It] exists immediately in custom, mediately in individual
self-consciousness, knowledge, and activity[.]”32 Its end is substantive freedom.
From the undifferentiated substantiality of the family and the differentiated abstractness
of civil society, the State sublates and transcends the particular and the universal, or matter and
form to use Aristotle’s terminology.
The state is absolutely rational inasmuch as it is the actuality of the substantial
will which it possesses in the particular self-consciousness once that
consciousness has been raised to consciousness of its universality. This
substantial unity is an absolute unmoved end in itself, in which freedom comes
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into its supreme right. On the other hand this final end has supreme right against
the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member of the state.33
This universal will that Hegel speaks of is not the ‘general’ will of Rousseau. To the latter, the
universal will is the general will which proceeds out of the individual will. To Hegel the
universal will is what is absolutely rational in the individual will. And yet it is difficult to see
how Hegel, with his obsession to actualize unity and universality in a concrete form, has avoided
Rousseau’s collectivism. Indeed, it is plain in the above quoted passage, and will be made more
so below, that he has not.
The State accomplishes its end through its Constitution, which consists of three
substantive divisions: the Legislature, the Executive, and the Crown. The Legislature has the
power to determine and establish universal laws; open to the many, it thereby draws them into
public life. The Executive consists of civil servants and advisory officials; its purpose is the
“maintenance of the state’s universal interest, and of legality, in this sphere of particular rights
[i.e., that of the civil society], and the work of bringing these rights back to the universal[.]”34
The highest ranking executives are in direct contact with the monarch. With the Crown we have
“the power of subjectivity, as the will with the power of ultimate decision . . . [in which] the
different powers are bound into an individual unity which is thus at once the apex and basis of
the whole, i.e., of constitutional monarchy.”35 In Hegel’s conception of the State we can see
some rationalist Newtonian echoes of Hobbes’ Leviathan.
Hegel’s conception of the State, like his conception of civil society betrays the
conservatism of his philosophy. It does so in two ways. First, from the premise that an
institution(s) is/are needed in order to fully actualize man’s freedom via the ethical life it does
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not follow that the monopolistic institution of the State is the correct conclusion. Hegel here
commits a non sequitur. Moreover, he provides no compelling case for the State as against other
institutions in society. Second, following the Treaty of Westphalia and the French Revolution,
the modern nation-state became the dominant political institution. Constitutional monarchies and
liberal republics began to increase. Germany itself became a constitutional monarchy, and Hegel
ends the Philosophy of Right with the Germanic realm as the fourth world-historical realm, the
one in which a State (or States) had arisen. Finally, another criticism of Hegel is that his
conception of civil society is a flawed one, having been influenced by classical economists like
Adam Smith. Hegel sees civil society as little more than a competitive marketplace of selfinterested individuals seeking material benefit and thus bound to rip itself apart at the seams.
This conception is wholly mistaken, but more will be said on this subject in chapter eight.
With regards to international war, too, we can see Hegel’s conservatism and collectivism.
Vis-à-vis each other, the States are sovereign individuals. Hegel speaks of the “national mind.”36
Why States can be sovereign and individuals cannot is not entirely clear, Hegel’s dialectical
argument for the necessity of the State in actualizing the ethical Idea notwithstanding. Lockean
and Hobbesian social contract arguments for the State work just as well, if not better, in
justifying the need for a world government. Hegel’s dialectical argument for the State seems to
allow him to avoid this dilemma, but I do not find his argument compelling. He has another line
of defense, however, in that he argues that a State is no more an actual State without other States
than an individual is an actual “person without rapport with other persons.”37 As we shall soon
see, however, this defense is not as strong as it seems.
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States, being sovereign, will quite naturally come into conflict with each other and go to
war. Hegel does not merely see war as a necessary evil, however. Indeed, like Randolph Bourne,
he sees war as the health of the State. Only, unlike Bourne, he is not concerned with the State
growing in such power and centralization that it breaks the bounds of constitutional limits. Hegel
sees war as a good thing. States are an ethical unity and go to war to protect that unity, not
merely from other States but from internal forces. The State recognizes that the enforced unity
brought about by war is needed to preserve itself from its own internal contradictions (or in
Hegel’s mind, the stresses of civil society). “[W]ar is a ‘moment’ in the ethical life of the
state.”38 In war, individual citizens are educated in the ethical Idea when they submerge and lose
their individuality in the universal, in the common will pursuing the State’s goal of selfpreservation.
States paradoxically have equally legitimate sets of conflicting rights and therefore have
no rights against each other.39 Hegel imports the Hobbesian notion of states being in a state of
nature vis-à-vis each other. In Hegel’s philosophy of history, States are paradoxically founded by
evil actions and the tyrants who found them are considered “great” men due to their place in the
rational process of history. Good is created through evil. Likewise, the question of right in wars
between States is decided by world history; the outcome itself is history’s judgment. “[W]ar
makes them unequal so that they can be unified, and this happens when one gives way to the
other.”40 In other words, might makes right.
Recall that the rational process of history has the end of actualizing absolute freedom for
humanity. The State is the embodiment of the ethical Idea, of absolute freedom, for its citizens. It
stands to reason, following Hegel’s obsession with the Idea, the synthesis of concrete and
38
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universal, that the State that most embodies the ethical Idea vis-à-vis other States is superior.
World history is the final arbiter in this matter, but world history is progressive and rational. This
implies a growing rationality as history marches forward. Hegel thought that modern warfare
with modern weapons would be more humane than previously. Though history has proven him
wrong by the sheer inhumanity of modern total war, for Hegel history must lead to the “complete
and total rationalization of human kind” and thus
to the homogenization or unification of humanity characterized by an increased
agreement over all the fundamental aims of life. The triumph of reason will mean
the elimination of the grounds of all war and conflict because there will be
nothing left to fight about. It will represent the final triumph of bourgeois civil
society with its pacific and commercial interests over the political state which
seeks preeminence in struggle and combat. In the final analysis Hegel’s idea of an
end of history undercuts his insistence on the necessity of war.41
The State, then, would seem to be a “moment” in the rational historical process leading to the
triumph of reason in absolute freedom for man. Is this where Hegel intends to go? I am not sure.
Such a future may entail the emergence of a World-State, as Hegel’s philosophy of history would
seem to necessitate.
Next I turn to a prominent communitarian of a different stripe, a contemporary thinker
who has more thoroughly rejected both modernity and liberalism, including modern nationstates. My discussion and criticism of his ideas has been strongly influenced by the work of
Rasmussen and Den Uyl.

Alasdair MacIntyre: Postmodern Aristotelian Communitarian
Alasdair MacIntyre is commonly considered to be a communitarian, although strongly
disassociates himself from contemporary communitarians who “advance their proposals as a
contribution to the politics of the nation-state.” He adds: “To those Aristotelians, such as myself,
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. . . the nation-state is not and cannot be the locus of community.”42 This is something with
which radical liberals can sympathize. However, Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift argue that
MacIntyre can best be understood as a communitarian because for him
the very possibility of sustaining rationality and objectivity in the arena of moral
and political evaluation depends on locating individuals and their arguments with
other individuals within an overarching and nested set of inherently social
matrixes. . . . On MacIntyre’s view, failing to recognize the way in which human
beings can be and are constitutively attached to their communities entails an
inability to give a coherent account of the circumstances necessary to achieve any
kind of human good (whether communal in content or not), for in absence of such
constitutive communal frame works, the very idea of morality as a rational
intelligible enterprise drops out.43
MacIntyre appears to have a strong antipathy toward liberalism and anything connected with it.
Among his criticisms of liberalism are the standard ones discussed briefly in the introductory
chapter: atomism, an a-social and a-historical conception of human nature, subjectivism,
relativism, emotivism, privileging the right over the good, instrumentalism, and so on.
We have already seen that even if these charges are true, to some extent, of other forms
of liberalism, they miss their mark against Aristotelian liberalism. This should be particularly
obvious with respect to all but the last two. With regard to the charges of privileging the right
over the good and instrumentalism, a few more words could perhaps be said. The charge of
privileging the right over the good is really only applicable to deontological versions of
liberalism. In the Aristotelian tradition, the right and the good can be conceptually distinguished
by not separated. Moreover, in Aristotelian ethical theory, despite the fundamental pre-political
importance of rights, it is ultimately the good that is privileged over the right, for all of the goods
and virtues are constitutive means to one’s ultimate end or good, one’s own flourishing.
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In Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, MacIntyre argues that rights are not ethically
primary because they depend upon deeper ethical concepts and also that rights are too absolute
and blunt to adequately handle the complexities of moral life. Because of these two flaws, he
argues that a political/legal order based on liberal rights is generally detrimental to selfperfection because it destroys the community traditions within which people’s pursuit of the
good life is inextricably embodied.44 This argument too misses its mark. The first part of the
argument fails because from the fact that rights are not ethically primary it does not follow that
they are not politically primary. The second part of the argument also fails because liberalism,
especially Aristotelian liberalism, with the exception of contemporary social or left-liberalism,
does not attempt to employ rights-language for the whole of ethics. Rights are a narrow subset of
morality. It is only contemporary and progressive social liberalism that has led to the
proliferation of rights language to the impoverishment of ethics.
The conclusion of MacIntyre’s philosophical argument ties in with the instrumentalism
charge, but before we get to that let us first consider a related objection. MacIntyre shares with
Charles Taylor, another communitarian, a cultural/sociological objection to liberalism. The
objection is this: that for a regime to make rights, i.e., liberty, the primary moral message to
citizens is not enough to maintain the intellectual, moral, cultural and scientific foundations that
make liberal civilizations possible. In short, liberalism is self-destructive. There is a kernel of
truth to this objection. However, in addition to the responses given in the previous paragraph,
which I would apply to this objection as well, I would suggest that, as will be seen in subsequent
chapters, to the extent that this objection holds true it does so mainly to social liberalism and
corporatist liberalism and is primarily due to the acceptance of the state by most liberals.
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The right to liberty has transformed into a right to any and all positive freedoms, to
entitlements to the fulfillment of our needs and wants. The classical liberal distinction between
rights and the rest of morality has been broken down by progressive, social liberalism. And so
Western civilization has seen the rise of Leviathans, which increasingly intrude into every aspect
of our lives. The result has been the rapid erosion of traditions both good and bad, the erosion of
virtue and personal responsibility, and the intensification of special interest warfare. In short, the
abandonment of the negative right to liberty has led to the dramatic growth of the state and a
concomitant breakdown of social order. The instrumentalism that MacIntyre decries is but
another symptom, as statist politics is centered around serving special interests and resolving
conflicts between them. The perceived goods that people pursue through the liberal-corporatist
state are external to the practices followed to acquire them.
The conclusion of MacIntyre’s philosophical argument against liberalism is that liberty as
the fundamental political value is detrimental to self-perfection because it ultimately destroys
traditional community life within which people’s conception of the good life is embodied.
Liberalism in the name of freedom imposes a certain kind of unacknowledged
domination, and one which in the long run tends to dissolve traditional human ties
and to impoverish social and cultural relationships. Liberalism, while imposing
through state power regimes that declare everyone free to pursue whatever they
take to be their own good, deprives most people of the possibility of
understanding their lives as a quest for the discovery and achievement of the
good, especially by the way in which it attempts to discredit those traditional
forms of human community within which this project has to be embodied.45
What dominion is MacIntyre talking about? Granted that the state is a problem in itself, but if the
state did nothing but protect the right to liberty the only “dominion” being imposed is a
prohibition on aggression. No one is forced to pursue whatever they take to be their own good.
They are simply allowed to do so. Moreover, there is nothing inherent in protecting the right to
45
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liberty that serves to discredit traditional forms of human community, except the following:
What MacIntyre is ultimate objecting to is the prohibition on violence and other forms of
initiatory force. Is this the sort of community tradition he has it in mind to preserve? Perhaps he
will reply that if communities are not allowed to enforce their traditions by aggression or the
threat thereof, then they will not last in the face of competition. If this is the case, however, then
they must not have been as valuable to those who abandoned them for alternatives. Who is
MacIntyre, or anyone else who wants to preserve a particular community or tradition, to coerce
others into conforming? In previous chapters I have argued that aggression is not a part of any
form of flourishing worthy of the name. There is no individual or group right to preserve an
association or cultural tradition by aggression.
Ironically, MacIntyre’s criticisms of liberalism run him dangerously close, if not into, a
form of cultural relativism.
For I am never able to seek the good or exercise the virtues only qua individual.
This is partly because what it is to live the good life concretely varies from
circumstance to circumstance even when it is one and the same conception of the
good life and one and the same set of virtues which are being embodied in a
human life. What the good life is for the fifth-century Athenian general will not
be the same as what it was for a medieval nun or a seventeenth-century farmer.
But it is not just that different individuals live in different social circumstances; it
is also that we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social
identity. I am someone’s son or daughter, someone else’s cousin or uncle; I am a
citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to
this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be good for one
who inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city,
my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and
obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is
in part what gives my life its own moral particularity.46
An Aristotelian liberal will readily accept all of this, except for the implicit argument, which
MacIntyre makes more explicit elsewhere, that there is no substantive universal human nature
that we all share. Without this, MacIntyre must fall into cultural relativism. While we are all the
46
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things MacIntyre says above, we are also human beings and as such share certain essential
characteristics. There may be aspects of the social context that we are born into that run contrary
to human nature, or are internally contradictory, or inferior to aspects of another set of
community traditions. While some of us may get distracted by the range of choices liberty opens
up to us, it is only if we are free to choose that we can truly be virtuous and flourish – and having
a range of alternatives to compare can help us find the right path for us.
I turn now to a predecessor of MacIntyre’s, an early proponent of social liberalism: T.H.
Green. As with MacIntyre, my discussion and criticism of his ideas has been strongly influenced
by the work of Rasmussen and Den Uyl. As a social liberal Green stands somewhere between
classical and more radical forms of liberalism on the one hand and communitarianism on the
other. Communitarianism seems unable to avoid the specters of paternalism and totalitarianism.
Does social liberalism represent a viable “Third Way”?

T.H. Green: Social Liberal
T.H. Green is usually considered one of the first of the social liberals, concerned with
more than just negative rights. He also seems to advocate a fairly minimalist government by
modern standards. He stresses the importance of civil society and civic or political duties more
than traditional classical liberals and libertarians, but like other liberals and Aristotle he believes
that society and the state exist for the benefit of individuals rather than the other way around. On
the other hand, there is enough ambiguity in his moral and political thought to make one wonder
just how much government he would continence and whether it is possible to draw a sharp
distinction between so-called social liberalism and communitarianism. Certainly many who have
come after Green have thought his philosophy justifies a more expansive and intrusive state.
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Green’s ethical theory bears some affinity to the Aristotelian theory espoused in this
dissertation. It is both teleological and perfectionist. For example, he argues: “The moral
progress of mankind has no reality except as resulting in the formation of more perfect individual
characters; but on the other hand every progress toward perfection on the part of the individual
character presupposes some embodiment or expression of itself by the self-realizing principle in
what may be called . . . the organization of life.”47 But his ethical theory also bears some Kantian
overtones and explicit positions that distance his views from those of an Aristotelian. There is his
emphasis on will, for example, and his view that “morality consist[s] in the disinterested
performance of self-imposed duties.”48
Green’s political philosophy and conception of rights also bear some striking similarities
to the metanormative dimension of the Aristotelian-liberal account of rights put forward in this
dissertation. He too sees liberty, self-direction and personal responsibility to be necessary for
moral perfection.
The value then of the institutions of civil life lies in their operation as giving
reality to these capacities of will and reason, and enabling them to be really
exercised. In their general effect, apart from particular aberrations, they render it
possible for a man to be freely determined by the idea of a possible satisfaction of
himself, instead of being driven this way and that by external forces, and thus they
give reality to the capacity called will: and they enable him to organize his reason,
i.e., his idea of self-perfection, by acting as a member of a social organization in
which each contributes to the better-being of all the rest.49
In a way similar to Aristotelian liberals he conceives of the social/political/legal function of
rights and government to be limited to establishing the conditions and encouragements necessary
for self-perfection rather than to directly promote or require virtue and prohibit vice. “The real
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function of government [is] to maintain the conditions of life in which morality shall be
possible[.]”50
There is a crucial difference here, however. In Green’s theory, the function of rights and
government is to establish the conditions and encouragements necessary for moral conduct. In
the Aristotelian-liberal theory espoused here, the function of rights and the political/legal system
is to establish the conditions necessary for the possibility of moral agency (self-direction). There
is a world of difference here, in that the Aristotelian-liberal theory goes no further than
prohibiting aggression whereas Green’s theory presumably requires significantly more than that
although I am none to clear on precisely what. This is not to say that simply securing the
necessary conditions for the possibility of moral agency will not tend also to lead to the
development of the necessary conditions and encouragements for moral conduct and selfperfection. There are very good reasons, theoretical and historical, to believe it will. But note that
this is even less direct than Green’s theory. The advantage of the Aristotelian-liberal theory is
that it requires no aggression to enforce and consequently it demands a more consistent respect
for persons and practice of reason, discourse, persuasion and cooperation with others; its
conception of rights can be consistently upheld, that is, it does not end up with conflicting rights
in principle as Green’s must; and since it does not seek directly to establish certain conditions
and encouragements for moral conduct it does not bias the structure of the political/legal order in
favor of or against any particular forms of flourishing.
The question remains: what sort of government policies are necessary for establishing the
conditions and encouragements necessary for moral conduct? Green apparently rules direct
morals legislation out, for he says that unlike rights, which it is the state’s function to protect,
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“moral duties do not admit of being so enforced.”51 In his undergraduate essay on legislative
interference in moral matters, he objects on the practical grounds that, unlike the Greek polis, the
modern state is much too large, populous and diverse. He rightly recognizes that morals
legislation will tend to cause social strife and that civil society is much better suited to educating
its citizens than is the state. But if the conditions and encouragements for moral conduct are to be
established, surely some sort of soft-paternalist policies are required to give the right nudges.
Once a government embarks down this road, however, it will be favoring the conceptions of
morality and flourishing held by those in power at the expense of other forms. In his “Lectures
on the Principles of Political Obligation,” he does argue that education should be enforced by the
state so that parents will not be allowed to neglect their children’s education. Of course, the
definition of neglect will be determined by those in power and so may not conform to how Green
or the parent might think it is defined. He seems to have considerable respect for private property
and free trade. However, once the door of government interventions is cracked open, successive
administrations will naturally seek to open it wider and wider. Should government do more to
establish the necessary conditions and encouragements? Many who have been influenced by
Green have thought so.

Conclusion
While some communitarian criticisms have hit home to varying degrees against some
forms of liberalism, I do not think they do so against the account of Aristotelian liberalism
presented in this dissertation. Moreover, it seems that communitarianism cannot avoid the
specters of paternalism and totalitarianism. Communitarianism tends to subsume individuals
within the collective and subject them excessively to the authority of the community, by the
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initiation of force if necessary. Social liberalism is not a viable “Third Way,” as it too involves
the institutionalized initiation of force and will tend to result in the scope and power of the state
expanding over time.52 Even Aristotle, who often sought the proper mean between extremes,
recognized that some things do not admit of a mean. While Aristotle himself would not agree, for
both moral and practical reasons liberty is not something to be compromised. Liberty ought
always to be respected, just as murder is always wrong. Indeed, I do not think it correct to
conceive of a proper mean as being a compromise between two flawed extremes in the first
place. Rather, it is the two flawed extremes that represent compromises in one direction or
another from the right course. On the other hand, from a different perspective, one can conceive
of liberty as it is defended here – freedom from the threat or use of initiatory physical force, i.e.,
aggression – as the proper mean between the Hobbesian conception of liberty in the state of
nature as the moral and legal freedom to do whatever one wants (including aggress against
others), on the one hand, and the complete rejection of a right to liberty, on the other.
Much of the reticence socialists and communitarians feel toward liberalism can probably
be attributed to a fundamental misunderstanding of market processes. This misunderstanding, I
believe, has at least two sources: 1) the misidentification of statist-corporatist capitalism with
free markets and 2) the mistaken approach taken to economic theory by prominent classical and,
especially, neoclassical economists. Modern mainstream economics provides an especially
unrealistic, mechanistic and atomistic picture of markets. The Austrian school of economics and
the radical form of liberalism defended here are not plagued by these errors, however; and these
issues, among others, will be discussed in the next three chapters. For now, it may suffice to
assuage the communitarian critic with the following point by Roderick Long:
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Strictly speaking, liberals do not generally have any objection to status
relationships as such; they need not regard significant moral ties as originating
from voluntarily chosen relationships alone. In this sense, liberals have nothing
against communitarian values. What liberals insist on is that people’s lives not be
coercively controlled by such relationships. This distinction is one that
communitarian critics of liberal individualism often miss.53
In the next chapter, as I begin to delve more deeply into politics, I present a sustained critique of
corporatist liberalism and the modern, democratic state.
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Chapter Six.
The New Left and Participatory Democracy
Political and economic freedom is not simply the absence of government controls over the
economy and of dictatorial authority. It involves the emergence of alternative and more
fragmented notions of “authority” in which participants in effect have to earn the always partial
authority they have. It depends on the active participation in the polity and in the economy by
diverse people who exercise their own initiative.
– Lavoie and Chamlee-Wright, Culture and Enterprise, p. 1.
Radicalizing [democracy] is too often imagined as moving toward “direct democracy,” voting
directly for social outcomes. But there is much more to democratic processes than voting, and
much more to politics than government. Wherever human beings engage in direct discourse with
one another about their mutual rights and responsibilities, there is a politics. I mean politics in the
sense of the public sphere in which discourse over rights and responsibilities is carried on.
– Lavoie, “Democracy, Markets and the Legal Order,” pp. 111-112

Introduction
Liberalism, and the market forces it has traditionally championed, helped to undermine
and overthrow the old order of the status society which characterized human social existence
from the dawn of history up until around the eighteenth century. The old order still continues to
exist in some places in the world and is not entirely vanquished even in the West. Still the liberal
revolution that occurred around the time of the eighteenth century promised to usher in a new
order, replacing the status society with the contractual society. This revolution achieved
significant success that persists to this day. The liberals were radical champions of liberty,
property, equality, limited governments and free markets – the original Left. Their opponents, in
contrast, were reactionary conservatives – the original Right – who wanted to preserve rigid
hierarchies of status based on heredity, plutocratic monopoly privilege and the top-down
management of society by these elites. It might be wondered at, then, how it came to be in the
1960s that the radical New Left movement saw the liberal-corporatist state as the primary source
of modern society’s ills, or at least the chief obstacle to fixing them. What relation did this
corporatist liberalism have to the radical liberalism of old? Why and how did the new radicals
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oppose it? In addressing these questions I seek not to engage primarily in historical
reconstruction and analysis but rather to draw from the history of liberalism and the New Left
important lessons for the conduct of our private and public affairs. To engage in a bit of
foreshadowing, these lessons call for radicalization of how we conceive of democracy and
politics and their role in the pursuit of our well-being. The primary purpose of this chapter and
the next is to build on the burgeoning tradition of Aristotelian liberalism; specifically, it is to
develop a non-statist conception of politics grounded in man’s natural end – which is to live a
life of eudaimonia (flourishing, well-being, happiness). To this end, the New Left concept of
participatory democracy will be contrasted with the prevailing reality of manipulative
democracy. And it will be argued that there is still too much focus on what the state can and
should do for us. Rather, the locus of politics ought to be shifted from the state to society – to
what we as members of society can and should do for ourselves and each other.

A Brief History of Liberalism
Liberalism arose in radical opposition to the status society of the old order. The old order
was characterized by rigid status hierarchies based on heredity, plutocratic monopoly privilege
and the top-down management of society primarily to the benefit of those on top. Social and
geographic mobility were severely restricted. Feudal lords were given control over tracts of land
and the production, commerce and people within them. Individuals and companies would be
granted monopoly privilege over areas of production and trade, both within and without the
country (e.g., the East India Trading Company). The origin of intellectual property in the form of
copyrights and patents had its origin in such grants of monopoly privilege. The state controlled
the mint. Guilds controlled entire professions with the backing of the state. Tariffs were raised to
protect domestic industry, benefiting wealthy and politically-connected elites at the expense of
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everyone else. Wars were waged to open up new markets and natural resources for exploitation
by companies with official government charters.
The market forces of capitalism gradually undermined the institutions of the old order.
The growth of international production and trade, the development of new industries and
methods of production, the expansion and increasing wealth of the middle class – these
phenomena brought change, progress and, most importantly, hope to an otherwise static and
stagnant society in which the bulk of the population previously had no hope of significantly
bettering their situation and that of their posterity. These socio-economic changes culminated the
political revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the English Revolutions and the
later American and French Revolutions. The old order was shaken loose and the way paved for
the Industrial Revolution. But those who favored the old order did not go quietly, and the old
order was not entirely vanquished. As Murray Rothbard relates the conflict: “Soon there
developed in Western Europe two great political ideologies, centered around this new
revolutionary phenomenon: one was Liberalism, the party of hope, of radicalism, of liberty, of
the Industrial Revolution, of progress, of humanity; the other was Conservatism, the party of
reaction, the party that longed to restore the hierarchy, statism, theocracy, serfdom, and class
exploitation of the Old Order.”1 Nevertheless, the eighteenth century and especially the
nineteenth century ushered in economic growth, prosperity and victories for individual liberty
that were unprecedented in human history.
Why then did the members of the radical New Left movement come to see liberalism as
intimately related to the corporatist welfare-warfare state of the twentieth century? The answer to
this lies in dissolving two socialist myths about feudalism and capitalism. Of one of these myths,
Rothbard remarks:
1

Rothbard (1965b), p. 5.

160

The myth held that the growth of absolute monarchies and of mercantilism in the
early modern era was necessary for the development of capitalism, since these
served to liberate the merchants and the people from local feudal restrictions. In
actuality, this was not at all the case: the King and his nation-State served rather
as the super-feudal overlord re-imposing and reinforcing feudalism just as it was
being dissolved by the peaceful growth of the market economy. The King
superimposed his own restrictions and monopoly privileges onto those of the
feudal regime. The absolute monarchies were the Old Order writ large and made
even more despotic than before.2
Over time the absolute monarchies gave way to constitutional monarchies and democratic states,
culminating in World War I. Even the freest of these countries, the United States, which came
closest to approaching the liberal ideal of limited government in its formative years, engaged in
the politico-economic policies of the old order at the outset. And this brings us to the second
myth, which conflates the radical liberal ideal of free markets (laissez-faire capitalism) with
state-corporate capitalism. Thus the evils of state-corporate capitalism are identified as the
necessary expression and outcome of liberal ideals. State-corporate capitalism has nothing to do
with radical liberalism, however, but rather is the result of its abandonment. No sooner did many
of the original revolutionary liberals achieve partial success on their immediate goals than they
gave up their radical methods and joined the new Establishment, settling at first for merely
liberalizing the state and then eventually giving up their radical ideals as well. It was this
renunciation of liberalism’s radical roots and the concomitant shift to conservative methods of
reform, along with the rejection of radical natural law/natural rights philosophy in favor of the
much more amenable to raison d’état decision-making philosophy of utilitarianism, that left a
radical void into which stepped socialism as a reaction to the then quasi-conservative liberalism
and traditional conservatism.3 Communists, social democrats, and most socialists have similarly
abandoned socialism’s radical roots in favor of conservative means. The modern liberal
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corporatist state is anything but liberal, being rather a return to methods of the old order in liberal
democratic drag.

Participatory Democracy vs. Manipulative Democracy
Passive Citizenship and Representative Democracy
One of the cornerstones of modern liberal democracy, as it is commonly called, is the
system of democratic representation, usually seen as a superior alternative to direct democracy
for a variety of reasons. Many members of the New Left came to see it as a major part of the
problem with liberal democracy, however. They identified it strongly with manipulative
democracy and juxtaposed it to participatory democracy. One of the few older members of the
New Left, Sidney Lens, summarizes the sentiment well in his essay “The New Left and the
Establishment”:
The United States is a democracy, all right, but a manipulative one in which we
are excluded by and large from the major decisions in our lives. Participative
democracy, on the other hand, means participation in the process of decisionmaking in all areas of life – economic and social, as well as political. Now if you
judge the United States by its own standards of political democracy – that is, the
right to put an “X” in a box every four years and to speak and write with a degree
of tolerance – then the United States ranks very high in the firmament of
democracies. But if you put it to the criteria of participative democracy, it ranks
rather low. The area of decision-making is extremely narrow, and while we do
have elections they are between two parties which stand for much the same thing.4
There are other aspects to the charge of manipulative democracy, of course, but the system of
representation is a key component.
Although in principle political offices are open to all citizens of a certain age, the reality
is that most will never get into office and will have little if any influence on important decisions
that greatly affect their lives. The system of representation has the effect of creating or
maintaining a distinction between ruler and ruled, although this distinction is much more blurry
4
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and permeable than that created by monarchical and dictatorial regimes due to the electoral
process, voting and the universal franchise. Massimo Teodori, editor of the important book The
New Left: A Documentary History, offers a pithy summary of the realization of this contradiction
between principle and practice that sparked the New Left movement: “The students, who had
been raised to believe the myth of the great American democracy, found here – no less than in
other aspects of their life – a contradiction between fact and principle, between values their
upbringing had taught them to cherish and the exercise of authoritarian power by individuals
who professed those same values.”5
A libertarian writer, James Bovard, recently compared the act of voting in elections to the
feudal act of swearing fealty:
French historian Marc Bloch noted that, during the Middle Ages, “the notion
arose that freedom was lost when free choice could not be exercised at least once
in a lifetime.” The only freedom many people sought was to pick whose “man”
they would become. Medieval times included elaborate ceremonies in which the
fealty was consecrated. With current elections, people are permitted to choose
whose pawns they will be. Voting is becoming more like a medieval act of fealty
– with voters bowing down their heads and promising obedience to whoever is
proclaimed the winner.6
Are relatively frequent elections a sufficient safeguard for freedom? And what good are elections
when any representative democratic system eventually, and inevitably, becomes rigged to favor
incumbents and a class of elites? The present system is dominated by a class of career
politicians, increasingly hereditary, who must possess some combination of wealth, influence,
insider connections, and official credentials, and who use their offices to acquire more.
Generally, the higher the office the more this is the case. It is little wonder that a system such as
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this would create a mass of passive, easily manipulated citizens and a professional political class
increasingly adept at manipulating them.
In an important but neglected work, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, Adam
Ferguson, a liberal of the Scottish Enlightenment, voices some worries about the increasing
division and specialization of labor of modern commercial societies that bear on the topic at
hand. He does not repudiate the increasing division and specialization of labor outright and even
sees benefits in it, but he finds it particularly problematic with respect to representative
democracy. Ferguson preferred small nations; a small nation makes direct democracy possible,
allowing all citizens an active role in government. It is well-known that beyond a certain extent
(ignoring for the moment potential technological advances) a representative or authoritarian
system becomes necessary for the state to function. Democratic representation encourages the
division and specialization of labor in the realms of politics and security provision. But before
going further, let us see what Ferguson has to say on the division and specialization of labor.
Ferguson observes that “By the separation of arts and professions, the sources of wealth
are laid open.”7 But for Ferguson, “It is in conducting the affairs of civil society, that mankind
find the exercise of their best talents, as well as the object of their best affections.”8 And so he is
concerned about the effects of increasing division and specialization of labor on active man and
active citizenship: “This description [active citizenship] does not pertain to any particular craft or
profession; or perhaps it implies a kind of ability, which the separate application of men to
particular callings, only tends to suppress or to weaken. Where shall we find the talents which
are fit to act with men in a collective body, if we break that body into parts, and confine the
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observation of each to a separate track?”9 He sees in the shift from citizen militias to professional
and mercenary armies, that even republics have undergone, the cause of a “breach” in “the
system of national virtues.”10 It disarms the populace, removes from most of them an important
avenue of active citizenship, promotes a more bureaucratic and obedient sensibility in the
soldiers, and is more conducive to offensive wars that are destructive of domestic liberty. Just as
excessive division of labor and specialization in security provision and its consequent
professionalization is undesirable, so too is such a division of labor and professionalization in
politics. Ferguson says of both that it helps “to break the bands of society, to substitute form in
place of ingenuity, and to withdraw individuals from the common scene of occupation, on which
the sentiments of the heart, and the mind, are most happily employed.”11
So Ferguson was willing to accept an extensive division of labor and specialization in the
economic spheres of activity, but he saw the same in the realm of security provision and politics
to have a destructive influence on active citizenship and on liberty, 12 for it encourages the bulk
of the citizenry to be apathetic about political issues. It also encourages the formation of a
professional political class that will make careers out of their political offices, giving them a
dangerous amount of power and influence. The concentration of power in the hands of relatively
few professional politicians, while the vast bulk of the population remains only vicariously
connected to politics and largely ignorant about important matters pertaining to policy,13 is a
strong inducement for the continual growth of government, particularly when the professional
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politicians take advantage of perceived crises to ratchet up its power and scope.14 The tendency
is to consolidate and expand government power, to increasingly centrally plan society and the
market which in turn begets more calls for central planning as the people become accustomed to
central planning in more and more areas of life and in order to deal with the inevitable
unintended consequences of previous policies. For these reasons, and others described here and
elsewhere, small nations with direct democracy would be more conducive to active citizenship
and the preservation of liberty, while large representative democracies are destructive of active
citizenship and liberty. A vast multitude of the former is more conducive to beneficial
spontaneous social processes while a relative handful of the latter is decidedly not.
Gambling with Morality: The Moral Hazards and Inefficacy of Voting
As the New Left movement developed it grew steadily more radical, rejecting the formal
democratic process in favor of extra-governmental direct action. Why did they bypass the state?
Part of the reason is that it involves moral hazards and is inefficacious. In 1963, John Lewis, then
president of the Student Nonviolent Coordination Committee, gave a speech in which he gave
voice to both of these concerns:
In good conscience, we cannot support the administration’s civil rights bill, for it
is too little, and too late. There’s not one thing in the bill that will protect our
people from police brutality. . . . We are now involved in a serious revolution.
This nation is still a place of cheap political leaders who build their careers on
immoral compromises and ally themselves with open forms of political, economic
and social exploitations. . . . The party of Kennedy is also the party of Eastland. .
. . The Revolution is at hand, we must free ourselves of the chains of political and
economic slavery. . . . We all recognize the fact that if any social, political and
economic changes are to take place in our society, the people, the masses, must
bring them about. . . . Mr. Kennedy is trying to take the revolution out of the
street and put it in the courts.15
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The great majority of the people, and particularly blacks and the poor, had been left out of the
decision-making process for too long.16
The formal process was too slow, too gradual, too prone to compromises not merely on
results but on moral principles. Politicians too often proved themselves to be corrupt. Politicians
often break campaign promises, for a variety of reasons, and all too often get away with it. The
New Left came to recognize that allying with establishment politicians was a mistake, as they
were more interested in preserving and furthering their own power.17
Politically there emerged, through local community work, the contradiction
between the strategy of alliances, which often ended in co-optation and only
marginal improvements, and the strategy of power, i.e., beginning to build a
movement capable of remaining autonomous, both in its demands and in its
control over the institutions in which it participated.18
They came to recognize the difference “between those who were part of the movement and made
it autonomous, and those who wanted to use the movement; between those involved in its internal
dynamics and those who debated its power strategies in magazine columns.”19 Even Martin
Luther King succumbed to the lure of statist politics.20
While members of the New Left did conduct voter-registration campaigns in the early
1960s, even then this was “opposed by some activists, for whom the drive for the vote
represented a recourse to old-fashioned and discredited methods.” But the main purpose of the
campaign seems not to have been voting but educating “citizens about their rights, catalyz[ing]
energy at the base of the most deprived levels of society and encourag[ing] potential local
leaders to adopt participatory methods.” 21 In SNCC, The New Abolitionists, Howard Zinn
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complained about “the ineptitude of parliamentary procedure.”22 Winning the vote was not
sufficient. The problems the New Left saw demanded direct moral action in the streets.
It is a crucial matter that voting is essentially gambling with morality. This insightful
observation was made by Henry David Thoreau but has been too little noticed, contemplated and
taken seriously by most. The members of the New Left movement understood it and acted on it
better than most. Thoreau wrote:
All voting is a sort of gaming, like chequers or backgammon, with a slight moral
tinge to it, a playing with right and wrong, with moral questions; and betting
naturally accompanies it. The character of the voters is not staked. I cast my vote,
perchance, as I think right; but I am not vitally concerned that that right should
prevail. I am willing to leave it to the majority. Its obligation, therefore, never
exceeds that of expediency. Even voting for the right is doing nothing for it. It is
only expressing to men feebly your desire that it should prevail. A wise man will
not leave the right to the mercy of chance, nor wish it to prevail through the
power of the majority. There is but little virtue in the action of masses of men.
When the majority shall at length vote for the abolition of slavery, it will be
because they are indifferent to slavery, or because there is but little slavery left to
be abolished by their vote. They will then be the only slaves. Only his vote can
hasten the abolition of slavery who asserts his own freedom by his vote.23
With this last sentence Thoreau is no longer really speaking of voting, as becomes clear later on
when he writes “Cast your whole vote, not a strip of paper merely, but your whole influence.”24
With these two sentences, and some passages that come in between, Thoreau is advocating
precisely the radical methods increasingly employed by the New Left movement; he is
advocating civil disobedience and participatory democracy.
A moral hazard arises from this gambling aspect of voting and the gulf that the formal,
especially representative, democratic process creates between the act of voting and the
consequences of said act. Responsibility and costs are diffused among a plurality or majority of
voters who do not actually have to carry out or enforce policies themselves. Given the nature of
22
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voting, the employment of the coercive power of state agents, and the fact that the benefits of
state policies tend to be concentrated while the costs tend to be spread over a large population
(including those who did not vote for them), voters have a strong incentive to support policies
that they otherwise would not if they had to bear the full cost and risk in money, time and
enforcement themselves. This moral hazard is compounded by the representative system. A
democratic representative cannot identify precisely who his real constituents are (those who
voted for him). He is not strictly responsible to them; generally the worst he has to fear is a small
chance he will be ousted in the next election. Nor are they held strictly responsible for his actions
while in office. Despite frequently employed social-contract language, this is not a real principalagent contractual relationship. And the representatives themselves are not the ones who actually
have to pay for, carry out or enforce the policies they enact either. The result of these facts is that
both voters and their representatives have strong incentives to support and enact irresponsible
legislation, regulations and policies.
Making Men ______:25 Corporatist Liberalism & the Bureaucratic Welfare-Warfare State
Like classical liberals and contemporary libertarians, members of the New Left generally
opposed corporate-political partnerships and the bureaucratic welfare-warfare state. Indeed, it is
interesting to note that I am not sure of the origin of the term ‘welfare-warfare state’. Was it
coined by the New Left? or by libertarians, who use it frequently? At any rate, Massimo Teodori
uses the term in the introduction to his documentary history of the New Left, published in
1969.26 The New left opposed not only interventionist foreign policies, the warfare state, but also
the provision of welfare through statist-political means, the welfare state. They were opposed to
25
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the bureaucratic administration of society in general, with education, welfare and war being three
of the major battlegrounds.
The New Left recognized the interconnection between social, economic and political
problems. For example,
[t]he activists began to discover that many of the important economic structures of
the South were in some way connected to and controlled by those of the North;
that the programs for huge military expenditures which supported the most highly
developed national industries could be approved only thanks to deals made by
Southern representatives in exchange for the installation of military bases in their
states; that the welfare programs of preceding decades, just like the civil-rights
and poverty programs, had not in fact improved the lives of the people toward
whom they had been directed, but had only favored the expansion of a powerful
bureaucracy; that the reason there would be no mass unemployment and
economic crisis, as had been predicted, was that the war economy continued to
expand.27
The bureaucratic welfare-warfare state rests upon the ideology of corporatist liberalism, which,
Teodori argues,
promotes internal economic planning, together with increased consumption and
planned obsolescence, aims toward the control of distribution and advertising and
toward a monopoly over mass communications, finances scientific research
applied to the development of technology and social control, requires a liberal
policy of coexistence abroad to permit the expansion of markets, supports higher
education for the training of experts and consultants, subsidizes rich foundations
which patronize cultural and intellectual developments, and is interested in state
promotion of public well-being through welfare programs. In other words, it is a
system based on power in the hands of an oligarchy which penetrates and controls
– directly through ownership, or indirectly through pressure and influence – the
life of the entire nation.28
The 1963 SDS document America and New Era correctly identified the real source of the
problem, i.e., the statist-political forces seeking to maintain and further the system that benefited
them – the politicians, corporate officers, union leaders, college administrators, foundation
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officials, etc.29 These people tended to reduce basic social issues “to problems requiring
administrative manipulation.”30
The ideology of corporatist liberalism, Carl Oglesby, president of SDS in 1965, argued in
a speech, “performs for the corporate state a function quite like what the Church once performed
for the feudal state. It seeks to justify its burdens and protect it from change.”31 The revolt of the
New Left was “a revolt against paternalistic, indirect authority which hides the hand of power in
the glove of verbal idealism.”32 State funded and controlled public education was a part of this
system. It substituted a kind of “painless, non-threatening coercion” for overt coercion,
indoctrinating children and young adults in the reigning orthodoxy, molding them into “good
citizens,” and instilling the skills necessary to take their places as cogs or operators of the
existing machine.33
Hannah Arendt's analysis of the differences between action (praxis)34 and work – and
between politics, which involves action, and fabrication or making (poiēsis), which involves
work – has negative implications for the central planning of society that is characteristic of
modern representative-democratic states. In particular, I have in mind her criticism of Plato, and
to a lesser extent Aristotle, regarding their tendency to view society as a sort of organization and
politics as the running of society as such an organization – or, in their words, politics as akin to
household management. Action, Arendt defines as “the only activity that goes on directly
between men without the intermediary of things or matter”;35 it is directly and intimately related
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to politics, which Arendt links to Scottish Enlightenment notions of spontaneous order.36 “To act,
in its most general sense, means to take initiative, to begin (as the Greek word archein, “to
begin,” “to lead,” and eventually “to rule,” indicates), to set something into motion (which is the
original meaning of the Latin agere).”37 Work, on the other hand, is
the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence, which is
not imbedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated by, the species’ everrecurring life cycle. Work provides an ‘artificial’ world of things, distinctly
different from all natural surroundings. Within its borders each individual life is
housed, while this world itself is meant to outlast and transcend them all.38
We need not accept in its entirety Arendt's conception of action and work with all its
implications and baggage in order to appreciate the difference between dealing with other human
beings as ends in themselves (i.e., voluntarily and politically) and treating them like beasts who
must be tamed, or raw materials for the shaping, or living tools, or mere parts of the machinery
of the state.39 A famous Marxist phrase is apropos here: the formal democratic process of the
state, particularly in the form of representative democracy, amounts to the “replacement of the
government of men by the administration of things.”40
Arendt identifies an element of violence in all making (fabrication),41 and observes
government foundings and legislation to be a kind of making.42 In “legislating and the execution
of decisions by vote” men “‘act like craftsmen’: the result of their actions is a tangible product,
and its process has a clearly recognizable end.” Plato and Aristotle prefer ‘making’ because “of
36
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its greater reliability. It is as though they had said that if men only renounce their capacity for
action, with its futility, boundlessness, and uncertainty of outcome, there could be a remedy for
the frailty of human affairs.”43 This aversion to spontaneous order and genuine politics is
pervasive in political philosophy.
Escape from the frailty of human affairs into the solidity of quiet and order has in
fact so much to recommend it that the greater part of political philosophy since
Plato could easily be interpreted as various attempts to find theoretical
foundations and practical ways for an escape from politics altogether. The
hallmark of all such escapes is the concept of rule, that is, the notion that men can
lawfully and politically live together only when some are entitled to command
and the others forced to obey.44
In applying to “its administration the [then] currently recognized maxims for a well-ordered
household,” Plato was quite aware that he was proposing “a revolutionary transformation of the
polis.”45 The treating of society as an organization to be run according to a plan has the effect of
“banishing the citizens from the public realm” while they leave the ruler to “attend to public
affairs.”46 James O’Brien observes of the New Left radicals that the “Federal Government’s
liberal bureaucracy, as typified by the Justice Department and the War on Poverty, was viewed
with increasing impatience and distrust. The new radicals came to regard the liberal style as a
series of back-room deals among “leaders,” in which decisions were made without the
participation of the governed.”47
Arendt calls a delusion the idea “that we can ‘make’ something in the realm of human
affairs – ‘make’ institutions or laws, for instance as we make tables and chairs, or make men
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‘better’ or ‘worse’ – . . . it is conscious despair of all action, political and non-political, coupled
with the utopian hope that it may be possible to treat men as one treats other ‘material’.”48
In the Republic, the philosopher-king applies the ideas as the craftsman applies
his rules and standards; he ‘makes’ his City as the sculptor makes a statue, and in
the final Platonic work these same ideas have even become laws which need only
be executed.
Within this frame of reference, the emergence of a utopian political system which
could be construed in accordance with a model by somebody who has mastered
the techniques of human affairs becomes almost a matter of course; Plato, who
was the first to design a blueprint for the making of political bodies, has remained
the inspiration for all later utopias.49
Such centrally planned schemes of government must inevitably “break down quickly under the
weight of [the] reality . . . of the real human relationships they [cannot] control.”50 Beyond the
impracticability of central planning, of running society like an organization, there is the moral
dimension that legislation in both the foundational and general sense, insofar as it rests upon
force, treats human beings as means rather than as ends in themselves and thus gives us a prima
facie reason to condemn it as immoral and unjust.
Participatory Democracy: Direct Moral Action and Voluntary Cooperation
The New Left was a radical and decentralized movement that lacked any coherent
ideology. It was born out of an immediate need to confront the many social, political and
economic problems of the day.
Dissent and revolt sprang from individual and social malaise; that is, out of a kind
of individual and social alienation from prevalent institutions, values and
behavior. The spring which set the action into motion . . . was the need to reaffirm
lost values in the name of ideal objectives and moral standards – freedom,
community feeling, right to participate, control of one’s own life – rather than a
positive vision of society and its structures.51
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Participatory democracy was both a means and an end; its goal was the end of manipulative
democracy and the return of freedom, direct participation and cooperation in pursuit of shared
ends. As a means, participatory democracy eschews the top-down administration of things, the
voting, the lobbying, the backroom deals, and the coercion in favor of bottom-up change through
direct moral action and voluntary cooperation. The organization of the movement reflected its
goals and its methods with “no separation between masses and intellectuals, movement and
party, those who theorize and those who act; between ‘leaders’ and ‘followers.”52
Participatory democracy for the New Left involved two distinct sorts of activity: protest
and the cooperative development of parallel or alternative institutions. Both types were
spontaneous and decentralized, brought about by grass-roots development and leading by
example. Members staged sit-ins, picketing, marches, ‘freedom rides’ and other forms of largely
non-violent protest in order to galvanize support, make a statement and influence the public.
Members would also move into local communities and help them organize to solve local
problems. “A great many local programs sprang up – neighborhood political groups, local radio
stations, bulletins, cooperatives, tenants’ associations, police control committees”53 as well as
‘free universities’ and alternative, voluntary welfare programs,54 and so forth. Certain of these
had their aim as the formation and development of counter-communities, reflecting “the desire to
build values, structures, life-styles and actions which should pre-figure the society of
tomorrow.”55
Teodori relates how the logic of direct action led directly to the radicalization of the
movement.
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The two-party structure, as the principle vehicle for participation in the political
process, seemed at the time not only a historical reality, but also a mental habit
which set limits even for the new modes of thinking. But the very logic of direct
action and nonelectoral organization of the new grass-roots organizations, as well
as the contact with the nation’s social and economic realities and power
structures, helped evolve the new activists’ attitudes toward the ruling class.56
For the new radicals, ‘independent politics’ combined with direct action, which
rested in the hands of anyone wanting to use it as a means of political
participation and intervention in social and economic life. Because of the
dispersion of power among complicated institutions and the ever-growing
complexity of the organization of post-industrial society, direct action was a form
of challenge which could attack the system anywhere. Direct action was a method
which returned the initiative to the base and escaped the trap of those ideological
disputations over “the necessity of deciding everything in advance” which had
paralyzed the traditional left. The method proved successful in at least two
respects: it mobilized an ever-growing number of citizens who discovered the
possibilities for expression as well as the permanently revolutionary nature of
direct action and its possible use as an alternative to both “the bloody futility of
civil war and the ineptitude of parliamentary procedure.”57
Thus participatory democracy goes beyond even Jefferson’s wish for a revolution every twenty
years but eschews the bloody violence of the American Revolution.58
What Happened to the New Left?
The New Left achieved a number of successes in its heyday – from wide-ranging civil
rights victories, to ending the Vietnam War, to reviving political activism on campus. What,
then, happened to the New Left? For surely there is much left still to be done. After achieving
these victories it would seem that the New Left has largely disappeared from the scene, its
members retiring from activism and/or allowing themselves to be co-opted into the
Establishment. Members of the New Left seem to have given up their radicalism in favor of the
status quo and, at best, piecemeal reform; in short, they have returned to the ways of the Old Left
which is not really of the left at all. What can explain this phenomenon? People do tend to grow
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more conservative as they age, but this is not an inevitable occurrence and is rather relative.
There are two related factors that, while they do not exhaust the range of likely influences, I
think carry much explanatory power: 1) While the New Left turned away from the formal
democratic process in favor of spontaneous participatory democracy over the course of the
movement, I do not think most of them ever really rejected the former on principle. It was too
slow and corrupt for dealing with urgent problems in all their immediacy. But once the most
urgent of these problems were resolved or at least significant progress had apparently been made,
once the Establishment had finally begun to take notice and cater to issues important to the
activists, and as the activists grew older and became eligible for moving into respectable
positions of power, well, then, the formal democratic process probably began to look more
attractive as a means for furthering their remaining goals. As so often happens with radical
movements, the New Left was co-opted by or rejoined the Establishment. Staughton Lynd, in the
introduction to Priscilla Long’s The New Left: A Collection of Essays, writes: “Among white
radicals. . . . As participatory democracy, like nonviolence, came to seem the product of a naïve
early stage of protest before the magnitude of the Movement’s task was fully recognized, white
radicals drifted back toward the political style of the Old Left.”59 Lynd describes this trend
beginning in the second half of the 1960s. 2) The New Left lacked a systematic and consistent
ideology with which to resist the lure of statist politics. One example of this lack can be found in
Thomas Hayden’s essay “The Politics of the Movement,” in which he looks forward to the
formation of a sort of counter-Continental Congress that “might even become a kind of second
government, receiving taxes from its supporters, establishing contact with other nations, holding
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debates on American foreign and domestic policy, dramatizing the plight of all groups that suffer
from the American system.”60
And what of the New Left’s successes? Arguably little or no lasting progress was made.
With regard to civil rights, the plight of ethnic minorities and the poor remains a live issue – and
government social-welfare policies and intervention in the economy are largely to blame,
policies and interventions that former members of the New Left continue to advocate today.
What of war? The American empire overseas continues to grow. Presidents continue to get us
involved in entangling alliances and conflicts that inevitably spur further conflicts, and Congress
and the Judiciary continue to acquiesce to the expansion of executive power. The New Left
played a key role in stopping one unnecessary, un-Constitutional and unjust war, but there have
been more such wars since. Universities continue to be bureaucratic factories of good corporate
citizens. Political activism on campus has largely been co-opted into the status quo, while the
process of student government elections serve as early training grounds for our future rulers. The
New Left was not radical enough. And it lacked a systematic, consistent anti-statist ideology to
sustain it.
Direct Democracy vs. Representative Democracy: Is There an Important Difference?
It might be thought that the various problems plaguing the formal democratic process that
we have been discussing are peculiar to a particular form of democracy, that is, representative
democracy. Representative democracy, we have seen, distances the bulk of the population from
direct moral and political action on important public matters. It encourages the formation of a
professional political class. It is conducive to a top-down bureaucratic management of society by
a technocratic and plutocratic elite. The masses have every incentive in this system to be
increasingly ignorant of their representatives and of important public issues. It might be thought,
60
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then, that democracy can be radicalized in the direction of direct democracy and that this will fix
its problems. Direct democracy would seem at least superficially to be a form of participatory
democracy, for in direct democracy the entire population is supposed to be able to be directly
involved in deciding important public matters. But not so fast. Is direct democracy really all that
different from representative democracy? Is direct democracy really a formalized participatory
democracy?
Direct democracy is not really a form of participatory democracy and there are certain
important respects in which direct democracy and representative democracy are not so different.
Participatory democracy is extra-governmental and involves discourse and deliberation
culminating in direct action; it is decentralized and spontaneous, dynamic and flexible. Both
direct democracy and representative democracy transform democratic processes into a rigid,
formalized, procedural instrument of the state. The result is a centralization and monopolization
of democratic decision-making processes.
The focus in direct democracy on voting is still vulnerable to the Thoreauvian objection
of gambling with morality, i.e., that you must gamble on getting enough votes to get done what
you believe to be right. The very existence of this centralized voting system for deciding public
matters of moral importance encourages citizens to focus their energies on this formal
democratic process, which is to say that it encourages the wasting of time and money on vote
getting (or buying), at the expense of getting anything actually productive done in a timely
fashion. The result is the incentive increasingly to use the system to centrally plan society from
the top-down.61 And a gulf is opened up between discourse and action. As Benjamin Constant
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remarks: “Lost in the multitude, the individual can almost never perceive the influence he
exercises. Never does his will impress itself upon the whole; nothing confirms in his eyes his
own cooperation.”62 This is not participatory democracy. Participatory democracy is about taking
spontaneous direct action, in voluntary cooperation with likeminded fellows, to do what one can
to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a lesser one.
Finally, as H.L. Mencken argues, both direct democracy and representative democracy
are usually “led and dominated by a few men of unusual initiative and determination, some of
them genuinely superior, but most of them simply demagogues and fanatics.”63 He goes on to
add:
The truth is that the difference between representative democracy and direct
democracy is a great deal less marked than political sentimentalists assume.
Under both forms the sovereign mob must employ agents to execute its will, and
in either case the agents may have ideas of their own, based upon interests of their
own, and the means at hand to do and get what they will. Moreover, their very
position gives them a power of influencing the electors that is far above that of
any ordinary citizen: they become politicians ex officio, and usually end by selling
such influence as remains after they have used all they need for their own ends.
Worse, both forms of democracy encounter the difficulty that the generality of
citizens, no matter how assiduously they may be instructed, remain congenitally
unable to comprehend many of the problems before them, or to consider all of
those they do comprehend in an unbiased and intelligent manner. Thus it is often
impossible to ascertain their views in advance of action, or even, in many cases,
to determine their conclusions post hoc.64
This might seem like an equally good indictment of participatory democracy, but two things can
be said to this objection: 1) I am not quite so cynical and pessimistic about the abilities of the
common man as was Mencken. 2) People are far better at dealing with personal, local, smaller
matters alone and in voluntary cooperation with others than they are at directing the vast
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coercive power of the state. When they are misled by fanatics and demagogues in control of the
state apparatus (and even on the rare occasions when they are not misled), the consequences are
usually disastrous; when they are misled by similar types not in control of the state, the harm
caused pales in comparison and is more easily corrected. And when it comes to the larger issues,
well, these are usually imaginary or greatly exaggerated (recall the fanatics and demagogues), or
they are the direct result of previous state action in which case more state action would only
compound the error.
Fundamentally though, both representative democracy and direct democracy are statist
forms of democracy. Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s incisive critique of statist democracy, while
primarily directed at modern representative democracy, given its contemporary prevalence, is
also applicable to direct democracy. In his book, Democracy: The God That Failed, Hoppe
makes a distinction between private ownership of government and public ownership of
government. The characteristic historical example of the former is monarchy, of the latter, statist
democracy. A privately-owned government is one in which the government is considered to be
the personal property of an individual(s). In contrast,
[d]emocratic rule—in which the government apparatus is considered “public”
property administered by regularly elected officials who do not personally own
and are not viewed as owning the government but as its temporary caretakers or
trustees—typically only follows personal rule and private government
ownership.65
These two forms of government have systematically different effects on social time preference.
The Austrian theory of time preference holds that, ceteris paribus, people tend to prefer
satisfaction of wants sooner rather than later. An individual with a higher degree of time
preference will be more present-oriented, while a person with a low degree of time preference
will be more future-oriented or far-sighted. Under a privately-owned government, the ruler and
65
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the people will tend to have relatively lower degrees of time preference than they would under
publicly-owned or democratic government.
Hoppe offers two interrelated structural/institutional factors that drive the tendency
towards higher time preference in democracies: “public” ownership of the government and free
entry into it.
A democratic ruler can use the government apparatus to his personal advantage,
but he does not own it. He cannot sell government resources and privately pocket
the receipts from such sales, nor can he pass government possessions on to his
personal heir. He owns the current use of government resources, but not their
capital value. In distinct contrast to a king, a president will want to maximize not
total government wealth (capital values and current income) but current income
(regardless and at the expense of capital values). Indeed, even if he wished to act
differently, he could not, for as public property, government resources are
unsaleable, and without market prices economic calculation is impossible.
Accordingly, it must be regarded as unavoidable that public-government
ownership results in continual capital consumption. Instead of maintaining or
even enhancing the value of the government estate, as a king would do, a
president (as distinct from a king) has no interest in not ruining his country. For
why would he not want to increase his confiscations if the advantage of a policy
of moderation—the resulting higher capital value of the government estate—
cannot be reaped privately, while the advantage of the opposite policy of higher
taxes—can be so reaped? For a president, unlike for a king, moderation offers
only disadvantages.66
This, of course, applies not only to presidents or prime ministers in a democracy but also to
members of congress or parliament as well as to bureaucrats. Obviously not all politicians act in
the manner described above, or at least do not intentionally pursue policies with such effects, but
public-government ownership has the effect of encouraging such tendencies; it creates an
incentive.
Moreover, in a modern democracy, entry into government is in principle open to
everyone. In contrast, entry into government in a monarchy is restricted to the ruler and his
family and friends. This has the effect of stimulating “the development of a clear ‘class
66
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consciousness’ on the part of the governed public and promotes opposition and resistance to any
expansion of the government’s power to tax.”67 Also, “government attempts at territorial
expansion tend to be viewed by the public as the ruler’s private business, to be financed and
carried out with his own personal funds. The added territory is the king’s, and so he, not the
public, should pay for it. Consequently, of the two possible methods of enlarging his realm, war
and military conquest or contractual acquisition [e.g., marriage], a private ruler tends to prefer
the latter.”68
Free entry into government blurs the distinction between the rulers and the ruled.
Anyone, in theory, can become part of the ruling class. The “class-consciousness” of the ruled is
blurred. Pressure groups will inevitably attempt to influence politicians and get representatives
elected in order to use the coercive power of the government apparatus to satisfy their short-run
interests at the expense of others. Consequently, “public resistance against government power is
systematically weakened.”69
The combined effect of these two factors – “public” ownership of government and free
entry into it – is conducive to a state of affairs, commonly used to refer to environmental issues,
that can best be characterized as a “tragedy of the commons.”70,71 Of course, the tendency of a
higher social time preference under publicly-owned governments relative to privately-owned
governments should be understood in conjunction with the tendency of government growth. The
Jacobin-style, statist democracies obviously won out over Jeffersonian-style democracy in the
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twentieth century.72 The transition from monarchy to democracy in the West has been
characterized by rising public debt, high levels of taxation and inflation and the advent of total
war. Representative democracy, particularly as it matures, develops a clearer demarcation line
between ruler and ruled, but so long as it remains a democracy the line is far less clear and rigid
than in a monarchy or dictatorship. Direct democracy only serves to blur the line even further.
Direct democracy, then, is not the radical antidote to the evils of representative
democracy. As Don Lavoie observes:
Radicalizing [democracy] is too often imagined as moving toward “direct
democracy,” voting directly for social outcomes. But there is much more to
democratic processes than voting, and much more to politics than government.
Wherever human beings engage in direct discourse with one another about their
mutual rights and responsibilities, there is a politics. I mean politics in the sense
of the public sphere in which discourse over rights and responsibilities is carried
on, much in the way Hannah Arendt discusses it.73
When democracy is but the handmaid of the state, relegated merely to the instrumental process
of its functioning, as direct democracy still is, it cannot be truly radical and participatory. It
cannot help but be inefficacious and coercive. The problem, then, is not democracy but the state
itself. As Edmund Burke wisely observed in his radical youth:
Parties in Religion and Politics make sufficient Discoveries concerning each
other, to give a sober Man a proper Caution against them all. The Monarchic,
Aristocratical, and Popular Partizans have been jointly laying their Axes to the
Root of all Government, and have in their Turns proved each other absurd and
inconvenient. In vain you tell me that Artificial Government is good, but that I fall
out only with the Abuse. The Thing! the Thing itself is the Abuse! Observe, my
Lord, I pray you, that grand Error upon which all artificial legislative Power is
founded. It was observed, that Men had ungovernable Passions, which made it
necessary to guard against the Violence they might offer to each other. They
appointed Governors over them for this Reason; but a worse and more perplexing
Difficulty arises, how to be defended against the Governors? Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes? In vain they change from a single Person to a few. These few have the
Passions of the one, and they unite to strengthen themselves, and to secure the
72
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Gratification of their lawless Passions at the Expence of the general Good. In vain
do we fly to the Many. The Case is worse; their Passions are less under the
Government of Reason, they are augmented by the Contagion, and defended
against all Attacks by their Multitude.74
Burke rightly recognized the source of the state’s evil in its very nature, viz., that it subordinates
the rest under the will of the one, the few or the majority, that the state is necessarily supported
by violence and injustices, and that these amount to tyranny.
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Chapter Seven.
Immanent Politics and the Pursuit of Eudaimonia
Political and economic freedom is not simply the absence of government controls over the
economy and of dictatorial authority. It involves the emergence of alternative and more
fragmented notions of “authority” in which participants in effect have to earn the always partial
authority they have. It depends on the active participation in the polity and in the economy by
diverse people who exercise their own initiative.
– Lavoie and Chamlee-Wright, Culture and Enterprise, p. 1.
Radicalizing [democracy] is too often imagined as moving toward “direct democracy,” voting
directly for social outcomes. But there is much more to democratic processes than voting, and
much more to politics than government. Wherever human beings engage in direct discourse with
one another about their mutual rights and responsibilities, there is a politics. I mean politics in the
sense of the public sphere in which discourse over rights and responsibilities is carried on.
– Lavoie, “Democracy, Markets and the Legal Order,” pp. 111-112

Introduction
In the previous chapter I presented a brief overview of the history of liberalism then
examined the history and beliefs of the New Left movement in thematic fashion in order to
illustrate some lessons about democracy and radical movements. These lessons call for
radicalization of how we conceive of democracy and politics and their role in the pursuit of our
well-being. The primary purpose of this chapter is develop a non-statist conception of politics
grounded in man’s natural end – which is to live a life of eudaimonia (flourishing, well-being,
happiness). And it will be argued that there is still too much focus on what the state can and
should do for us. Rather, the locus of politics ought to be shifted from the state to society – to
what we as members of society can and should do for ourselves and each other.

Toward an Aristotelian Radicalization of Politics and Democracy
Aristotle on Politics and Democracy, and on the Good Man vs. the Good Citizen
Before elaborating the aforementioned neo-Aristotelian theory of non-statist politics it
will first be useful to briefly explicate and critique Aristotle’s views on politics and certain
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matters pertaining to it, such as his conception of the polis, liberty, the good citizen and the good
man. The aim here is to distill from Aristotle’s ideas the essence of the political. We may begin
with Aristotle’s conception of the polis.
What is Aristotle’s conception of the polis? Aristotle says
Every polis is a community of some kind, and every community is established
with a view to some good; for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which
they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the polis or political
community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at
good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.1
A polis is a political community, i.e., a community aimed at the highest good, which
encompasses all the others. But of whom is this community comprised and what is the highest
good at which they aim in common?
A polis is a community of equals, aiming at the best life possible. Now, whereas
eudaimonia [flourishing, well-being, happiness] is the highest good, being a
realization and perfect practice of excellence, which some can attain, while others
have little or none of it.2
The polis is comprised of equals and the highest good at which they aim in common is
eudaimonia.
Political community is, to our current knowledge, unique to human beings. Human
beings are, according to Aristotle, logikon and politikon animals. Aristotle explains thusly:
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious
animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the
only animal who has the gift of speech [lo&gon; logon]. And whereas mere voice
is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals
(for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation
of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech [lo&goj; logos] is
intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just
and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of
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good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of beings who
have this sense makes a family and a polis.3
Philosopher Roderick Long elaborates on Aristotle’s explanation here by pointing out that while
the best translation for these terms logikon and politikon in English are ‘rational’ and ‘political’,
respectively, the close links between the two are somewhat lost in translation.

lo&goj [logos] does mean “reason,” but its more basic meaning is “speech,” or
“language,” or indeed anything that is spoken. By extension, it has two derivative
meanings: first, that which is expressed or explained in speech – in other words,
the intelligible nature of something; and second the capacity or faculty of speech
– in other words, reason. However, even when lo&goj [logos] is used to mean
“reason,” it nevertheless retains a connotation of “language” and “discourse,” and
accordingly a social dimension, that the English word lacks. To be a rational
animal is to be a language-using animal, a conversing animal, a discursive animal;
and to live a human life is to live a life centered around discourse.
Our nature as rational animals is thus closely allied to our nature as political
animals. To be a political animal is not simply to be an animal that lives in groups
or sets up governments (after all, sheep do the former and barbarians do both; but
neither, in Aristotle’s view, are political – or at least not in the fullest and highest
sense); rather, it is to cooperate with others on the basis of discourse about shared
ends.
For Aristotle, being political is an expression of being rational; just as rational
animals naturally conduct their private affairs through reason rather than through
unreflective passion, so they naturally conduct their common affairs through
public discourse and rational persuasion, rather than through violence. . . . A fully
human life, then, will be a life characterized by reason and intelligent cooperation.
(Bees may cooperate after a fashion, but not on the basis of discourse about
shared ends.) To a discursive (logiko&n [logikon]) animal, reason’s value is not
solely as an instrumental means to other goals, but as an intrinsic and constitutive
part of a fully human life; and the same is true for the value of cooperation. The
logiko&n [logikon] animal, to the extent that it truly expresses lo&goj [logos] will
not deal on cooperative terms with others merely because doing so makes others
more likely to contribute instrumentally to the agent’s good; rather, the agent will
see a life of cooperation with others as an essential part of his own good.4
3
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We might then sum up Aristotle’s conception of politics as discourse and deliberation between
equals in joint pursuit of eudaimonia.
To fully understand the nature of the polis and of the polis members’ relations to each
other it is necessary to explore the role that liberty plays in Aristotle’s ethical and political
thought. Long argues that liberty is an external good for Aristotle. He distinguishes between two
different meanings of external, however: “An external1 good is one that is external to body and
soul; that is, one that consists largely or solely in facts about the agent's environment. By
contrast, an external2 good is one that is external to the agent's well-being; that is, its value is
purely instrumental.”5 Miller seems to concede to communitarians that liberty is an external2
good for Aristotle with these remarks: “Aristotle . . . evidently relegated liberty to the status of a
mere external good” and “freedom is only instrumentally valuable.”6 Long argues that, to the
contrary, Aristotle treats liberty as an external1 good but not also as an external2 good.
Like friendship, liberty is an external1 good but is not merely of instrumental value. It is a
constitutive part of eudaimonia. Voluntary action for Aristotle is that in which “the moving
principle is in the agent himself”7 and actions done under compulsion are involuntary.8 When one
is physically coerced the moving principle is not in the agent himself.9 For actions to be
considered virtuous or vicious, and by implication for someone to achieve eudaimonia, the agent
must act voluntarily and not under compulsion.10 Additionally, Long makes the following points:
He observes that Aristotle says in the Politics that “slavery is inconsistent with self-sufficiency
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(a)uta&rxeia [autarchia]).”11 In the Nicomachean Ethics, we see that self-sufficiency is a formal
requirement of eudaimonia,12 and that “subordination to another person, being slavish, is
inconsistent with greatness of soul.”13 We are also told in the Politics that “virtuous people must
be spirited and that spiritedness involves an inclination toward freedom.”14 Moreover, Aristotle
argues that deviant constitutions are despotic whereas a polis “is a community of freemen.”15
Finally, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle anticipates Kant when he says “the man is free . . . who
exists for himself and not another.”16
As the foregoing analysis implies, liberty and individual autonomy are intimately
interrelated with group political autonomy. Miller argues that group “political autonomy
(political rule according to law) requires some measure, at least, of individual autonomy (selfgovernance of the soul): that is, a city-state is (politically) autonomous only if the citizens are
(individually) autonomous to some degree.”17 The individual citizens must be able to rule
themselves rationally before being fully able politically to rule and be ruled in turn. Group
political autonomy also requires, among other things, the consent of the governed to the
constitution of the polis.18 Miller argues that consent is merely evidence of a just constitution for
Aristotle: “Aristotle gives no indication of . . . treating the consent of the governed as a
justification for political authority. Rather, his view is that the voluntary compliance of the
subjects to political rule is evidence that the political rule is justified.”19 But as Long points out,
Aristotle suggests otherwise:
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Yet it would, like as not, seem highly absurd to those willing to reflect, if this
should be the task of the politikou~ [politikou]: to be attending to how he can rule
and despotize (despo&zh [despozē]) over his neighbors, both those who are willing
and those who are not willing. For how can that be politiko&n [politikon], or
appropriate to a lawgiver, which at any rate is not even lawful? Now to rule not
only rightly but wrongly is unlawful, and to dominate is not also to do so rightly.
Nor yet do we see this in the other sciences; for it is not the task (e!rgon [ergon])
of a healer, nor of a steersman, to either persuade or coerce, the one his patients
and the other his passengers [but only to persuade them]. But most people seem to
think despotic art is politikh&n [politikēn]. And precisely what they each will say
is neither right nor advantageous with regard to themselves, this they are not
ashamed to practice toward others; for they seek rightful rule for themselves, but
toward others they have no concern for the things that are right.20
Long argues that this passage is a reply to Plato's argument in the Politicus that, analogous to a
good physician, the “true politiko&j [politikos] . . . is not one who rules over willing subjects,
but rather one who rules wisely, be his subjects willing or unwilling.”21 Aristotle here turns
Plato's argument on its head by denying his “assumption that the consent of the patient is
irrelevant to the e!rgon [ergon; function, task] of medicine; and he insists that to rule against the
will of the ruled is a violation of [natural] law and [natural] justice.”22
This consent of the governed is no mere consent of the majority but must be unanimous
consent. This is the case because, as Miller convincingly argues in Nature, Justice, and Rights,
Aristotle implies that the best polis is a group of individuals co-operating for
mutual [not the overall] advantage, when he characterizes it as 'a community of
similar persons for the sake of the best possible life' ([VII.8] 1328a35-7). It is
implied that all members of the polis must take part in the good life, since the
inhabitants who play a merely functional role in promoting the end without
partaking are adjuncts rather than members (cf. IV.4 1291a24-8).23
As evidence, among others, Miller cites the following passage from Aristotle's Politics:
But a polis is excellent due to the fact that the citizens who partake in the
constitution are excellent; but in our case all the citizens partake in the
20
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constitution. We must therefore enquire as to how a man becomes excellent; for
even if all the citizens could be excellent without each of the citizens [being
excellent], the latter would be more choiceworthy; for 'all' follows from 'each'.24
In other words, a polis that does not have the consent of every citizen or does not promote the
eudaimonia of every citizen is not a just polis. Consent, of course, is not enough by itself to
establish group political autonomy and justify political rule. As the foregoing has suggested, it is
also necessary that the constitution of the polis be in accord with natural justice and, more
generally, that it promotes the eudaimonia of each and every one of its citizens.
An important qualification needs to be made regarding the role of consent in Aristotle's
political theory, however. Long remarks that “Aristotle's focus is on consent to the political
framework, rather than on consent within the political framework. Liberalism, of course, has
traditionally been concerned with both.”25 Long points out that it is important to take note of the
different uses to which Aristotle put the terms e)leuqeri&a (eleutheria) and e)cousi&a (exousia).
Both can be translated as “freedom” or “liberty,” but e)leuqeri&a (eleutheria) “represents the
condition of not being ruled against one's interest and without one's consent” and “is for the most
part a matter of consent to the constitution as a whole” while e)cousi&ai (exousiai) “are specific
freedoms one is allowed under that constitution.”26 The following passage from the Metaphysics
is evidence that Aristotle did not think e)leuqeri&a (eleutheria) necessarily implied any and all

e)cousi&ai (exousiai):
For all things are ordered together in relation to one end; but, just as in a
household, to those who are free (e)leuqe&roij [eleutherois]) it is least open
{h!kista e!cestin [ēkista exestin]; note that e!cestin [exestin] is the verb form of
e)cousi&a [exousia]} to act as chance dictates, but rather, all or most things are
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ordained, whereas for slaves and beasts little is ordained toward the common end,
and most is as chance dictates.27
For liberals and for the Athenian democrats, e)leuqeri&a (eleutheria) is not separable from

e)cousi&a (exousia); but Aristotle rejects this conception of e)leuqeri&a (eleutheria): “It is thought
that . . . doing whatever one wishes counts as being free (e)leu&qeron [eleutheron]). Thus, in
democracies of this sort, each person lives as he wishes. . . . But this is base; for one should not
deem it slavery, but rather salvation, to live according to the constitution.”28 Hence, the door to
paternalistic legislation is open.
However, there are at least two rights in particular, highly valued by (classical) liberals,
that Aristotle also recognizes and values: the right to bear arms and the right to private property.
According to Aristotle, the “constitution must be confined to those who bear arms.”29 Indeed,
ancient Athens possessed no standing army or police force. It relied on a citizen militia.
Aristotle's reasons for advocating an armed citizenry are the same as the reasoning for the
Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, viz., so that the citizens could ward off
both threats from abroad and tyranny at home.30 An unarmed citizenry is virtually an enslaved
one.31 It is tyrannies and oligarchies, and certainly not the best polis, that do not trust the general
population with arms.32
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In Politics II.5, Aristotle claims that private property is necessary for virtuous actions: for
example, generosity.33 Miller correctly observes that Aristotle does not explicitly “endorse a
Locke-style labour theory of acquisition,”34 but Long argues that Aristotle does do much to lay
the groundwork for such a theory.35 Long points out that “Aristotle, like the Lockean liberal,36
insists that one's property is an extension of oneself;37 it is for this reason that our property is so
precious to us, as something that is our own.”38 Most significantly, Long adds, property comes to
have this relationship to and importance for us precisely because we have produced it.39 Aristotle
states:
The cause of this is that existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved, and
that we exist by virtue of activity (i.e., by living and acting), and that the
handiwork is in a sense, the producer of activity; he loves his handiwork,
therefore, because he loves existence. And this is rooted in the nature of things;
for what he is in potentiality, his handiwork manifests in activity.40
It remains to discuss Aristotle’s conceptions of the good citizen and the good man, and to
do that we must also consider in more detail his conception of political rule. To begin with,
Aristotle distinguishes political rule from other forms of rule such as kingly, despotical, and
household management.41 “When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when,
according to the rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is
called a statesman” and there is political rule.42 Those who know only how to rule and not how
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to be ruled as well as those who know only how to be ruled and not how to rule are not capable
of political rule.43
Aristotle remarks that “there are different kinds of citizens; and he is a citizen in the
fullest sense who shares in the honours of the state. Compare Homer's words 'like some
dishonoured stranger';44 he who is excluded from the honours of the state is no better than an
alien.”45 A polis “ought to be composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars.”46 It is the
virtuous who possess individual autonomy, or the greatest measure of it, and in the best polis the
citizenry will all be virtuous and roughly equally so. The reason for this lies in Aristotle's
conception of distributive justice and, particularly in relation to the question of who should rule,
what has come to be called the merit principle. In discussing the just distribution of political
offices, Aristotle makes the following argument:
All men think justice to be a sort of equality; and to a certain extent they agree
with what we have said in our philosophical work about ethics. For they say that
what is just is just for someone and that it should be equal for equals. But there
still remains the question: equality or inequality of what?. . . . But if wealth and
freedom are necessary elements, justice and valour are equally so; for without the
former qualities a [polis] cannot exist at all, without the latter not well. . . . If the
existence of the [polis] is alone to be considered, then it would seem that all, or
some at least, of these claims are just; but, if we take into account a good life
[which is the telos of the polis], then, as I have already said, education and
excellence have superior claims.47
Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions,
and not of living together. Hence they who contribute the most to such a society
have a greater share in it than those who have the same or a greater freedom or
nobility of birth but are inferior to them in political excellence; or than those who
exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by them in excellence.48
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Thus, a polis that is politically autonomous will consist of citizens who are virtuous and roughly
equal in this regard so that they can justly rule and be ruled in turn.
But is it possible to be both a good citizen and a good man at the same time? Can the
requirements of the one conflict with those of the other? In what, specifically does being a good
citizen consist?
One citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community is the
common business of them all. This community is the constitution; the excellence
of each citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of which he is a
member. If, then, there are many forms of government, it is evident that there is
not one single excellence of the good citizen which is perfect excellence. But we
say that the good man is he who has one single excellence which is perfect
excellence. Hence it is evident that the good citizen need not of necessity possess
the excellence which makes a good man.49
Thus a good citizen is loyal and obedient to his polis, whether it is just or not, and in such cases
where the polis is not just the requirements of being a good citizen will conflict with the
requirements of being a good man. For Aristotle, obviously, the requirements of being a good
man trump those of being a good citizen; and herein lies potential for civil disobedience and even
revolution. The good man and the good citizen can be one and the same in the best polis,
however. But should we not go further than this constitution-relative conception of the good
citizen? Should we not take a broader perspective and say that a good citizen will be a good man
who, recognizing that his polis deviates from the best polis, will do what he can to right its
wrongs and steer it toward the ideal? For surely a citizen too is deficient who settles for a polis
that is less than it can be.
From the liberal point of view there is a more serious difficulty besetting Aristotle’s
conceptions of the good citizen and the good man. Aristotle seems to suggest that the good man
cannot actualize his full potential except when he is exercising practical wisdom as a just ruler.
49
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He says that “the good ruler is a good and wise man, but the citizen need not be wise.”50
Moreover,
men are praised for knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and he is said to
be a citizen of excellence who is able to do both well. Now if we supposed the
excellence of a good man to be that which rules, and the excellence of the citizen
to include ruling and obeying, it cannot be said that they are equally worthy of
praise.51
Finally, Aristotle claims that “Practical wisdom is the only excellence peculiar to the ruler: it
would seem that all other excellences must equally belong to ruler and subject. The excellence of
the subject is certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion.”52 It would seem, then, that the truly
good man will be a rare bird indeed and that he will only be so while he rules over supposedly
free men, not when he serves in his capacity as a mere citizen. Even in the best polis it seems that
the good citizen and the good man are only one and the same when united in the good ruler.
Given the considerations of this section and previous chapters, radical liberals can have no truck
with this ideal.
Both individual autonomy and group political autonomy depend upon the citizens
receiving a proper education, however, for virtuous behavior generally requires education
beginning in childhood. Aristotle, in essence, discusses two forms of education pertaining to
intellectual virtue and ethical virtue, respectively, in Nicomachean Ethics II.1. “[I]ntellectual
excellence in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires
experience and time), while moral excellence comes about as a result of habit.”53 It is the task of
legislators to “make citizens good by forming habits in them . . . and those who do not effect it
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miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.”54 The legislators
or lawmakers must design the constitution and the law, which need not be written,55 so that the
polis will perform its proper educative function of teaching the citizens intellectual virtue and
habituating them in ethical virtue, for
the paternal command indeed has not the required force or compulsive power (nor
in general has the command of one man, unless he be a king or something
similar), but the law has compulsive power, while it is at the same time an
account proceeding from a sort of practical wisdom and intellect. And while
people hate men who oppose their impulses, even if they oppose them rightly, the
law in its ordaining of what is good is not burdensome.56
From the point of view of the modern liberal, there are a number of deficiencies in Aristotle's
ethical and political thought. First, Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia is arguably overly
monistic, focusing on a rather narrow conception of the contemplative life, the political life, or
some combination of the two. Despite his significantly greater recognition of the value of
diversity and the individualized and diverse nature of human flourishing than Plato, he did not
appreciate them fully. Second, Aristotle did not fully understand the nature, value, and
fundamental importance of individual liberty for human flourishing. Third, he wrongly attributes
to nature rather than cultural factors and mere prejudice on his part the alleged rational
deficiency of women compared to that of men and of non-Greeks compared to Greeks. Fourth, as
noted in chapter five, Aristotle, conflates the state and civil society in his conception of the polis,
a conflation that might have been unavoidable in the era of the Greek city-state but can no longer
be excusable in light of modern experiences, theory, and historical knowledge. The conflation of
state and civil society can only lead to conceptual confusion, paternalism, and totalitarianism.
Fifth, he overestimates the power and efficacy of the state to educate its citizens in virtue. And
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finally, again as noted in chapter five, liberals must reject his principle of rulership and, to a
certain extent, his principle of community as well.
Toward a Non-Statist Theory of Politics and Democracy
We have seen that in Aristotle’s conception of political liberty the role of consent is
limited to the constitution, or political framework. Consent within the constitution is not as
important to him, whether it should be protected or not depends on the case. Liberals, on the
other hand, hold consent within the political framework to be just as important as consent to the
political framework; liberalism is a political philosophy of mutual consent. But liberalism has
since its discovery carried the seeds of its own corruption and destruction within it, with the
exception of a few truly radical thinkers over the past few centuries, in the form of an inner
contradiction – its acceptance of the state. Just as the radical members of the New Left
movement of the 1960s eventually made their peace with the state after achieving their most
immediate goals, so too did the original revolutionary liberals settle for merely liberalizing the
state and then joining the new Establishment. It was this renunciation of its radical roots and the
concomitant shift to conservative methods of reform, along with the rejection of radical natural
law/natural rights philosophy in favor of the philosophy of utilitarianism, much more amenable
to raison d’état decision-making, that left a radical void into which stepped socialism as a
reaction to the then quasi-conservative liberalism and traditional conservatism.57 The role of the
state in most liberal theories leads to an inevitable tension between consent to the political
framework and consent within the political framework. For the state, which is an organization
that claims a territorial monopoly on the legal use of force and ultimate decision-making, must,
by its very nature and existence, interfere with at least some mutually consensual relationships.
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Roderick Long, in his essay “Immanent Liberalism: The Politics of Mutual Consent,”
draws some illuminating distinctions between immanent and vicarious liberalism as well as
immanent and vicarious communitarianism. He drew his inspiration for the distinction between
immanent and vicarious liberalism from a similar distinction between genuine and spurious
communitarianism made by Karl Marx in his essay “On the Jewish Question.” As Long relates
Marx’s argument:
[T]he modern democratic state systematically spreads a communitarian illusion
over an underlying liberal reality. Citizens of such states exercise the
communitarian values of solidarity and fellowship with other human beings – but
only at the political level, through their ties to the state apparatus (in the form,
e.g., of equal rights to the franchise). Such communal ties have no significance in
people’s actual, everyday lives, which remain competitive, individualistic, and
atomized[.]58
Against this vicarious form of communitarianism, Marx advocates an immanent
communitarianism in which communitarian ideals are realized in people’s everyday lives in
society. These communitarian ideals are essentially expressed in status relationships; the ideal
community is modeled after the family (or, to hearken back to Arendt’s critique of Plato, the
household).59 For socialist communitarians, these status relationships ought to be egalitarian in
nature rather than hierarchical as with the conservatives of the Old Order. Marx’s solution to the
problems inherent in liberal corporatism
is to reassert the claims of status over contract – not, of course, by giving
government priority over society, but rather by reshaping society along status
rather than contract lines. In short, he favors an Immanent Communitarianism,
with status values realized directly at the level of society, and he warns
communitarians against a Vicarious Communitarianism that, by attempting to
realize status only indirectly through the intermediary of the state, in effect turns
the entire social realm over to the liberal ideal of contract.60
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The paradigm liberal relationship is the contractual relationship, which is characterized
by mutual consent. The distinction between immanent and vicarious liberalism hinges on the
locus of consent. “Shall liberalism be immanent, realizing contract values directly at the level of
society, or vicarious, realizing such values only indirectly and fictively through the intermediary
of the state – thus running the analogous risk of turning the entire social realm over to the
communitarian ideal of status?”61 And it is exactly the realization of this risk in corporatistliberal democracies around the world against which the New Left rebelled. Long points out that
although at first glance the social contract appears to embody the contractual ideal of mutual
consent,
[s]ocial-contract theory runs the risk of displacing consent from its immanent role
at the level of society to a vicarious role at the level of the state. This opens the
door to the Rousseau-Kant-Hegel paradigm of contractualism, which aims not at
freedom from constraint, but rather at freedom through constraints expressive of
the constrainee’s true will. Thinkers in this paradigm see the function of consent
as the legitimation of our chains, rather than their removal. The danger to
liberalism is that, in focusing on the role of consent to the political framework,
liberals may lose sight of consent, or its absence, within that framework –
bartering, in Benjamin Constant’s terms, the liberty of the moderns for the liberty
of the ancients. This is fine from a communitarian perspective, of course, but
surely undesirable from a liberal one.
Social-contract theory need not have such implications, of course. For Overton,
Milton, and Locke, for example, the function of the social contract is to guard and
preserve consensual relations in everyday social life, not to replace them. Contract
values remain immanent, not vicarious. When consent to political authority takes
center stage, however – as it does with Hobbes and Rousseau – and the state
rather than society becomes the morally significant locus of contract relations, the
result all too often is a de facto society of status resting on a de jure foundation of
contract[.]62
Although the state is not the morally significant locus of contract relations in all theories of
liberalism, we have seen that it tends to become so in practice over time. This is because even the
most minimal state monopolizes two of the most important realms of political decision-making
61
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and enforcement: law and security. It must by its very nature, if it is to remain what it is, prohibit
mutually consensual relations in these realms. Moreover, theory and history have shown that no
state remains limited for long; they all eventually grow into Leviathan if they are not first
overthrown from within or conquered from without.
In the previously quoted passage above, Long says something interesting about the
liberty of the moderns versus the liberty of the ancients that bears further consideration. He
remarks that vicarious liberalism risks trading the former for the latter, with the implication that
this would not be desirable. As described, correctly, by Constant, they do appear to be
irreconcilable. The liberty of the ancients, Constant writes:
consisted in exercising collectively, but directly, several parts of the complete
sovereignty; in deliberating, in the public square, over war and peace; in forming
alliances with foreign governments; in voting laws, in pronouncing judgments; in
examining the accounts, the acts, the stewardship of the magistrates; in calling
them to appear in front of the assembled people, in accusing, condemning or
absolving them.63
There is room for consent to the political framework here, but the ancients “admitted as
compatible with this collective freedom the complete subjection of the individual to the authority
of the community.”64 In contrast, the moderns traditionally understood liberty to mean everyone
having
the right to be subjected only to the laws, and to be neither arrested, detained, put
to death or maltreated in any way by the arbitrary will of one or more individuals.
It is the right of everyone to express their opinion, choose their profession and
practice it, to dispose of property, and even to abuse it; to come and go without
permission, and without having to account for their motives or undertakings. It is
everyone’s right to associate with other individuals, either to discuss their
interests, or to profess the religion which they and their associates prefer, or even
simply to occupy their days or hours in a way which is most compatible with their
inclinations and whims. Finally it is everyone’s right to exercise some influence
on the administration of the government, either by electing all or particular
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officials, or through representations, petitions, demands to which the authorities
are more or less compelled to pay heed.65
Here we have both consent to the political framework and consent within the political framework
protected, but something has gone missing in the transition. While a marked improvement over
the liberty of the ancients, the liberty of the moderns replaces direct political participation with a
vicarious substitute. Representative democracy is substituted for direct democracy.
[T]he individual, independent in his private life, is, even in the freest of states,
sovereign only in appearance. His sovereignty is restricted and almost always
suspended. If, at fixed and rare intervals, in which he is again surrounded by
precautions and obstacles, he exercises this sovereignty, it is always only to
renounce it.66
Representative democracy and the federal and constitutional checks and balances that
accompany it in modern republican governments are thought to be necessary to protect the
liberty of the moderns. Is it not possible to have the liberty of the moderns with the direct
participation of the ancients? to combine the best features of both types of liberty? Indeed, I
think it is. The dialectical solution to this apparent dilemma lies in participatory democracy and a
shifting of the locus of politics from the state to civil society. What is needed is a truly
immanent, rather than our customarily vicarious, politics.
At this point libertarian anarchists may object. What is all this talk about democracy and
politics within the locus of society? We are trying to get rid of democracy and politics; these are
creatures of the state, after all. Well, no, they are not, actually. One of the aims of this chapter
and the last has been to show that properly conceived they are radically non-statist. Granted,
more needs to be said in this regard, but I am not yet done. Don Lavoie has some remarks that
are particularly relevant here:
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Just as socialism resolved the conflict between democracy and markets by
rejecting markets, liberalism ends up marginalizing democracy [by traditionally
relegating it to an instrumental process within the state]. . . . The anarchist
position seems even worse . . . anarchism winds up apparently rejecting politics,
and therefore democracy, altogether. After all, as radical liberals say, if
everything is decided by market forces, what is there to vote about?
In that question is contained, I suspect, a fundamental misreading of the nature of
both market forces and democratic principles. First of all, as I have been saying,
democracy is more an issue of open discourse than it is an issue of voting. And
secondly, when decisions are “left to the market” there is plenty to talk about.67
Although the market process operates by fixed laws, in a fundamental sense we are the market.
Ultimately, it is up to us what the market will provide and what it will not. The market reflects
our own values. To this it can be added that the market is but an aspect of society, albeit an
important one, not the whole of it. Not all decisions need be purely market-based ones.
Lavoie makes some important points about the political culture necessarily underlying
any political framework as well as the market. Critics of the market often assume wrongly that it
is comprised of a-political, cultureless, atomistic agents. When defending their preferred political
framework people usually assume without explicit argument a political culture necessary to
support it. Every political framework is necessarily supported by commonly held beliefs about
what is morally acceptable. Focusing on the legal system, Lavoie writes:
What makes a legal system, any legal system, work is a shared system of belief in
the rules of justice – a political culture. The culture is, in turn, an evolving
process, a tradition which is continually being reappropriated in creative ways in
the interpersonal and public discourses through which social individuals
communicate. Anarchism seems workable to its advocates only because they
implicitly assume a certain democratic political culture will prevail. Unless
anarchists begin to say something about the kind of political culture that would be
necessary for a stateless legal order, they will never get very far.
Everything depends here on what is considered acceptable social behavior, that is,
on the constraints imposed by a particular political culture. Where slavery is
considered offensive, those who attempt it are easily overwhelmed by the horror
of the public. Where it is thought by the general public justifiable, no amount of
67
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constitutional design will prevent it. Where taxes are accepted as morally
defensible, they will be deployed; where they are equated with slavery, they will
be impossible to collect. The feasibility of slavery or taxation does not
fundamentally depend on the (concentrated) opinion of the designated
representatives of the public, but on the (distributed) opinions of the public itself.
To be sure, there are fixed natural laws, economic and otherwise, that preclude some political
frameworks from being workable. Of the rest, some will be better than others; and some, like
minarchism, will possess such inherent structural incentives as to carry the seeds of their own
eventual destruction. But all rely upon an underlying political culture for support.
Lavoie is quite right that political culture is an issue that libertarian market anarchists
sorely need to address, particularly with regard to the two most sacred and intertwined duties of
the state: the provision of justice and security.
The issue of the market supply of legal services is especially interesting, in that
law lies at the intersection of the two great ideals of liberalism, democracy and
markets. Law is at once the most important precondition of effective market
processes and the most important topic of democratic political discourse.
In the debates over the supply of justice services, anarchists have tended to picture
the legal order nonpolitically, and the limited governmentalists to picture it
noneconomically. I think both of these ways of thinking about the legal order
need to be challenged. Each is a one-sided way of viewing political economy,
which should be seen as an inseparable whole.
Rothbard and [David] Friedman are a case in point. They take the position that
politics (and hence any positive notion of democracy) is by definition a matter of
government, so that the whole topic is, as it were, summarily dismissed. There is
no need for political discourse in the utopias of these authors, since agents simply
“buy” justice services on an impersonal competitive market. Friedman’s approach
leaves the enforcement, interpretation, and definition of rights to be “decided by
the market.” In Rothbard’s case, enforcement and interpretation are left to private
police and courts, but the legal rules are supposed to be derived from natural law,
established once and for all by a deductive science of ethics.
In either case, there is no room in these utopias for politics. At most, political
discourse is only needed in order to drive the process that brings about a radically
liberal society, but once the free society exists, all the work of politics is over. The
definition of rights is decided without the need for discourse, either by the force
of an impersonal market, or by the force of an unquestionable logic.
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Liberals cannot resolve the issue of whether a legal system could be supplied by a
free market because the issue depends on what is happening in the political
culture, in the ongoing discourses about mutual rights and obligations, which
individualist liberalism, in both limited-government and anarchist versions, utterly
ignores. Radical liberals have been so intent on establishing a universal system of
individual rights that they have failed to address the cultural conditions in which
socialized individuals would demand this or that kind of legal service.
The weakness of both sides in the debates over anarchism is their neglect of what
lies behind the legal order. Why does anybody obey the law, whether it is
conceived as being supplied in a competitive or monopolistic manner? Limitedgovernment advocates assume that it is the ultimate threat of force by a monopoly
state that ensures that individuals will obey the law. Anarchists assume that there
is a demand for genuine justice on the part of individual agents, so that
competitive courts will profit most from behaving in a properly liberal manner.
Both beg the question of the political culture. What gives legitimacy to a legal
system is neither the force of threat by the police, nor the force of pure logic, but
the force of public opinion, of the distributed political discourse about rights and
responsibilities.68
Lavoie is arguably unfair to Friedman and Rothbard, but tendencies he identifies are there
in both and in their followers. While Friedman, Rothbard, and their followers do not ignore the
issues of political culture to the extent Lavoie suggests, he is right that they do not give these
issues enough attention. And notably Lavoie remarks in a footnote that he has been persuaded
that free-market anarchism is workable under the right cultural conditions.69 He does seem to go
too far, however, in another footnote:
Indeed, this may be giving these authors too much credit. Political discourse
presupposes an open exploration of issues of mutual concern. It seems that for
Rothbard and his followers, genuine political discourse is not even needed in
order to get to the free society. Instead, it seems there needs to be what is
essentially a religious-conversion experience. The definition of rights is not open
to exploratory dialogue but presumed to have been accomplished once and for all
in Rothbard’s Ethics of Liberty.70
I do not think it accurate to say that Rothbard held the Libertarian Law Code had been deduced
once and for all in his Ethics of Liberty. But what I find particularly problematic about this
68
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footnote is the vagueness in the notion that the definition of rights must be open to exploratory
dialogue. What does this mean exactly? It seems uncontroversial to me that there will and should
be open exploratory dialogue as to which particular liberal theory of rights is the best; likewise,
that there will and should be dialogue over the proper interpretation and application of rights at
the margin. There will even be disagreements over matters of substance. But the core
conceptions of the basic liberal rights must be generally accepted if there is to be genuine,
immanent political-democratic discourse at all. Lavoie seems to recognize this in another work
co-authored with Emily Chamlee-Wright:
To do away with the principle of voluntary action, no matter how worthy the end,
is to annihilate freedom and to institute slavery. When the challenge of social
responsibility is made in the arena of civic debate, this is no longer a problem, as
any action taken in response to those claims would be voluntary.71
They are here discussing the challenge of social responsibility with regard to businesses but the
point applies to political-democratic discourse generally. Liberty, in the full liberal sense, is a
necessary precondition for genuine, immanent politics.
Let us now turn to the task of developing the kernel of an adequate theory of politics. I
understand such a theory to be a non-statist one along Aristotelian-liberal lines, grounded in a
eudaimonistic theory of virtue ethics and natural rights. In the liberal tradition rights have, at
least since Locke, generally been grounded in self-ownership, and liberalism has generally been
viewed by defenders and critics alike as having little or nothing to say about ethical issues
beyond justice. An Aristotelian liberalism, on the other hand, grounds rights precisely in man's
obligation to pursue his own eudaimonia, his natural and ultimate end, which is a life of
flourishing or well-being, a life proper to man. Since man is a rational, political and social
animal, a fully human life is one lived in accord with these essential aspects of his nature within
71
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the context that he is neither a god nor a mere beast but a human being who must make his way
in the world in all his vulnerable embodiedness without giving in to the baser aspects of his
nature.
First and foremost, eudaimonia requires living a life of reason, which means using one's
rational faculty to discover the ends one ought to pursue and the proper means for achieving
them, both in solitary situations and in social and political life. The virtues are constitutive of a
life of eudaimonia, principles of proper conduct both for when we are alone and in our relations
with others. Like the virtue ethics of Aristotle, Aristotelian-liberal virtue ethics focuses on the
moral agent; it offers a supply-side approach rather than a typically modern demand-side
approach to morality and rights. As Roderick Long (1994/95) explains: “According to a demandside ethics, the way that A should treat B is determined primarily by facts about B, the patient
[recipient] of moral activity; but for a supply-side approach like Virtue Ethics, the way that A
should treat B is determined primarily by facts about A, the agent of moral activity.” The central
question of a eudaimonistic virtue ethics is not “What consequences should I promote?” or
“What rules should I follow?” but rather “What kind of person should I be?” 72
It is the very nature of eudaimonia and virtue, or more narrowly of moral acts, that they
must be desired and freely chosen for the right reasons.73 The pursuit of eudaimonia, the practice
of virtue, must be self-directed. Coercive interference, or the threat or use of physical force,
compromises self-direction and therefore moral agency. An act of mine does not count as
virtuous and therefore contributory toward my eudaimonia if you force it upon me, even if it
otherwise would have been had I desired and freely chosen it for the right reasons. From the
structural level of analysis, of the ordering principle of society, we can see that the right to
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liberty protects the possibility of self-direction, a necessary condition for moral agency common
to all forms of human flourishing. The right to liberty, in this sense, is a metanormative principle.
From the personal level of analysis, the level of ethical theory, we can draw on the supplyside/demand-side distinction to arrive at the realization that rights do not derive primarily from
facts about the rights-bearer qua moral recipient but rather derive primarily from facts about the
moral agent. In other words, it is not that rights are first properties of individuals and thereby
produce obligations in others. On the contrary, it is rather our prior obligations as human beings
to live a life of reason from which rights are derived. As Long argues,
just as courage, generosity, and temperance are the virtues that define the
appropriately human attitudes toward danger, giving, and bodily pleasures
respectively, so the virtue of justice defines the appropriately human attitude
toward violence. A maximally human life will give central place to the
distinctively human faculty of reason; and one's life more fully expresses this
faculty to the extent that one deals with others through reason and persuasion,
rather than through violence and force. To choose cooperation over violence is to
choose a human mode of existence over a bestial one. Hence the virtuous person
will refrain from initiating coercion against others.74
Rights are legitimately enforceable moral claims derived from the prior obligation to deal with
each other through reason rather than force. Stated negatively and more precisely: your right is a
legitimately enforceable moral claim derived from my prior obligation not to threaten or use
initiatory physical force against you.
For Locke, the origin and purpose of government, and its only justification, is the
protection of the individual's rights to life, liberty and property. If the state is to have any
justification in light of a Lockean or Aristotelian liberalism, it will at least have to meet this
criterion. A careful examination of the nature of the state, however, reveals that it cannot. Recall
that the state is an organization that claims a territorial monopoly on the legal use of force and
ultimate decision-making. Consider, also, that states generally acquire their revenue by physical
74
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coercion (taxation). Now, taxation is theft and therefore a violation of property rights. While it is
conceivable that in principle a state could acquire its revenue purely from voluntary
contributions, it would be a misnomer to call this taxation.75 If tax “contributions” were truly
voluntary, there would be no need to back up their collection with the threat or use of initiatory
physical force. As a self-proclaimed territorial monopolist, even the most minimal libertarian
state, should it seek to enforce its claim, must necessarily violate the rights of any of its rightsrespecting subjects who prefer an alternative. When the state attempts to prohibit competitors in
the voluntary production, purchase and sale of security and legal services, it violates the rights of
all the parties involved. Even if we put all this aside, no state known to history has been so
constituted as to provide a reasonable assurance that the exercise of its power will not be
arbitrary, that the laws it passes will be just, that it will not seek continually and increasingly to
expand the size and scope of its activities beyond the protection of rights.
It would be correct to point out that none of the foregoing precludes the possibility of a
state actually acquiring the explicit and unanimous consent of its subjects. It is, after all,
conceivable that a state could, at least in principle, manage to do so. A few points can be made in
reply. First, while this may in principle be possible, in actual practice such an occurrence is
exceedingly unlikely and like to be of only transitory duration. Second, this in-principlepossibility is no justification of a state that does not have explicit and unanimous consent in
reality. Third, although consent is necessary, it is not enough to justify the state, to make the state
just. A state that has the explicit and unanimous consent of its subjects but violates the rights of
other persons who are not its subjects is still unjust, as are its agents and supporters.
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More to the point, a contract with the state is no more valid than, and is essentially the
same as, a slavery contract.76,77 This is essentially because the state claims a territorial monopoly
on the legal use of force and ultimate decision-making. In both cases (of state contracts and
slavery contracts), to paraphrase Spooner, an individual delegates, or gives to another, a right of
arbitrary dominion over himself, and this no one can do, for the right to liberty is inalienable. If
the subject/slave later changes his mind, exit from the agreement would be barred to him by the
terms of the contract; a state contract with the right of secession (down to the individual level), or
a slavery contract with the right of exit, would be a contradiction in terms. Moreover, even if the
contract stipulates what the state/master can or cannot do to the subject/slave, aside from those
stipulations the state/master has been delegated or given arbitrary dominion over the
subject/slave. If anything, the state contract is the worse of the two because states generally have
greater power and perceived legitimacy than individual persons and private organizations. To
whom does the subject turn when the state inevitably begins exceeding the limits of the contract?
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
For an explanation of why the right to liberty is inalienable, and why one cannot therefore
delegate or give to another a right of arbitrary dominion over himself, two points can be made,
the first suggestive and the second decisive.78 First, since we all have an obligation to live a life
of eudaimonia, which requires self-directed action, person A cannot morally abdicate his

76

For lack of a better term, I will use ‘state contract’ to refer primarily to hypothetical explicit contracts with the
state, although my argument against these applies equally as well to the fiction of the implicit consent-based social
“contract.”
77
Locke's contention that the people have a right to revolution because the relationship between a people and their
state is contractual notwithstanding; that this ought to be the case is true. Moreover, a truly voluntary government
will recognize an unlimited right of secession (making revolution unnecessary). But Locke's normative claim about
states does not reflect reality – states do not behave as if their relationships with their people are contractual, and no
such contract has ever been signed by all of the people in any case. Furthermore, it is not enough for the rights to
secession and revolution to reside only in the people as a whole.
78
The argument that follows is heavily indebted to Roderick Long's (1994/95) “Slavery Contracts and Inalienable
Rights: A Formulation.”

211

responsibility by delegating or giving to person B a right of arbitrary dominion over himself.
While this claim does not by itself establish the right to liberty or its inalienability, it does point
out the moral impropriety on the part of the would-be subject/slave to enter into a state or slavery
contract. Second, recall that for Aristotelian liberalism rights derive primarily from the moral
agent's obligation not to aggress against other rational beings. Rights do not simply reside in the
moral recipient and thereby produce obligations for others. Person A's right not to be aggressed
against by person B cannot simply be abdicated by an act of will to B, for B's obligation not to
aggress against A depends on B's calling as a human being, something which is not in the control
of A. Nemo dat quod non habet.79 The right to liberty is therefore inalienable. It follows from
this that both state contracts and slavery contracts are illegitimate because they are fraudulent on
the part of the would-be subject/slave and more generally unjust on the part of the would-be
state/master, for the former is attempting to transfer something that is not his to transfer and the
latter is attempting to receive and exercise a power to which he has no right. The state, therefore,
can never be just, even in the extremely unlikely event it should somehow garner the explicit and
unanimous consent of its subjects.80, 81 That the state is inherently unjust is a conceptual truth;
whether any given organization in society counts as a state is a separate empirical matter that
must be left up to analysis of history and the present. I dare say, however, that every one of the
national governments currently existing is a state.
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The foregoing highlights an important element of any adequate definition or theory of
politics: equality. I have in mind here equality of a particularly fundamental and radical kind:
equality of authority. Locke describes this equality of authority as a condition
wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than
another: there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species
and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of
the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without
subordination or subjection[.]82
The violation of a person’s rights constitutes putting him under subordination or subjection to the
rights-violator(s). Likewise, to delegate or grant to some person or organization the power of
arbitrary dominion over oneself constitutes submitting oneself to subordination or subjection.
[B]eing all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,
health, liberty, or possessions. . . . And being furnished with like faculties,
sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such
subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we
were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours.83
Roderick Long notes in his essay “Equality: The Unknown Ideal” that this “is a notable preKantian statement of the principle that human beings are not to be treated as mere means to the
ends of others.” Long also points out that equality of authority “involves not merely equality
before legislators, judges and police, but, far more crucially, equality with legislators, judges, and
police.”84
[T]he execution of the law of nature is in that state put into every man’s hands,
whereby everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that law [of natural
rights] to such a degree as may hinder its violation. . . . For in that state of perfect
equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over
another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, everyone must needs have a
right to do.85
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The state institutionalizes inequality of authority, making its subjects subordinate and subjected
to legislators, judges and police. This is true even of a democratic state. Locke took the equality
of authority described here as existing in a state of nature, which device he used as a thought
experiment for discovering man’s rights. Eschewing the use of such a philosophical method, I
take equality of authority instead to be natural in the Aristotelian sense of teleological
completeness or perfection.
We are now in a position to adopt the Aristotelian conception of politics sketched in the
previous section and to understand the role that the ‘between equals’ phrase plays in it within an
Aristotelian-liberal theory. In general, politics is discourse and deliberation between equals in
joint pursuit of eudaimonia. In specific, narrower cases, this will manifest in the cooperative
pursuit of shared ends which are partially constitutive of eudaimonia. I include deliberation in
the definition to signify in Aristotelian terms the decision-making process that culminates in
action. Politics is not limited to mere theoretical discourse but has its ultimate end in practical,
cooperative action in pursuit of eudaimonia.
There are at least three conditions necessary for immanent politics to take place: direct
participation, direct action and individual liberty. Politics ceases to be immanent, and becomes
increasingly vicarious until it is nonexistent or is replaced by despotical rule, under at least three
conditions: 1) the extent that it is conducted only by representatives, 2) the extent to which
discourse and deliberation are separated from their culmination in direct action, and 3) the extent
that rights-violating behavior (the threat or use of initiatory physical force) pervades the
relationship. Much of what passes for politics in modern states takes place only among
representatives, puts a vast gulf between political discourse and direct action, and involves
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rights-violating behavior or policies. Thus politics, an important means of pursuing eudaimonia,
is highly vicarious in even the freest of modern states.
The particular institutions within which genuine politics is conducted vary. It has been a
long-standing mistake in political philosophy to identify politics primarily with one particular
institution – the state – particularly since statist politics is extremely vicarious at best, a complete
misnomer at worst. Politics can take place at work, but I am not here referring to what is
cynically and jokingly called “office politics.” So-called office politics, like statist politics, is a
vulgar imitation of politics not really aimed at eudaimonia. It is more competitive than
cooperative, modeled as it is after the power-grabbing, back-stabbing, deceit and vice prevalent
in statist politics. Immanent politics at work can manifest in discourse and deliberation over the
goals of the company, its internal culture and activities for instilling and reinforcing it, the
products and services that will be provided, the wages and benefits of employees, philanthropic
efforts, its impact on the environment, and so forth. Genuine politics can also be found in the
governing operations of clubs of various types. When parents, whose son or daughter has died of
some rare and understudied disease that as yet has no cure, set out to raise awareness of it by
enlisting the voluntary aid of others and setting up a foundation to fund educational outreach,
scientific research and charitable support for other victims, genuine politics is involved. When
parents in a local neighborhood become fed up with ineffective public schools and get together
to discuss setting up a cooperative home-schooling venture, here too is genuine politics. Much of
what the New Left did in the name of participatory democracy involved genuine politics.
Genuine politics can even take place in internet chatrooms and forums and on blogs.
The question of what is or should be the end of politics is a perennial one in political
philosophy. Classical liberalism and contemporary libertarianism have traditionally held, with
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Lord Acton, that liberty is the highest end of politics. Other political philosophies and even
progressive or “leftist” deviations of liberalism give different answers and are willing to
compromise liberty to varying degrees in pursuit of their favored ends. Most classical liberals
and contemporary libertarians do not think that liberty is the highest end period, however.
Rather, they hold liberty to be the highest end of politics because it is a necessary means for
achieving other, more important ends, outside of politics. Consequently, they tend to limit
liberalism and politics to narrow considerations of justice, rights and liberty, putting a wall of
separation between politics and the rest of morality. It should be apparent that the highest end of
the conception of politics I have developed is not liberty but eudaimonia. Can my theory then
have any legitimate claim to being a form of liberalism? I think so. Classical liberals and
contemporary libertarians have mistaken statist politics for true politics. If politics is identified
with the state, then liberty must indeed be the highest end of politics – but it will eventually be
undermined by the state. Those who reject the state entirely tend to throw out the baby (politics)
with the dirty bathwater (the state). But in my conception, genuine politics presupposes liberty
and precludes acceptance of the state. Liberty, we might say, is the highest pre-political end, for
without it politics and flourishing are not possible. When the state is not the locus of politics,
there is no problem in holding liberty to be an end-in-itself and, more importantly, to be a
necessary precondition of and constitutive means to the highest end of politics – eudaimonia.
Statist policies such as wealth redistribution, economic regulation and morals legislation are all
unjust in this view; liberty and pluralism are not threatened by Aristotelian liberalism’s more
robust conceptions of ethics and politics.
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Chapter Eight.
Free Markets and Free Enterprise:
Their Ethical and Cultural Principles and Foundations
There is hardly an ethical problem, in fact, without its economic aspect. Our daily ethical decisions
are in the main economic decisions, and nearly all our daily economic decisions have, in turn, an
ethical aspect.
– Henry Hazlitt, The Foundations of Morality (1964), p. 301.
The market makes a perfect totalizing enemy: it is impersonal, has no particular location and
legitimates itself through a myriad of democratic practices of buying and selling. . . . The problem
is that . . . the market is a democratic institution aggregating the decisions of whomever
participates in it. When all is said and done, complaints about the market are nothing but
complaints about the people themselves.
– Paul Piccone, “From the New Left to the New Populism,” Telos, 101 (Fall 1994), p. 202.

Introduction
Thus far I have sketched an Aristotelian-liberal account of human flourishing along with
an integrated theory of virtue ethics and natural rights. I have discussed the Aristotelian-liberal
conception of society, defended this conception against communitarian critics and in turn
critiqued the communitarian conceptions of society and state. Finally, in the previous two
chapters, I have critiqued the state itself and statist democracy and sketched the foundations of a
new anti-statist theory of politics. No defense of liberalism would be complete, however, without
a defense of free markets. This last substantive chapter attempts to perform two interrelated
tasks: 1) provide a moral defense of the free market based on an Aristotelian-liberal theory of
virtue ethics and natural rights, and 2) challenge political liberals to take seriously the need for
liberalism as a political philosophy to deal with ethical and cultural foundations and principles
beyond political liberty, political justice and negative rights.
It may be useful at this late stage to offer a reminder in summary of just what Aristotelian
liberalism is. Aristotelian liberalism holds that man's natural end is a life of eudaimonia
(flourishing, well-being, happiness); that virtue is constitutive of one's own flourishing but must
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be freely chosen to count as such; that man is a profoundly social being, but nevertheless that
individuals are ends-in-themselves and not means to the ends of others; that the right to liberty is
a metanormative principle necessary for protecting the possibility of all forms of human
flourishing and an interpersonal normative principle such that rights-respecting behavior is
constitutive of one's own eudaimonia. Unlike most Enlightenment versions of liberalism,
Aristotelian liberalism is not solely concerned with rights, political justice and political liberty. It
is also important to identify ethical and cultural institutions and principles necessary for bringing
about and maintaining a free and flourishing society.
Free markets have never had a shortage of critics. However, the demonstration of the
necessity and superior efficiency of markets by economic theory and historical evidence has long
since refuted full-blown Marxist and socialist critics. Not that Marxism and other forms of
socialism are thoroughly dead, but they are no longer the dominant form of criticism. Today’s
dominant forms of market criticism, outside of economics, come from at least two sources: 1)
communitarians, and 2) the field of business ethics. Many communitarians fault mainstream
neoclassical economics for a number of Enlightenment pitfalls: an atomistic, a-historical and acontextual view of human nature; a mechanistic view of the world; the preoccupation with
universal laws and prescriptions to the exclusion of cultural differences; and so forth. But they
are not merely critical of mainstream economics, they are also critical of the market process itself
as atomizing and mechanistic, an impersonal force that destroys community bonds and
undermines tradition.
In the field of business ethics, while there is a general acceptance of the market (if not the
free market), there are frequent demands for “social responsibility” from businesses. Businesses
have a responsibility not merely to their stockholders, or even to their customers and employees,

218

but to all of their stakeholders. In this stakeholder literature, stakeholder is a rather nebulous
concept encompassing any constituency upon which a firm has an impact. Impact too is a rather
vague and broad standard allowing the inclusion of “suppliers, distributors, [and] the local,
national and global communities” to fall within the category of stakeholder.1 It is the
responsibility of a business to weigh the relative importance of these stakeholders within the
context of its impact and capabilities and to avoid having a negative impact when possible, to
compensate for it when not possible, and ultimately to “become an active agent for [positive]
social change.”2 Maximizing profit and dividends, while important, may not always be the top
priority and certainly are not the only concerns of business.
While these challenges to free markets are not without significant flaws, there are some
respects in which their criticisms are valid. Communitarians and business ethicists are right to be
critical of mainstream neoclassical economics and merely economic defenses of free markets
predicated on efficiency or some other utilitarian concept. The entrepreneur of mainstream
neoclassical economics is a cultureless, contextless, atomistic individual operating in
mechanical, calculative and reactive fashion to exogenous, impersonal forces. But this unrealistic
account of the entrepreneur and of the market is the result of mainstream general equilibrium and
perfect competition analysis, and is not a necessary feature of economics or of the market as
such.
Don Lavoie and Emily Chamlee-Wright point out that mainstream economics makes the
“explicit assumption that economic agents possess (or come to possess) all relevant information
necessary to make rational decisions.” They then identify three implicit assumptions that follow
from this, viz.:

1
2

Lavoie and Chamlee-Wright (2000), p. 112.
Quoted in ibid., p. 108.
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1. Economic agents possess the “true” model of the economy and thus, will
be able to identify the one clear path towards profit maximization.
2. As the competitive world is a world of equilibrium, a “socially
responsible” decision and a “profit maximizing” decision are usually
incompatible.
3. Individuals’ utility functions are well-specified . . . and rest upon a
singular goal.3
All of these assumptions have their basis in general equilibrium and perfect competition analysis,
in which simplified models of the world are created by making false assumptions in order to
make problems tractable to statistical methods. In equilibrium the economy goes through an
endless and unchanging round of activity. No new information, methods, products, or what have
you, are introduced; supply equals demand. Economic actors are thus able to possess perfect
knowledge of products and prices, supply and demand. Perfect competition resembles actual
competition in the real world not at all. It is a hypothetical situation in which no producer or
consumer has the power to influence prices. For this situation to attain, economic power must be
so diffused that the activities of the economic agent will have no measurable effect, goods and
services must be homogeneous, and actors must have complete and perfect information. Real
entrepreneurship is impossible in mainstream neoclassical economics, for all potential
entrepreneurial opportunities are perfectly competed away. Indeed, in equilibrium real
competition has ceased.
Within the model of perfect competition, there is no room for interpretation, no
space for weighting alternatives, no slack. Agents in such a world are mere cogs
in the machine, never really exhibiting any true agency.4
To paraphrase an inside joke among mainstream neoclassical economists: Two economists are
walking down the sidewalk and one of them spots a $20 bill lying in the gutter. He says to the

3
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other, “Look! There’s a $20 bill lying in the gutter. Aren’t you going to pick it up?” And his
companion replies, “No, there couldn’t be. If there had been somebody else would have picked it
up already.” The “entrepreneur” of mainstream economics merely reacts to objective stimuli,
making mechanistic calculations rather than value judgments and contextual interpretations, and
in general equilibrium – which is the mainstream model of the economy – has no distinctive
function to perform whatever. Moreover, business owners/managers have no room for discretion
and so the possibility of socially responsible decisions is excluded, for any socially responsible
decisions would a priori be economically irrational.
Now, the Austrian school of economics does make some use of equilibrium analysis.
Although there are some similarities between mainstream partial and general equilibrium and the
Austrian evenly rotating economy (ERE), the similarities are non-essential for these imaginary
constructs differ greatly in their underlying methods and in their purpose. Whereas mainstream
economists posit equilibrium as a model of reality, Austrians merely use it to abstract from the
actual workings of the market process in order to isolate analytically different aspects of how the
market process actually operates. Austrians employ similar techniques in order to understand
precisely what is the function of the capitalist-entrepreneur, the consumer, and so forth, in the
actual operations of real markets. Thus, while Austrian economists abstract away from the
particulars of culture and context in order to understand the function of, say, the pure
entrepreneur in the market process, it is only as a means to understand the phenomenon of profit.
The capitalist- or integral-entrepreneur, for example, is conceived essentially as a forecaster, an
owner, and a bearer of risk. In both cases, it is not forgotten that the entrepreneur is a sociallyculturally embedded actor in the actual market process. These Austrian praxeological concepts of
the entrepreneur are aspects of actual acting persons, not simplified models based on false
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assumptions that have no corresponding counterpart in the real world. Economics, being for the
Austrians a branch of praxeology (the general science of human action), is not concerned with
the mainstream’s homo œconomicus but rather with homo agens: acting man who employs
various scarce means to attain his ends, whatever they may be. The Austrians view the market as
an aspect of society, not the whole of it. The difference in methods between mainstream
economics and the Austrian school is that between Platonic Forms and Aristotelian concepts,
between precisive and non-precisive abstraction.5 Thus, some neo-Austrians make a fundamental
mistake when they conflate mainstream general and partial equilibrium, perfect competition, and
the concept of the entrepreneur with the Austrian concept of the ERE and the pure and capitalistentrepreneur, for example. Austrians, moreover, apply their praxeological concepts and theories
to the real world primarily by means of the thymological method (or hermeneutical psychology)
rather than primarily through econometric models.
The essential differences between mainstream neoclassical economics and Austrian
economics are important for our purposes in light of the criticisms put forth against economics
and free markets by communitarians and certain business ethicists. The communitarian charges
of atomism, mechanism, and so forth, strike home against mainstream neoclassical economics
but miss their mark against Austrian economics.6 With regard to the business ethics literature, the
mainstream neoclassical view of man and the market is fundamentally incompatible with the
view of economic actors having any ethical obligations beyond contractual ones. On the other
hand, the positive economic theory of the Austrian school as a descriptive foundation is not
merely compatible with but is arguably essential to a normative defense of free markets and free
enterprise, including one that goes beyond rights to the broader requirements of virtue.
5
6

On precisive vs. non-precisive abstraction in economics, see Roderick Long (2006a).
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both have their roots in Plato, despite communitarian claims to be hearkening back to Aristotle.
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Not all normative defenses of free markets and free enterprise are made equal. One type
of such a defense that is very common is the argument from economic efficiency. Another finds
its basis in natural rights. To commit oneself solely to one or the other, or even both together, I
will argue, is unnecessarily self-limiting. Moreover, economic efficiency arguments, taken by
themselves, suffer from an inherent weakness. As compelling as economic efficiency arguments
can be, they are only be persuasive, by themselves, to those who already hold the results of
efficiency to be of higher moral value or importance than other goods. Those who value
efficiency less highly than some other good that they think free markets harm or make harder to
attain will not be persuaded. Efficiency arguments provide no answer to the Marxist criticism of
alienation, for example. The unparalleled economic benefits of free markets are a good reason to
regard free markets as the most preferable economic system, but they are not the only reason and
arguably are not a sufficient reason to hold free markets to be the only moral alternative. Since a
deeper moral defense of free markets is possible, and since such a defense need not preclude the
economic benefits of free markets from being important considerations, it is unnecessarily selflimiting to limit the defense of free markets to arguments from economic efficiency.
It is also common to defend free markets by invoking our natural rights to life, liberty and
property. Thus, any government intervention in the market beyond protecting these rights is
unjust. I think this sort of defense is essentially correct and powerful. There seems to be a
tendency, however, inherent in all the Enlightenment versions of liberalism increasingly to
restrict the moral defense of free markets to considerations of negative rights, political liberty
and political justice. It is my contention that merely political liberalisms of this sort are
unnecessarily self-limiting. The moral defense of free markets can be strengthened by
considering broader ethical and cultural issues. Aristotelian liberalism is uniquely well-suited to
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the task of providing a full moral defense of free markets, for it can offer a seamlessly integrated
theory of virtue ethics and natural rights that allows for a robust conception of the good while
fully protecting individual liberty and pluralism. Even some Aristotelian liberals have not fully
grasped the potential uniqueness of Aristotelian liberalism in this regard.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl explicitly deny that simply refraining from rights-violating
behavior carries much moral weight. Rather, as they see it, rights are metanormative; as such
rights protect the central necessary condition that makes ethical action possible, the possibility of
self-direction. For Rasmussen and Den Uyl, rights function like deontic side-constraints,
delimiting what can count as moral in a social context. On the one hand rights-violating behavior
cannot be virtuous, but on the other merely refraining from rights-violating behavior does not by
itself count as virtuous. Rights-respecting behavior can still be marked by vice. It is possible to
live a life riddled through with vice, even a predominantly parasitic one, without ever violating
anyone’s rights. However, what Rasmussen and Den Uyl underemphasize is that while rightsrespecting behavior as such may seem unremarkable to the members of a fully libertarian
society, we do not live in a fully libertarian society. We live in a society in which the barbarism
of rights-violations is all too prevalent. Indeed, the human race has from its beginnings even unto
the present shown a distressing atavistic tendency to revert to violence, although there have,
thankfully, been historical pockets of prevailing liberty from time to time. Seen in this light, a
life supported by personal productivity and trade, lived in peace with one’s fellow men, even if
only to enjoy hedonistic pleasures, is a significant achievement. It would not seem to diminish
the achievement of a full flowering of virtue to recognize that there is at least a little virtue in
this, in simply respecting the rights of others. Moreover, it can be pointed out that there is a
world of difference between merely refraining from violating rights and actually respecting
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them; this is the difference for Aristotle between doing an action for the wrong reasons (not
virtuous) and doing it for the right reasons (virtuous).7
I have criticized, in chapters two and three, Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s view that rights
are metanormative principles but not also interpersonal normative principles. In chapter three, I
also offered my own account of rights. A brief summary of my account will be useful here.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl are indeed correct that rights are metanormative principles. They are,
from a certain point of view; namely, at the structural level of analysis (of political, economic,
and legal theory), rights serve a metanormative function. The typical liberal account of rights is a
demand-side one, i.e., it derives rights primarily (but not exclusively) from facts about the moral
recipient (rather than the moral agent) and then our duties as moral agents are derived from the
moral recipient’s prior rights. Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s account takes this form, albeit at a
systemic level. In contrast, Aristotelian liberalism is capable of providing a truly supply-side
theory of rights in which rights are derived primarily (but not exclusively) from facts about the
moral agent. Thus, at the personal level of analysis (of ethical theory), rights are interpersonal
normative principles derived from the requirements of our own flourishing and, in particular, the
virtue of justice. As rational, political and social animals our well-being requires that we deal
with others on a rational basis through discourse, persuasion and voluntary cooperation rather
than through the threat or use of initiatory physical force. The reasons for this are many; I cannot
explore them all here, but must restrict myself to a few remarks. In the Aristotelian tradition,
what the virtue of justice requires of us is informed by the requirements of the other virtues,
virtues such as productiveness, honesty, independence, integrity, courage and benevolence. Facts
about ourselves and others qua moral recipient are also relevant considerations for determining
7

Additionally, it is arguable that someone who lacks the psychological or physical strength to violate another’s
rights could not be said to “refrain” from doing so. (Nietzsche, Zarathustra, “Verily I have often laughed at the
weaklings who thought themselves good because they had no claws.”)
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what is required by virtue in general and the virtue of justice in particular, facts such as the
necessary conditions for our own flourishing and the flourishing of others (including
metanormative conditions). But the relevant difference in the derivation of rights is that this
latter sort of consideration factors into determining what moral obligations we have to others as a
constitutive part of our own well-being, and then rights (legitimately enforceable moral claims)
are derived from certain of these prior moral obligations.
But liberals can go beyond a virtue-ethical derivation of rights by pointing to the moral
principles and virtues expressed in various market activities and by identifying the ethical and
cultural foundations of free markets as well as the principles and virtues encouraged, and the
vices discouraged, by free markets. So long as the rights to life, liberty and property remain
central to the political philosophy of liberalism, there need be no fear of endangering liberalism’s
commitment to the values of pluralism and diversity. Identifying these foundations, principles
and virtues in general terms need not come at the expense of their actual diversity in particular
cultures and contexts. Even with a general theory, the issue of what virtue demands of us in
particular circumstances will still be a matter of personal judgment and open to debate.
The essential point to remember is that only the basic rights to life, liberty and property
(and their corollaries and consequences) guarantee the possibility of such personal judgment and
political-democratic debate. This is what many business ethicists seem to forget with their vague
demands for social responsibility that sometimes imply the need, sometimes explicitly call, for
state intervention. It is one thing to argue that businesses ought to be socially responsible in their
actions, it is another thing entirely to advocate violating rights in order to make them do so.
To do away with the principle of voluntary action, no matter how worthy the end,
is to annihilate freedom and to institute slavery. When the challenge of social
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responsibility is made in the arena of civic debate, this is no longer a problem, as
any action taken in response to those claims would be voluntary.8
Moreover, as Lavoie and Chamlee-Wright point out, much of the stakeholder literature in
business ethics shares something in common with mainstream economics: namely, the apparent
assumption that there is a single and clearly identifiable course of action to take in every
situation.9 But as an Aristotelian would argue, Lavoie and Chamlee-Wright point out that “Like
profit opportunities themselves, the ways in which business people might effect positive social
change need to be interpreted out of a complex social, political, and cultural context in which no
single course of action presents itself as the only correct choice.”10
It must be emphasized, however, that an Aristotelian account of virtue ethics does not
limit virtue to the modernist notion of morality-as-social-duties. In other words, the virtues and
vices that will be subsequently discussed are not exclusively of the other-regarding variety. The
focus of this chapter is not solely the social responsibilities, if any, of individuals and businesses.
On the other hand, it will not be argued that businesses never have any responsibilities beyond
those to their stockholders, or to their employees and consumers.11

Production, Consumption, and Exchange
Before moving on to such subjects as entrepreneurship, profit and competition, the
business firm and the active consumer, and the distribution of wealth, it will be useful to discuss
some more basic categories of activity in the market process: production, consumption and
exchange. At the subsistence level, production and consumption are necessary activities in the
maintenance of life. While modern moral theories typically do not ascribe any ethical weight to

8
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the process of production per se, especially to personal production for the maintenance and
improvement of one’s own life, an Aristotelian theory of virtue ethics need not be so
uncharitable. Indeed, there is something virtuous in producing for oneself what one needs to
survive and even to flourish, in pulling one’s own weight, as opposed to the corresponding vice
of producing nothing of value, of being a perpetual dependent and living parasitically off of
others.12
Life is conditional and the things, the values, we need in order to survive and flourish are
not acquired automatically. One must produce values in order to maintain and further one’s life,
and to do that well one must make rational use of one’s mind. Productive work is necessary for
producing and acquiring food, weapons, defenses, clothing, shelter, and other useful tools that
better our chances of survival and improve our quality of life. It is also necessary for the creation
of music, art, literature. Even philosophy can be an example of productive work. As Ayn Rand
argues, productive work “means the consciously chosen pursuit of a productive career, in any
line of rational endeavor, great or modest, on any level of ability.”13 As valuable as productive
work is for creating values, it serves another useful function as well. It also, chosen wisely,
provides us with a sense of purpose, a core personal identity with which to integrate and
determine the hierarchy of all our other values. Knowing that we are efficacious and worthy of a
flourishing life results in necessary self-esteem. In light of all this, productiveness is a virtue. But
the virtue of productiveness is not limited to a productive career or to material values; we can
and should produce spiritual values as well.
Consumption too need not be left in ethical limbo. It is true that consumption to excess is
commonsensically recognized as a vice, but from an Aristotelian point of view, so too might be a
12
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willing deficiency of consumption. Applying the doctrine of the mean, to consume the right
amount (of anything) is virtuous.14 The virtue of temperance or moderation in relation to
consumption is not only relevant to straightforward issues of physical and mental health. In life
we face many uncertainties and risks. We could unexpectedly lose our job, be injured, become
ill. We know that eventually we will be too old to work. Our house could burn down. We could
get in a wreck and total our car. If we have children, we’ll need to educate them. We may want
to buy something that we cannot yet afford. For all of these things and more it is prudent to
restrict our consumption to below our means so as to save and invest enough to cover such
expected and unexpected expenses in the future. While there are no guarantees in life and we
cannot always be prepared for everything, by saving and investing we can mitigate the risks and
uncertainty we face. If we do not, the consequences can range from inconvenience to disaster.
We will have to depend upon the generosity of others, which is not unlimited, and chronic
irresponsibility wears out its welcome very quickly. More will be said on saving and investment
versus consumption in the next section.
Production and consumption are not unique to the market process, but they are a part of
it. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine free markets and civilization flourishing for long in
a cultural environment in which productivity is not highly valued, in which it is morally
acceptable to live a parasitical existence. Moreover, the free market has the benefit of
encouraging the virtue of productiveness while discouraging the vice of parasitism, unlike the
social-welfare state which does precisely the opposite.
Since it is difficult, if not impossible, and certainly not very safe, to produce by oneself
all that is needed for subsistence, to say nothing of all that is needed for flourishing, human
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beings quite naturally are disposed to enter into a societal division of labor and to exchange the
fruits of their labor for that which they do not or cannot make for themselves. It has been pointed
out by Franz Oppenheimer that fundamentally there are but two ways to acquire any goods: 1) to
produce it oneself or exchange on a voluntary basis one’s own products for the products of
another; and 2) to expropriate by the threat or use of initiatory physical force the products of
another, in other words, to steal them.15 It has been observed often enough that theft is immoral
and unjust, if not often enough that the same activity is still theft when performed by the state.
It is deplorably not observed often enough that voluntary exchanges are mutually
beneficial. Even many defenders of free markets who recognize that voluntary exchanges are
mutually beneficial follow Adam Smith in misleadingly ascribing this mutual benefit to being a
contingent by-product of each party pursuing his own self-interest, self-interest being contrasted
with the demands of virtue. According to Smith, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher,
the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”16
Smith here follows Bernard Mandeville’s argument about private vices in the Fable of the Bees
in arguing that market incentives channel the “selfishness and rapacity” of men in such a way
that these private vices will have good results. He later elaborates this principle by pointing out
the unintended beneficial results to society as a whole:
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he [the
entrepreneur] intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain,
and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an
end which was no part of his intention. . . . By pursuing his own interest he
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really
intends to promote it.17
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This way of explaining the market process and defending free markets, however, is misleading.
It sets up a false dichotomy between morality and prudence (or self-interest). This conception of
morality as demanding selfless, unremunerated benefit to others is a peculiarly modern and
untenable one. It is correct to point out that market incentives encourage, nay, demand, that
individuals benefit others in order to benefit themselves; but benefit is benefit whether
remunerated or not. It seems unreasonably elitist and stringent to restrict virtues such as
benevolence and generosity to selfless, unremunerated benefiting of others. This is indeed a
harsh doctrine, as it forces man to act contrary to his natural inclinations. To restrict virtue to
only those actions that benefit or are intended to benefit others without benefiting or intending to
benefit oneself is to reduce the moral purpose of man to mere servitude. It is no accident that
modern ethical theories are primarily concerned with social order and consequently with social
duties, rather than with the perfection of the individual.
The classical, especially the Aristotelian, conception of virtue makes no such assumption
of a fundamental conflict between self-interest and virtue. It is rather a necessary consequence of
man’s social nature that his rational or enlightened self-interest and the demands of virtue
coincide. Rather than describing and defending free markets as transmogrifying private vice into
mutual and public benefit, it is more accurate to say that not only does the free market process
facilitate mutually beneficial trade by appealing to self-interest. It also encourages and greatly
facilitates the exercise of certain virtues, both personal and social, while discouraging certain
vices.18 It does so by providing incentives and opportunities to engage in personally rewarding
productive work and trade for mutual benefit, which in turn serve to educate us in virtue through
habituation. Virtuous action is married to pecuniary and even non-pecuniary rewards, thus

18

The market is an aspect of society, not the whole of it remember; likewise, not all virtues and vices are
encouraged or discouraged by, nor expressed through, the market process.

231

encouraging the development of a virtuous character through rewards and repetition.19 As H.B.
Acton points out: “It is not that the good of others is a contingent byproduct of selfishness, but
that each party can only benefit himself by benefiting others. . . . Giving help and receiving it
are united in one process. Not only is self-help rewarded, but misanthropy is rendered difficult
by being made to result in self-injury.”20 The market is a fundamentally social institution. By
contrast, as I will discuss in more detail later in the paper, the state is a fundamentally anti-social
institution, for it is the state and increasing state intervention that institutionalize and perpetuate
the dichotomy between self-interest and morality.
Against critics who argue that morality needs to be imported into or imposed on the
market, Acton points out that “in the market people can be just or unjust, honest or dishonest,
reliable or unreliable, and these are moral characteristics.”21 A competitive market environment
provides strong incentives to be virtuous and strong disincentives to avoid vice. Reputation is
important in the market. If one develops a bad reputation from being unreliable – say, for
example, that he is often late or only does mediocre work – then he will lose business or his job
or earn significantly less than he otherwise could. So he must have integrity and keep his
promises. Dishonesty will also tarnish one’s reputation, and if it rises to the level of fraud it can
even incur legal penalties. Consider customer service and sales jobs, if people in these jobs are
habitually rude to customers they will tend to drive away business; thus, they have an incentive
not only to meet the minimum requirements for tolerance and civility but also to work to please
customers with politeness and sensitivity. These salutary incentives and disincentives are
weakened and even reversed, however, when competition is distorted and stifled by various
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government interventions, e.g., monetary and credit inflation, bailouts, subsidies, taxation,
tariffs, trade quotas, monopoly privileges, and myriad regulations.

Property, Contracts, and Credit
Functioning markets presuppose voluntary exchange. Voluntary exchange, or trade,
presupposes private property. To say that something is someone’s property is simply to say that
control of it is rightfully his. Commonly-owned property is often difficult to manage, giving rise
to the notorious tragedy of the commons. Conflicts arise over use and there is little, if any,
incentive to use the resources responsibly and to take only “one’s fair share.” Aristotle
recognized this tragedy of the commons problem.22 A system of private property minimizes
conflicts over scarce goods and resources. Aristotle also pointed out that the virtue of generosity
presupposes private property; one cannot be generous with someone else’s property, only with
one’s own, and commonly-held property is not just one’s own.23 While Aristotle did not
explicitly endorse or lay out a Locke-style labor theory of property acquisition, philosopher
Roderick Long argues that he did do much to lay the groundwork for such a theory.24 Long
points out that “Aristotle, like the Lockean liberal,25 insists that one's property is an extension of
oneself;26 it is for this reason that our property is so precious to us, as something that is our
own.”27 Most significantly, Long adds, property comes to have this relationship to and
importance for us precisely because we have produced it.28 Aristotle states:
The cause of this is that existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved, and
that we exist by virtue of activity (i.e., by living and acting), and that the
handiwork is in a sense, the producer of activity; he loves his handiwork,
22
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therefore, because he loves existence. And this is rooted in the nature of things;
for what he is in potentiality, his handiwork manifests in activity.29
Property is a product of productive work and trade, and like productive work it not only plays a
necessary role in our survival and material flourishing, it also helps to form our personal
identities and give us a sense of self-efficacy and self-worth.
Trust is a very important aspect of market activities. If we do not trust that others will
respect our rights to life, liberty and property, relations, especially complex market relations, will
be difficult to initiate and maintain. Transaction costs are increased, making it more likely that
mutually beneficial cooperation and exchanges will not occur and reducing the benefit from
those that still do manage to occur. Unreliability, dishonesty, fraud and similar vices will also
diminish the trust that others place in us, which will tend to hurt us in the market. Trust is
particularly important when it comes to establishing contractual relationships. We trust that the
other party will live up to his end of the bargain. And we trust that, even if he does not, we can
always make recourse to the legal system.
A contract is a type of promise. Not all promises can or ought to be upheld in a court of
law, only those that, as Austrian economist and libertarian theorist Murray Rothbard argues,
involve a transfer of title to property. Rothbard argues: “[V]alidly enforceable contracts only
exist where title to property is retained by the delinquent party, without the consent of the former
(implicit theft).”30 Although Rothbard makes a sharp distinction between promises and contracts,
I do not think this sharp distinction holds up. I see no reason why a contract is not a special legal
species of promising. The essential difference between a contract and a regular promise is
thereby maintained. To see that a contract is a form of promising, consider this example: I enter
into a contractual relationship with you in which I sell you a car in return for $15,000. Let us say
29
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we agree that you need put no money down and will pay at a later date, in monthly installments.
This is essentially a promise to pay me the $15,000. Under the title transfer theory of contracts, if
you later refuse or fail to pay, you are essentially in position of stolen property, my car. Your
delinquency does not negate the promise to pay me, a promise which you broke. What makes the
contract enforceable, however, is not the act of promising but the transfer of property title.
Recognition that a contract is a special legal species of promising introduces issues of honesty
(entering into contracts without deceit), integrity (the virtue of sticking to one’s principles and
keeping one’s promises), responsibility (in exercising a number of virtues, including
productiveness, to ensure that one will be able to hold up his end of the bargain), and so forth.
It is interesting to consider the etymology of two important market terms: credit and
fiduciary. When someone is loaned money on credit, so that they are under obligation to repay
the principal plus interest at a later date, the relationship between the creditor and the debtor is a
contractual one. The term credit in this sense derives from the Latin term creditum, meaning “a
loan, a thing entrusted to another,” which is the past participle of credere, “to trust, entrust,
believe.”31 The term fiduciary is commonly paired with others, e.g., fiduciary trust, fiduciary
duty, fiduciary media (money substitutes). It is derived from the Latin term fiduciarius
"(holding) in trust," from fidere "to trust.” “In Roman law, fiducia was ‘right transferred in
trust’.”32 The term fiduciary media came to be applied to money substitutes because their use
depends upon the trust of those who use them as money that they will be accepted by others as
payment and that they are redeemable for base money.
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Savings and Investment vs. Consumption
Saving is having an excess of current production over current consumption. As the
eminent Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises argues, “Saving is the first step on the way
toward improvement of material well-being and toward every further progress on this way.”33
Savings can be set aside so as to have more later or as insurance against misfortune or to buy a
consumer good that one cannot yet afford. Savings can also be invested in order to earn more
money, or to create or buy a more efficient producer’s good so that he will have more consumer
goods and/or more leisure time in the future. “If acting man, other conditions being equal, were
not to prefer, without exception, consumption in the nearer future to that in the remoter future, he
would always save, never consume. What restricts the amount of saving and investment is time
preference.”34 A person’s time preference is high to the extent that he is present-oriented. The
lower someone’s time preference, the more he is willing to restrict consumption in order to save
and invest the excess of what he produces.
Time preference is related to interest in the following way. Mises defines originary
interest as “the ratio of the value assigned to want-satisfaction in the immediate future and the
value assigned to want-satisfaction in remoter periods of the future. It manifests itself in the
market economy in the discount of future goods as against present goods. It is a ratio of
commodity prices, not a price in itself.” Mises adds:
Originary interest is not a price determined on the market by the interplay of the
demand for and the supply of capital or capital goods. Its height does not depend
on the extent of this demand and supply. It is rather the rate of originary interest
that determines both the demand for and the supply of capital and capital goods. It
determines how much of the available supply of goods is to be devoted to
consumption in the immediate future and how much to provision for remoter
periods of the future.
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People do not save and accumulate capital because there is interest. Interest is
neither the impetus for saving nor the reward or the compensation granted for
abstaining from immediate consumption. It is the ration in the mutual valuation of
present goods as against future goods.
The loan market does not determine the rate of interest. It adjusts the rate of
interest on loans to the rate of originary interest as manifested in the discount of
future goods.35
The relationship between originary interest and the natural market rate of interest is crucial to the
free market’s self-regulation.
There are many ways in which governments can disrupt the societal consumptioninvestment ratio in favor of consumption. The most egregious way, the one responsible for the
systemic boom and bust business cycle, is a policy of easy credit. Such a policy is best facilitated
by a fractional reserve central banking system with fiat money (i.e., paper money unbacked by a
commodity with real value, like gold or silver). Easy credit is pumped into the economy by an
expansion of the supply of money and credit, primarily by means of printing fiat money and
artificially lowering interest rates. Monetary inflation leads to price inflation as the new money
trickles through the economy, acting as a regressive tax on the poor and encouraging more
spending now as people perceive prices rising and their money becoming less and less valuable.
Artificially low interest rates, below the natural market rate, give market actors false signals.
They see the value of savings and investment decline, particularly in light of inflation. Producers
are misled by the cheap credit to undertake more expensive projects they otherwise would not
have undertaken and which do not match real consumer demand, resulting in malinvestment.
Consumers are misled by the cheap credit to take out loans in order to spend it on consumer
goods. Andrew Dickson White, in his 1933 book Fiat Money Inflation in France, describes the
results: “Then, too, as values became more and more uncertain, there was no longer any motive
35
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for care or economy, but every motive for immediate expenditure and present enjoyment. So
came upon the nation the obliteration of thrift. In this mania for yielding to present enjoyment
rather than providing for future comfort were the seeds of new growths of wretchedness: luxury,
senseless and extravagant, set in: this, too, spread as a fashion.”36
There are many other policies that also tend to have this effect on consumption. Bailouts
and promises of bailouts for failing or failed businesses encourage riskier behavior. This includes
the FDIC’s deposit insurance for banks, which also encourages those who keep their money in
banks to be more complacent about the practices of their bank and the safety of their money.
Various social-welfare policies also tend to have a deleterious effect. In the absence of such
programs people must save for a rainy day and for their own retirement, or depend upon the
generosity of others. When governments provide these necessities, the incentive to save for them
is decreased or eliminated. When government promises to take care of your retirement, at least in
part, you have less incentive to do so yourself. Similarly with health care and medical expenses,
unexpected unemployment, the education of your children, and so on and so forth. With these
necessities partly or wholly guaranteed by government, what else is left to spend one’s money on
after taxes other than consumer goods? The individual’s sense of responsibility in providing the
fundamental necessities for himself and his family is diminished as is his control over them. He
leaves it up to the government and concerns himself with is own amusements in luxuries and
superfluities.37 In his book America’s Great Depression, Rothbard gives some more examples:
Government can encourage consumption by "food stamp plans" and relief
payments. It can discourage savings and investment by higher taxes, particularly
on the wealthy and on corporations and estates. As a matter of fact, any increase
of taxes and government spending will discourage saving and investment and
stimulate consumption, since government spending is all consumption. Some of
the private funds would have been saved and invested; all of the government
36
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funds are consumed. Any increase in the relative size of government in the
economy, therefore, shifts the societal consumption-investment ratio in favor of
consumption, and prolongs the depression.38
Yet another policy that has been employed recently is the handing out of “stimulus checks” to a
majority of the population along with urges to spend it, following the modern fashion that
consumer spending rather than savings and investment is the main driver of economic growth.
In the last few sections we have discussed a number of ways in which free markets
encourage certain virtues and discourage certain vices. We have also discussed a number of ways
in which government intervention into the economy tends to weaken and even reverse these
incentives and disincentives, encouraging vice and discouraging virtue. Let us now turn to a
discussion of the role of the business firm in society.

The Business Firm: Profit, Social Responsibility, and the Virtue of Prudence
We generally expect individuals and organizations like families, churches, clubs and
governments, to be socially responsible, although we disagree on what social responsibility is in
general and what it requires of us in particular. Should we not expect businesses to be socially
responsible as well? My short answer to this question is: Of course, we should. But the next
questions that ought to be raised are: 1) What does social responsibility mean in the context of
the business firm? And 2) what actions can legitimately be taken with respect to businesses that
do not live up to what social responsibility requires of them? With respect to the second
question, the Aristotelian-liberal answer is that rights are possessed by individuals whether they
are considered by themselves or as members of a group, including a business firm. Thus, a
business firm cannot be compelled by the threat or use of initiatory physical force to fulfill its
social responsibility. Although, if members of a firm violate the rights of others, members or
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non-members, then of course proportional defensive force against the particular aggressors is
justified. This leaves other methods of influencing a recalcitrant firm: public discourse, moral
suasion, boycotting, and so forth. With regard to the first question, it is perplexing that no one
ever seems to ask whether business firms have the same social responsibilities as other
institutions and organizations in society. It is simply assumed that they do.
In the business ethics literature, the two main contrasting approaches are the stockholder
position and the stakeholder position. According to the former, those directing a business firm
have an obligation first and foremost to the owners of and investors in the firm, e.g., the
stockholders (when the owners/investors and the manager(s) are not one and the same
person(s)).This is a contractual or legal obligation, and so too a moral obligation, to give the
owners and investors a good return on their investment, i.e., generally, but not necessarily
limited, to maximizing profits. Corporations are not independent persons but are rather bundles
of contracts established by human beings to perform particular tasks. The seminal work in the
stockholder literature is Milton Friedman’s “The Social Responsibility of Business.” According
to the stakeholder literature, a business firm has obligations to (nearly) anyone and everyone on
whom its activities have an impact, directly or indirectly. These obligations are both negative and
positive, to minimize or avoid harm, to compensate when this is not possible, and to promote
positive social change. What exactly this entails will necessarily vary from advocate to advocate.
It is not an uncommon tendency for profit owed to owners and investors to take a backseat to
other goals or obligations. The question that immediately springs to my mind, however, is: are
these two apparently diametrically opposed positions really mutually exclusive? I think ruling
out aggression as a legitimate policy on both sides of the debate – be it for subsidies,
protectionism (for business or labor), taxes or business-controlling regulations – is a necessary
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first step to reconciling these two views. The next step, mentioned briefly at the beginning of this
chapter, is to reject the unrealistic assumptions of mainstream neoclassical economics that make
“profit maximizing” decisions and “socially responsible” decisions mutually exclusive and the
latter economically irrational. The third step is to recognize that there is no one-size-fits-all
model of social responsibility for all institutions or organizations and even for all businesses.
And the final step is to recognize the role of the virtue of prudence in finding the best correct
action to take, among what is often a range of correct and incorrect options, that satisfies
obligations both to stockholders and stakeholders simultaneously.
If we do not make unrealistic assumptions about rationality, preferences,
entrepreneurship, competition, and how the economy in general functions, then there is no
necessary obstacle to turning a healthy profit in a socially responsible way. Moreover, the
socially responsible aspect of decisions need not come at the expense of turning a healthy profit;
it can even contribute to turning a better profit. More will be said on this soon enough, but first
we must establish the context for the role of the business firm in society. The purpose of a
business is to earn a living producing and selling goods and services that potential customers
need and want for prices they are willing to pay. Any additional purpose must in theory and
practice be secondary, otherwise what we have is not a business but something else, or at least it
will not be a business for long. To accomplish this with any degree of long-term success,
particularly within a competitive (i.e., free) marketplace, it is necessary to turn a healthy profit.
Profit can be allocated toward immediately improving one’s quality of life, toward investing for
a rainy day, or toward improving the business via expansion, innovation, employee training and
morale, fostering goodwill in the surrounding community through various actions like charity
work, and so forth. Even a philanthropic for-profit food company like Newman’s Own, whose
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tongue-in-cheek motto is “Shameless exploitation in pursuit of the common good,” must focus
on turning a healthy profit, for all of this profit after taxes is donated to charitable causes – no
profit means no money for charity.
As a result of the market process and the incentive of profit, generally the actions of a
profitable business will bring great social benefits far outstripping any negative impacts it
produces. Consider the incredible extent to which even hampered markets and regulated
businesses have improved quality of life over the past few hundred years simply by producing
and selling ever improving goods and services at lower prices. This alone is a remarkable
achievement for which markets and businesses seldom get the credit they deserve. John Hood
points out:
When businesses are more profitable, individuals – be they owners, stockholders,
executives, workers, and even consumers (if the profits stem from selling better
products at lower prices) – can accumulate more wealth, with which they can
make charitable donations or endow private foundations. . . . Without [a welloiled, efficiently operating, i.e., free, market] system, less wealth will be
generated for philanthropy. At the same time, without an efficient market system,
there are likely to be more social problems (stemming from poverty and
technological backwardness) on which philanthropists must spend their time and
money.39
Philosopher David Schmidtz illustrates the importance of unhampered economic growth well:
“Consider this: if the annual growth rate of America's gross domestic product (GDP) had been 1
percentage point lower between 1870 and 1990, America's per capita GDP would be less than
one-third its present level, which would put it on a par with Mexico.”40 When you add in the
things commonly thought of in the stakeholder literature as “socially responsible” that businesses
already do, typically philanthropy, the record of the too-often-maligned business firm improves
even more.
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Does this mean that all businesses necessarily do enough already? That it is too much to
ask for them to be socially responsible, or more socially responsible, too? Not necessarily, no.
But what a particular business can or should do depends in large part upon the circumstances of
that particular business. The foregoing does suggest, however, that calls for social responsibility
tend to give far too little credit to businesses for the social benefits they provide simply by
performing their core function. It also suggests that such calls tend to lack proper nuance and
attention to context as well as to require businesses to act as if they are not in fact businesses.
Profit and contractual obligations to the owners and investors must be the top priority of a
manager or CEO if a business is to be successful; unsuccessful businesses go out of business.
But believe it or not, there are actually strong business reasons for being socially responsible.
Different firms implement strategic philanthropy in different ways. John Hood observes:
For some corporations, it involves the introduction of formal cost-benefit
analyses, which set performance goals for social or charitable activities and
carefully track progress toward those goals. . . . For other corporations, strategic
philanthropy simply involves ongoing consideration of how philanthropy ties into
the firm’s need to attract good employees, enthusiastic investors, and loyal
customers.41
Firms cannot afford to throw away money as governments do. They will tend to invest in things
that will at least indirectly benefit them. This is only natural. Everyone does this in some way,
even so-called selfless parents42 who set up a charitable foundation to fund research into sudden
infant death syndrome because they lost their child to it and do not want other parents to
experience the same loss. Certainly businesses must keep an eye on the bottom line when
engaging in philanthropic activities, but their motives need not be limited to this. The leaders of
firms are people too and are fully capable of having additional reasons, such as that of the
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aforementioned parents, to engage in corporate philanthropy. Businesses also have a far greater
incentive than governments, and even non-profit charitable organizations, to insure that their
philanthropic activities are effective at achieving clearly defined philanthropic goals. They may
not invest as much money collectively as individuals and charitable organizations each do
collectively, but why should they have to? In addition to cash, however, “corporations are giving
non-profit organizations managerial advice, technological and communication support, and
teams of employee volunteers.”43
Let us look at some of the specific strategic reasons businesses have for engaging in
philanthropic endeavors. A couple have already been mentioned. One of these is attracting loyal
customers. One common way this is done is by cause-related marketing. To give just one
example from among many, during the early 1980s American Express pioneered a program in
which when consumers made purchases on their credit cards American Express would contribute
to a charity valued by the consumer. Cause-related marketing is only effective on the margin,
however, meaning that goodwill from philanthropic activities is no substitute for offering goods
or services that are competitive in price and quality. Cause-related marketing can provide the
tipping point in competitive markets, helping consumers choose which product they prefer from
a range of similar products.44 Another strategic reason for business philanthropy is attracting and
building a productive workforce. A productive workforce is a key component of business success
in competitive markets.
[O]ne common approach, particularly when trying to attract skilled workers to a
facility, is to make donations to organizations or causes that improve the
amenities of the community surrounding the facility. Just as the railroad
companies of the nineteenth century funded YMCAs and schools for their
employees, so today many companies give funds to local chapters of the Boy
Scouts, to schools and universities, and to local human services agencies.
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Another successful approach is instilling a sense of teamwork and the corporate mission through
volunteer activities. In the past, companies commonly sponsored team sports. More recently,
charity work is being sponsored. For example, “Connecticut-based GE Plastics has used several
community-service projects in which volunteer teams have helped renovate a homeless shelter, a
boys’ club, and a YMCA.” “Similarly, Questar Corporation, a natural gas company in Salt Lake
City, researches and publishes a list of local volunteer opportunities for employees.” Union
Planters National Bank in Memphis, Tennessee does something similar, running a program that
facilitates its employees engaging in local philanthropic activities and that rewards the most
devoted with special prizes and public recognition.45
Two other strategic reasons for business philanthropy are promoting the general
economic interest of business firms and promoting pro-business public policy. As John Hood
relates, “A great deal of corporate giving, especially the large amount of it directed toward
institutions of higher learning, involves research of educational programs with an obvious
connection to a donor firm’s economic interest. The Ameritech Foundation, for instance, gave
Ohio State University $1 million in 1993 ‘to support research in how telecommunications can be
used to improve education, health care, and international trade’.”46 In a vicarious political
environment, in which government policies can have a significant impact on markets and
individual businesses, it is certainly in a business’ interest to promote pro-business public policy.
This is especially true of newer, less well-established, rising companies.
So, for example, many companies fund programs to teach students about free
enterprise and the American economic system. Corporate-funded chairs in
business, economics, entrepreneurship, sociology, and law often have the stated
purpose of promoting market values and concepts. Furthermore, many
corporations fund think tanks, associations, and other organizations in the public
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policy arena that research and promote capitalistic values and market-oriented
public policies.47
On the other hand, in an economic environment in which governments are recognized to have the
power to intervene in the economy, large, established and currently dominant corporations have
an incentive to influence public policy to their advantage, i.e., by buying special privileges and
stifling competition in order to maintain the status quo. This may be a major explanation for why
most large U.S. corporations that are active in the public policy arena give more money to
organizations hostile to economic freedom.48
Social responsibility is not limited to philanthropy, of course. What about the
environment? Employee wages, benefits and layoffs? And so on. With regard to the
environment. Consider the well-understood problem called the tragedy of the commons. It has
long been recognized, although frequently ignored when politically expedient, that private
owners of land and resources have more incentive to manage them responsibly than land and
resources that are commonly owned. Consider also that businesses must cater to consumer needs
and wants. Businesses do play a role in shaping those needs and wants, to be sure, but the idea
that they exert some kind of overwhelming control over the desires of passive consumers through
diabolical advertising is grossly overblown. The recent rise in environmental concern, not
entirely stemming from global warming alarmism, illustrates how businesses must follow the
prevailing winds of consumer desires in order to remain competitive. All manner of businesses
are nowadays finding creative ways to market environmentally-friendly products and services.
Similarly, with the recent rising concern with obesity food companies are increasingly starting to
offer (more) healthy alternatives. Government intervention, providing artificial economic
incentives, can explain some of this but far from all.
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To briefly tackle the issue of employees, again, given a free and mobile labor market and
free markets in general, it is in a business’ competitive interest to attract the best employees it
can afford. Offering higher salaries and more and better benefits than one’s competitors is the
key means of attracting the best employees. Believe it or not, businesses also have incentives to
lay off employees responsibly, from workforce morale and public image to cost savings.
Suddenly laying off workers with no good reason, no warning and no help in finding another job
can lower the morale of the remaining workforce. A pattern of such behavior, or a single high
profile layoff, such as when many workers have to be laid off at once, can adversely affect the
company’s public image. And finally, severance packages and unemployment insurance can be
costly. Getting a former worker re-employed as soon as possible can cost much less. Some firms
have their own outplacement programs, but others employ specialized outplacement firms.49
So, businesses provide incredible but underappreciated social benefits simply by
performing their core function, but there is no necessary incompatibility between “profit
maximizing” decisions and “socially responsible” decisions. Many businesses already are
socially responsible in the stakeholder sense, but this does not mean that businesses could not be
more socially responsible. I suggested earlier that prudence is the key to finding the best choice,
among a range of options, that combines both profitability and social responsibility. Prudence, or
practical wisdom, in the Aristotelian tradition is that virtue by which we integrate all of the
goods and virtues we pursue into a complete life and by which we determine the proper
application of the other virtues to particular situations. Aristotelian prudence is not pure,
calculating prudence à la Hobbes, however; while the moral virtues without practical wisdom are
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blind, practical wisdom without the moral virtues is empty.50 “Profit opportunities,” Lavoie and
Chamlee-Wright point out, “are the outcome of an interpretive process that is highly dependent
on context.”51 There is often more than one way to turn a healthy profit, and with some creativity
a business leader can not only fulfill his other moral obligations in addition but even promote his
company and possibly even increase its profitability at the same time. Consider one last example
of a creative, profitable and socially responsible business decision: The owners of Hannah
Anderson, Inc., a supplier of high quality children’s clothing, devised a clever marketing and
philanthropic strategy to both promote how long-lasting their clothing is, establishing a brandname reputation for superior quality, and donate used clothing to charities. So they started a
program to give any customer who returns her Hannah Anderson clothing in good used condition
a 20 percent credit towards her next purchase. The used clothing is then donated to area charities.
“In 1989 and 1990, for example, more than thirty thousand of these articles of children’s clothing
were donated to Portland, Oregon-area shelters for battered women.”52 Generosity need not be a
bad business decision; indeed, it can be quite the opposite.53

We Are the Market: Being an Active Market Participant
The existence of slack means that there is room for either morally good or morally
bad choices. Contrary to the impression given by some economists, the blind
forces of competition alone will not necessarily yield an ethically admirable
business community. As in all domains of human endeavor, virtue does not arise
automatically but requires its own standard bearers.54
While free markets offer powerful incentives to provide goods and services that
consumers need and want, generally with increasing quality and decreasing prices, free markets
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are not black boxes dispensing manna from heaven. We are the market. Ultimately, it is up to us
what the market will provide and what it will not. The market reflects our own values. It is the
function of the entrepreneur to be alert to, and effectively exploit, untapped opportunities to
provide goods and services that consumers will want at prices they are able and willing to pay.
The market is something of an economic democracy, with the purchases of consumers being an
analog to votes for the goods and services they prefer, but a free market is far more responsive
than a statist democracy. In a free market, those who fail to satisfy consumers go out of business.
Those who better satisfy consumers will reap more profits. Ultimately it is consumers who
decide which businesses, goods and services fail and which succeed, and so it is important to be
an active and informed consumer.
The market is not the whole of society, however; it is but an aspect of it. Consequently,
not every solution to a problem need be a market solution. There is ample room for the exercise
of social power through voluntary associations and initiatives of various sorts, such as private
charities – a form of social entrepreneurship, if you will. When we as citizens or consumers see
an untapped opportunity or a problem that needs solving, we need not wait for another
entrepreneur, social or economic, to take the initiative. Sometimes we should not wait but rather
should take responsibility for getting something done ourselves.

249

Chapter Nine.
Conclusion
Liberty: not the daughter but the mother of order.
– Pierre-Joseph Proudhon

If Hayek, Rasmussen and Den Uyl are correct, and I think they are, liberalism is unique
among political philosophies in having as a central concern “the problem of how to find an
ethical basis for the overall political/legal structure of society,” namely one that recognizes the
value of individual liberty and can accommodate moral and cultural pluralism and diversity.1
Rasmussen and Den Uyl claim that this problem should be the central problem of political
philosophy, but call it “liberalism’s problem” because liberalism has been the only political
tradition to recognize its fundamental importance.2 Liberalism’s best solution to this problem is
the natural right to liberty and its logical corollaries. Liberalism shows us how diverse moral
value systems can be ethically compossible both within and between societies. But liberals,
especially Aristotelian liberals, need not, indeed, cannot afford to, and should not, limit their
focus to rights, liberty and political justice.
Aristotelian liberalism has as its concern bringing about and maintaining a free and
flourishing society. Aristotelian Liberalism holds that man's natural end is a life of eudaimonia
(flourishing, well-being, happiness); that virtue is constitutive of one's own flourishing but must
be freely chosen to count as such; that man is a profoundly social being, but nevertheless that
individuals are ends-in-themselves and not means to the ends of others; that the right to liberty is
a metanormative principle necessary for protecting the possibility of all forms of human
flourishing and an interpersonal normative principle such that rights-respecting behavior is
1
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constitutive of one's own eudaimonia. Consequently, unlike most Enlightenment versions of
liberalism, Aristotelian liberalism is not solely concerned with negative rights, political justice or
political liberty. It is also important to identify ethical and cultural principles and institutions
necessary for bringing about and maintaining a free and flourishing society.
If I have been successful, I have shown, if not conclusively then surely at least plausibly,
the value of an Aristotelian form of liberalism and its ability to answer the challenges of
postmodern, social or left-liberal, communitarian and conservative critics of liberalism.
I have discussed the nature of human flourishing and developed an integrated theory of
virtue ethics and natural rights. In doing so, I first presented Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s account
of human flourishing and their theory of rights as metanormative principles. I also critiqued their
theory and then presented the different theories of Ayn Rand and Roderick Long. After this I
sketched my own theory of rights which aims to synthesize the two seemingly incompatible
accounts of rights put forth by Rasmussen and Den Uyl on the one hand and Long on the other. I
argued that rights are both metanormative and interpersonal normative principles, meaning that
1) from the structural level of analysis, rights, by serving as the standard and basis for law,
protect the conditions necessary for the possibility of human flourishing without biasing the
political/legal order in favor of or against any form of flourishing and 2) from the personal level
of analysis rights are moral principles, legitimately enforceable moral claims to be precise, that
guide our conduct and are derived from the requirements of our own eudaimonia, particularly the
virtue of justice.
After this, I revisited the nature of human flourishing, addressing the is-ought problem,
critiquing the survivalist standard of value in ethics, and examining in more detail the basic
goods and virtues that constitute human flourishing. I revisited the importance of liberty and
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justice as constitutive goods of eudaimonia. Choices and actions must be voluntary in order to
count as virtuous and contributory toward one’s flourishing. Following Aristotle’s distinction
between general and special justice, with some modifications, I distinguished between social and
political justice. Both are informed by what is required by our own flourishing, by the various
goods and virtues. Political justice focuses more narrowly on the most basic requirements of
social life (as a good) and how we should treat each other as fellow human beings (as a virtue).
Consequently, its concern is the protection of the right to liberty (and its corollaries and
consequences) and rectifying rights violations. Social justice is, as Aristotle remarks, complete
virtue with respect to other people. It involves the fulfillment of the requirements of the other
virtues with respect to other people, but unlike political justice is not legitimately enforceable. To
enforce social justice by law, regulation or other means involving the threat or use of initiatory
physical force is to set it in conflict with political justice, to undermine the very foundations of
society, and to harm both the aggressor’s and the victim’s well-being.
Liberty and justice, of course, are not the only goods and virtues important to a
flourishing life and a flourishing society. I argued that, as important as liberty is, social and
personal autonomy are also important issues of concern. Both social and personal autonomy are
important to a flourishing life and their systematic absence in a society can undermine the
foundations necessary for liberty. Likewise, since self-direction is central to all three dimensions
of autonomy, compromising liberty entails compromising social and personal autonomy: to the
extent that you lack self-direction, you cannot be socially or personally autonomous. The virtue
of courage is also important – not only the courage to physically defend one’s liberty but the
courage to seek and face the truth, to put one’s convictions to the test in public debate or by
putting them into action, to stake one’s reputation, to take the initiative to get things done rather
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than wait for others to take the lead or do it for you. Generosity toward friends, family and
strangers is integral to a free and flourishing society. It fosters spiritual and material flourishing
for all parties involved, exemplifies and encourages cooperation and mutual aid, and facilitates
the continuance and transmission of culture. In the form of charity, it is necessary for providing a
voluntary social safety net to the unfortunate. Civility and tolerance are necessary for facilitating
the discovery of truth and the peaceful and productive co-existence of different value systems.
The virtue of independence, properly understood, mitigates the human tendency to fall in with
the herd without encouraging the opposite vice of a-social, a-moral atomism. In order to flourish
and contribute to a free and flourishing society, individuals must possess the virtue of
productiveness. And so with other virtues as well. The systematic lack of these virtues and
presence of their corresponding vices can over time undermine a free and flourishing society. As
discussed in the last few chapters, however, there are strong reasons to believe a free society will
encourage virtue and discourage vice while the state, especially an active and powerful one, acts
systematically to undermine and reverse the salutary incentives and disincentives present in a
condition of liberty.
After the more extensive discussion of the nature of human flourishing, I then sketched
an Aristotelian-liberal conception of society and addressed social liberal and communitarian
criticisms as well as their own conceptions of society. I conceived of politics, the market, and the
state all as aspects of society, not external intrusions, although the state differs from the first two
in being an organization. Against the communitarian conception of society I posited an
Aristotelian-liberal conception of the Great Society (or Global Society), its major institutions,
and its myriad levels of overlapping associations, communities and organizations. This
cosmopolis is on one level a moral community that we all share in by virtue of universal aspects
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of our humanity, which call upon us to live a life of reason and discourse with one another. On
another, empirical, level it is a global spontaneous order – a loose-knit society lacking any
central planner and linked together by long-distance correspondence, travel, migrations and
commerce. Improving technology in communications and travel, and increasing economic
prosperity and interdependence, are producing a more integrated global society – facilitating
cross-cultural influences as well as the development and maintenance of closer-knit communities
that are not territorially contiguous, without necessarily dissolving diversity. This conception of
society recognizes that it is not unusual for people to be members of more than one association,
community or organization at the same time, and that not only do people at times end
membership with one and begin membership with another but that this can be necessary to
promote our own flourishing and we should be at liberty to do so as we see fit. This conception
of society is strikingly at odds with the communitarian one.
The typical communitarian conception embraces some degree of cultural relativism,
involving a rejection of the notion that there are universal aspects of human nature or the notion
that anything meaningful can be said about them. It defines the individual good in terms of the
individual’s contribution to the pre-defined good of society rather than seeing the good of society
as being the promotion of the good of each and every individual. But the crucial factor that
makes communitarianism incompatible with liberalism, insofar as the factor is embraced, is the
acceptance of using aggression to protect the community and enforce its authority on the
individual. Communitarians like MacIntyre go beyond recognizing that man is a profoundly
social being to rejecting any social ties and obligations a person can and should have to others
beyond his particular tight-knit community on the basis of being a fellow human being. They go
beyond recognizing that man needs to belong to a community in order to flourish to denying him
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the liberty to choose a different community, disobey or challenge its principles and traditions
(other than the basic rights), or change roles within it, if the community happens to be so
constituted as to prohibit these things. In reaction against a usually imagined atomistic
individualism, and misunderstanding the true causes of such real atomistic individualism as
exists, they tend to submerge the individuality of persons within the collective. While some
communitarian criticisms of liberalism have hit home against other versions of liberalism to
varying degrees, communitarians have been unable to provide alternatives that are clearly
defensible and avoid the specters of paternalism and totalitarianism. Social or left-liberals, while
they are generally more cosmopolitan and typically do not go as far as communitarians in
subjecting the individual to the coercive authority of the community, still flirt with the same
dangers.
After this preliminary discussion of the nature of society, I turned explicitly to politics.
First, I sketched a brief history of liberalism in order to set the context for a discussion of the
New Left movement and its opposition to so-called corporatist liberalism. The New Left
movement was shown to have more in common with classical liberalism and contemporary
libertarianism than the traditional left/right political continuum would suggest. All three share a
rejection of the old order of the status society that corporatist liberalism represents. Lessons were
derived from the New Left opposition to the corporatist-liberal democratic state. The history of
liberalism and the New Left teaches of the evils and inefficiencies of the bureaucratic managerial
state and manipulative statist democracy. It also teaches that there are non-statist alternatives to
social problems. And it teaches of the dangers radical movements face from co-option by the
ruling elites, especially when they lack a consistent, systematic anti-statist ideology.
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Next, I discussed Aristotle’s conception of politics in order to distill the essence of the
political in his thought and to point out some crucial areas of disagreement between him and
Aristotelian liberalism. It will be useful to recapitulate these disagreements and others mentioned
throughout the dissertation. An important point of disagreement discussed in chapter two is the
recognition that human sociality can be cosmopolitan, not strictly limited to small and local,
tight-knit communities like the polis. I have also noted that Aristotle did not fully recognize the
highly individualized and diverse nature of human flourishing. Chapter four introduced more
specific differences in how we conceive human flourishing: In particular, it is fairly well-known
that Aristotle’s conception of the best life entailed a life of leisure and that he did not think
highly of productive work and market activities. Aristotelian liberals reject this singular
conception of the best life and recognize the value and importance of productiveness and the free
market. Additionally, Aristotelian liberals necessarily reject Aristotle’s support for slavery and
the subordination of women.
While I cannot speak for other Aristotelian liberals on this, I, at least, agree with Aristotle
that the population size of a viable political community must by nature be small. Modern states
are far too large in terms of population size and extent of territory to be true political
communities. On the other hand, political communities can take different forms and individuals
will generally belong to multiple associations, communities and organizations during their
lifetimes. Also, people can and often do have meaningful cosmopolitan ties. Moreover, with
current and improving technology and economic prosperity in the areas of telecommunications
and travel, it is not even necessary for meaningful associations, communities and organizations
to maintain tight territorial contiguity.
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In my examination of Aristotle’s conception of politics, I distilled the following essential
definition: politics is discourse and deliberation between equals in joint pursuit of eudaimonia.
Where we ultimately disagree is on the relevant meaning of ‘equals’ and on the proper locus of
politics (see below). Liberals disagree with Aristotle on his conflation of the state and civil
society. Liberals also disagree with Aristotle on the extent to which the law is educative and that
it should be used for this purpose. The difference between the modern state with its mountains of
vague, often contradictory, legislative laws and the Greek city-state with its largely customary
laws is too often overlooked. If laws can have any educative power, they need to be relatively
few in number, unambiguous and easy for a layman to learn, understand and remember. And
they need to be supported by a shared political culture, otherwise they will simply be broken en
masse. Witness the complete ineffectiveness, indeed, counterproductiveness, of the American
Prohibition on Alcohol and War on Drugs. Moreover, there is no direct, one-to-one, necessary
relationship between laws and education to virtue even in the best of conditions. Effective
enforcement of the law can force correct behavior, but correct behavior does not necessarily lead
to virtue. More fundamentally, however, liberals disagree with Aristotle over the legitimate
scope of the law and its primary function in society. The primary function of a legal system and
its laws is not education but conflict resolution, and its legitimate scope is limited to prohibiting
and rectifying (as far as possible) the most anti-social of vices – aggression, i.e., rights-violating
behavior. Finally, while Aristotle makes consent a criterion for his best polis, he limits this
consent to the constitution. Liberalism makes mutual consent a criterion for all social
relationships.
After distilling from Aristotle’s thought what I take to be the essence of the political, I
then turned to the task of developing a non-statist conception of politics and democracy. I argued
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that the essential characteristic and primary purpose of politics is the joint pursuit of eudaimonia
– specifically, politics is discourse and deliberation between equals in joint pursuit of
eudaimonia. The particular institutions within which politics is conducted vary, but there are at
least three conditions necessary for politics to take place: direct participation, direct action and
individual liberty. Politics ceases to be immanent, and becomes increasingly vicarious until it is
nonexistent or is replaced by despotical rule, under at least three conditions: 1) the extent that it
is conducted only by representatives, 2) the extent to which discourse and deliberation are
separated from their culmination in direct action, and 3) the extent that rights-violating behavior
(the threat or use of initiatory physical force) pervades the relationship. Much of what passes for
politics in modern states takes place only among representatives and involves rights-violating
behavior or policies. Thus politics, an important means of pursuing eudaimonia, is highly
vicarious in even the freest of modern states. Moreover, the tendency among liberals to limit
liberalism and politics to considerations of justice narrowly conceived, and to radically separate
politics and morality, is misguided – for politics presupposes liberty, and the right to liberty
precludes the threat or use of initiatory physical force. Political-democratic-civic debate over our
responsibilities to ourselves and each other can only truly take place within the context of
individual liberty. As Lavoie and Chamlee-Wright point out:
To do away with the principle of voluntary action, no matter how worthy the end,
is to annihilate freedom and to institute slavery. When the challenge of social
responsibility is made in the arena of civic debate, this is no longer a problem, as
any action taken in response to those claims would be voluntary.3
Statist policies such as wealth redistribution, economic regulation and morals legislation are all
unjust in this view; liberty and pluralism are not threatened by Aristotelian liberalism’s more
robust conceptions of ethics and politics.
3

Lavoie and Chamlee-Wright (2000), p. 116.
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Finally, as no defense of liberalism would be complete without a defense of free markets
and free enterprise, I endeavored to provide one. I argued that Austrian economics does not
suffer from the flaws that communitarian and business ethicist critics have leveled or could level
against mainstream neoclassical economics. Then I discussed some of the ethical and cultural
foundations and principles of free markets and free enterprise. I identified moral principles
embodied in free market activities as well as moral and cultural foundations presupposed by
them. I also argued that free markets encourage certain virtues and discourage certain vices while
state intervention weakens and even reverses these incentives and disincentives. And I discussed
the role of business firms in society, pointing out that they are usually not given the credit they
deserve for the social benefits they provide simply by performing their core function. Not
stopping there, I argued further that businesses can be more socially responsible but that this
cannot take precedence over profitability; through the creative exercise of practical wisdom
business leaders can find ways to be socially responsible without hurting the bottom line, indeed,
can even find ways to make socially responsible decisions that improve the bottom line – but
they cannot legitimately be forced to be socially responsible.

A Final Objection? The Charge of Utopianism or Gnosticism
There are really two potential objections to Aristotelian liberalism here, but they are very
much related, the latter being sort of a theological version of the former. Does the theory of
virtue ethics and natural rights described in this dissertation represent an impossibly high
standard of ethical excellence? On a related note, is it foolishly impractical given the current
shoddy state of the world? And is the ideal society suggested by the non-statist conception of
politics and severe critique of the state an impossible goal? Even if it is achieved, will it ring in a
perfect world of peace, love and happiness without violence, misfortune and suffering?
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Naturally, my short answer to all of these questions is “No.” First, I wish to answer the charge of
gnosticism that might be leveled by followers of the philosopher Eric Voegelin.
It is hard to find a clear definition of gnosticism in the sense that Voegelin uses it. He
uses the term to refer to a certain kind of mass movement, particularly mass political movements.
As examples, he gives “progressivism, positivism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, communism,
fascism, and national socialism.”4 In his view, the consequences wrought by these movements
have been disastrous. With few and only partial qualifications, I do not disagree. What makes
them gnostic are certain similar characteristics they share with the original Gnostic religious
movement of antiquity. Before listing the main characteristics, it first bears pointing out that
even the broad libertarian movement as a whole might not yet qualify as a mass movement.
However, as Voegelin points out, “[n]one of the movements cited began as a mass movement; all
derived from intellectuals and small groups,”5 so contemporary libertarianism and Aristotelian
liberalism are not off the hook yet! With regard to the following list, Voegelin cautions that the
six characteristics, “taken together, reveal the nature of the gnostic attitude.”6
1) It must first be pointed out that the Gnostic is dissatisfied with his situation.
This, in itself, is not especially surprising. We all have cause to be not
completely satisfied with one aspect or another of the situation in which we
find ourselves.
Despite Voegelin’s caveat it seems this characteristic does not carry much explanatory power. It
would seem more relevant if the dissatisfaction manifests as a form of profound alienation from
the world, from the society as a whole in which one lives, or from its government. Certainly
liberals and libertarians must feel some alienation, but is it enough to really count significantly
toward the gnosticism?

4

Voegelin (1968 [2004]), p. 61.
Ibid., p. 62.
6
Ibid., p. 64. Emphasis mine.
5
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2) Not quite so understanding is the second aspect of the gnostic attitude: the
belief that the drawbacks of the situation can be attributed to the fact that the
world is intrinsically poorly organized. For it is likewise possible to assume
that the order of being as it is given to us men (wherever its origin is to be
sought) is good and that it is we human beings who are inadequate. But
gnostics are not inclined to discover that human beings in general and they
themselves in particular are inadequate. If in a given situation something is
not as it should be, then the fault is to be found in the wickedness of the
world.
Voegelin comes dangerously close here to extreme pessimism and fatalism and to absolving
people of their responsibility for not behaving as well as they should and are able. On the other
hand, it seems from his description of the gnostic that the gnostic too flirts with, even embraces,
absolving people of responsibility: It is not their fault; they could not help it; all the blame rests
with flawed institutions and/or deterministic socio-economic and historical forces. Liberalism,
particularly the version of liberalism presented in this dissertation, avoids both of these extremes.
In order to approach and achieve our ideal, human nature need not be changed. What is
necessary is education and a change of institutions. There is a reciprocal causal relationship
between people and their institutions; people shape them and are influenced in turn. Institutions
present definite behavioral incentives and disincentives. But responsibility for one’s behavior
ultimately resides in the individual.
3) The third characteristic is the belief that salvation from the evil of the world is
possible.
Salvation is certainly too strong a word for what we expect from our ideal society. It would bring
greater material and spiritual prosperity, less injustice, i.e., less crime, exploitation and war. But
it will not bring heaven on earth. There will still be crime, some wealth and income inequality
(for that is only natural), scarcity, unhappiness and suffering. It will simply be much better than
conditions are now. All the evils that exist in the world are created by human beings, and while
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these evils cannot be eradicated entirely, they need not be as great and prevalent are they are and
have been.
4) From this follows the belief that the order of being will have to be changed in
an historical process. From a wretched world a good one must evolve
historically. This assumption is not altogether self-evident, because the
Christian solution might also be considered – namely, that the world
throughout history will remain as it is and that man’s salvational fulfillment is
brought about through grace in death.
Perhaps some contemporary classical liberals and libertarians believe there is an inexorable
progressive historical process tending toward a final stage of history, but I do not think most do.
Indeed, there is nothing guaranteed about achieving our ideal and even should it be achieved
there is no guarantee that it will last forever. Human beings and human society being what they
are, it is always possible for the necessary traditions and institutions to erode in the minds and
hearts of men over the course of generations.
5) With this fifth point we come to the Gnostic trait in the narrower sense – the
belief that a change in the order of being lies in the realm of human action,
that this salvational act is possible through man’s own effort.7
Classical liberalism and libertarianism in general, and the account presented here in particular,
do not seek to change the entire order of being. Some things, like the laws of physics and of
economics, just cannot be changed by man. The only changes that are sought lie within the
realms of personal education and morality as well as social, economic and political institutions.
These are changes that are within the realm of human action. Unlike other political movements,
however, the changes and goals of liberalism properly conceived cannot be achieved by
aggression, top-down central planning, or sudden and violent cultural revolutions. Rather, they
can only be achieved through persuasion, education, the building up of alternative institutions –
in short, a far from inevitable process of social evolution driven by purposeful, but not centrally
7

Ibid., pp. 64-65.
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coordinated, human action, the results of which on the macro-level will not be of human design.
It will take generations, but “anyone who fights for the future, lives in it today.”8
6) If it is possible, however, so to work a structural change in the given order of
being that we can be satisfied with it as a perfect one, then it becomes the task
of the gnostic to seek out the prescriptions for such change. Knowledge –
gnosis – of the method of altering being is the central concern of the gnostic.
As the sixth feature of the gnostic attitude, therefore, we recognize the
construction of a formula for self and world salvation, as well as the gnostic’s
readiness to come forward as a prophet who will proclaim his knowledge
about the salvation of mankind.9
Even non-gnostic movements have their leaders and their “prophets.” Knowledge is necessary
for any human endeavor. This is another feature that does not really add much by itself. Features
2-5 seem to do the bulk of the explanatory work. Taking all six features into consideration
together, it seems we can say conclusively that liberalism, particularly Aristotelian liberalism,
does not qualify as a gnostic political movement. Aristotelian liberalism is about liberty and
human flourishing; it is no more gnostic than Aristotle’s ethical and political philosophy.
In answering the hypothetical charge of gnosticism, the charge of utopianism has
partially been met as well. The conception of human nature presented in the dissertation is, I
think, a realistic one and the ideal society envisioned does not require human nature somehow to
be miraculously changed in order for it to be brought about and maintained. The ideal society is
not a perfect one in an otherworldly Platonic or Christian sense. It will not bring Heaven on
Earth or usher in the End of History. I take the moral case to have been made fairly strongly,
although the case can always be strengthened by fleshing the arguments out more fully and
presenting more than time or space allowed here. What I have not spent much time addressing is
the question of practicality, which raises objections that are variations on the theme “it will never
work.” Addressing this question is largely beyond the scope of this dissertation and certainly
8
9

Rand (1975), p. viii.
Voegelin (1968 [2004]), p. 65.
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cannot be accomplished in the concluding chapter. I must restrict myself to saying a few things
and referring the reader to the significant body of literature, which deals with various aspects of
the question of practicality, that already exists and continues to grow.
The moral/practical dichotomy does not sit well within Aristotelian philosophy. As has
been argued, unlike most modern ethics, Aristotelian virtue ethics does not recognize a natural
tension between what is moral and what is in one’s rational or enlightened self-interest.
Immorality is never practical or in one’s rational self-interest in this view, even though a Hobbes
or a Machiavelli would counsel otherwise. Moreover, if a critic is not convinced of the
practicality, that does not by itself obviate the moral case; arguments need to be presented
against the latter as well. This is simply a point about proper argumentation and should not be
taken as implying an embrace of a theory/practice dichotomy. It is sometimes said, “Well, it’s
good in theory but it doesn’t work in practice.” But this is nonsense. If a theory is inapplicable to
reality, then it is not a good theory.
The various theories of statism have been making a royal mess of things for centuries
now. Perhaps it is time to try something radically different. As I noted in a previous chapter,
Ronald Hamowy has observed that “For at least two hundred years [owing to the Scottish
Enlightenment], social philosophers have known that association does not need government, that,
indeed, government is destructive of association.”10 Scottish Enlightenment thinkers like Adam
Ferguson, David Hume and Adam Smith as well as modern thinkers like Austrian economist
F.A. Hayek have theorized about and described the emergence of society, culture, law, language,
and markets as spontaneous orders. Austrian economists, libertarians and others have built up a
significant body of literature that demonstrates both theoretically and historically that legislative
law and state-provided goods and services are inferior to other institutions in civil society: free
10

Hamowy (2005), pp. 236-237.
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markets and free enterprises, cultural norms, customary law and polycentric legal systems, and
private organizations such as the family, churches, private schools, clubs, fraternal orders and the
like.11

11
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